Social structures, industry system, corporate identities and strategic choices : a theory of strategy and an application to the Taiwanese microcomputer industry by Hung, Shih-Chang
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/34653
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
SOCIAL STRUCTURES, INDUSTRY SYSTEM, 
CORPORATE IDENTITIES 
AND STRATEGIC CHOICES 
A Theory of Strategy and an Application to 
the Taiwanese Microcomputer Industry 
By 
Hung, Shih-Chang 
B. B. A., M. B. A. 
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements 
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Warwick Business School 
University of Warwick 
MARCH, 1995 
i 
Contents 
List of Figures iv 
List of Tables iv 
Acknowledgement vi 
Abstract vii 
Abbreviation viii 
Chapter I WHY SOCIOLOGY IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT? 
1.1 Introduction 1 
1.2 
. 
The Firm in Society - Problem Analysis 3 
1.2.1 Economic Approaches to Strategy 3 
1.2.2 Sociological Rationales of Strategy 7 
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis 13 
Chapter 2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIOLOGICAL 
STRATEGY RESEARCH 
2.1 Introduction 17 
2.2 Approaches to Strategy Theory 18 
2.3 Paradigms of Organisation Analysis 19 
2.4 From Structuration to Sociological Strategy Theorising 23 
2.4.1 From Duality of Structure to Sociological Strategy 23 
2.4.2 Rethinking Rules and Resources 26 
2.5 Adding Corporatism to the Taiwanese Context 28 
2.6 Conclusion 32 
Chapter 3 THE FIRM IN SOCIETY: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 33 
3.2 The Need for a Classification Scheme 34 
3.3. Social Structures Analysis 35 
3.3.1 The State and Policy Style 38 
3.3.2 Business Recipe 41 
3.3.3 Technology Paradigm 43 
3.4 From Social Structures to Industry System 46 
3.4.1 Structures Patterning 46 
3.4.2 The Formation of An Industry System 47 
3.5 Corporate Identities 49 
3.6 The Conceptual Framework 51 
ii 
3.7 Conclusion 54 
Chapter 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 56 
4.2 Basic Methodology - Structurationist Comparative Case Studies 57 
4.2.1 Structurationism as a Methodology 57 
4.2.2 Comparative Case Studies 61 
4.3 The Case firms: Microcomputers 63 
4.4 Data Gathering 68 
4.4.1 Multiple Source of Data Collection Design 68 
4.4.2 Document Data Source and Availability 69 
4.4.3 Personal Interviews Issues 69 
4.5 Conclusion 72 
Chapter 5 SOCIAL STRUCTURES 
5.1 Introduction 74 
5.2 Taiwanese Policy Style 78 
5.2.1 The Role of the State and State-Business Relations 78 
5.2.2 Policy Style Rules 82 
5.2.3 Policy Style Resources 87 
5.2.4 Identification with the Style 94 
5.3 Taiwanese Business Recipe 96 
5.3.1 The Nature of Firms, Market Organisations and Internal Co- 
Ordination Structures 97 
5.3.2 Business Recipe Rules 102 
5.3.3 Business Recipe Resources 106 
5.3.4 Identification with the Recipe 110 
5.4 PC Technology Paradigm III 
5.4.1 The Development of Dominant PC firms and Exchange 
Relationships 113 
5.4.2 Technology Paradigm Rules 116 
5.4.3 Technology Paradigm Resources 123 
5.4.4 Identification with the Paradigm 126 
5.5. Conclusion 128 
Chapter 6 INDUSTRY SYSTEM 
6.1 Introduction 130 
6.2 The Taiwanese PC Industry 131 
iii 
6.3 The Analysis of Industry System 138 
6.3.1 The Patterning of Social Structures 138 
6.3.2 Connecting Macro/Meso and Micro Processes 142 
6.4 Business Organisations 145 
6.5 Conclusion 148 
Chapter 7 CORPORATE IDENTITIES 
7.1 Introduction 149 
7.2 Case 1: Acer 152 
7.3 Case 2: Mitac 155 
7.4 Case 3: FIC 158 
7.5 Case 4: ASI 160 
7.6 Case 5: Clevo 162 
7.7 Case 6: Twinhead 163 
7.8 Case 7: Compal 165 
7.9 Case 8: AUVA 167 
7.10Case 9: Elitegroup 169 
7.11 The Comparison of Corporate Identities 172 
7.12 Conclusion 177 
Chapter 8 STRATEGIC CHOICES 
8.1 Introduction 179 
8.2 OEM vs. Own-brand 180 
8.3 Purchasing Behaviour 185 
8.4 Innovation 188 
8.4.1 Choice of Inter-firm R&D Cooperation 188 
8.4.2 I. P. R. Protection: the Free Rider or Leader 191 
8.5 Internationalisation 196 
8.5.1 Choice of Importing Foreign Labour 197 
8.5.2 Choice of Investment in South-eastem Countries and China 198 
8.5.3 Production Activities in Europe and the US 201 
8.6 Diversification, Integration and Acquisition 204 
8.7 Conclusion 210 
Chapter 9 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Introduction 214 
9.2 Managerial Consequences 215 
9.3 The Consequences for Strategic Industry Policy 217 
iv 
9.4 Conclusion About Firms and Society 220 
9.4.1 Generalisability 220 
9.4.2 Concluding Summary 221 
Appendices 
1. Introductory letters of reference and project description to Case Firms and 
Interviewees 225 
2. Field Interviews and Personal Contacts to Case Firms and Industry 227 
3. Secondary Data Sources in the Field 231 
4. Case PC Companies' Performance: Turnover, Profit on Margins and ROE 233 
5. Statutory Bodies - ITRI and 111 234 
6. National-Champion Branding 240 
7. Operationalisation of the Key Conceptual Categories of Analysis 241 
Bibliographies 
I. General 243 
II. The Taiwanese PC Industry 273 
List of Figures 
1.1 Organisation of the Thesis 14 
3.1 The Conceptual Framework: A Tripartite Structural Theory of Strategy 53 
6.1 PC Export Value by Product Type - Own-Brand, OEM and DFI 135 
List of Tables 
2.1 Structure and Agency in the Structuration Theory of Anthony Giddens 25 
5.1 Social Structures 75 
5.2 Taiwanese Policy Style, Taiwanese Business Recipe and PC Technology 
Paradigm 77 
6.1 The Growth Index of the Taiwanese Information Industry 133 
6.2 Achievement of Information Products in Taiwan 136 
6.3 The General Character of the Taiwanese PC industry 137 
V 
7.1 The Case PC Companies 150 
7.2 Corporate Identities: Firm's Structural Links with Social Structures 151 
8.1 Choice of OEM or Own-brand with respect to Corporate Identities 181 
8.2 Choice of Purchasing: Diversification of Sources vs. Supplier Loyalty 186 
8.3 Choice of Notebook Strategic Alliance 189 
8.4 Firm's Tendency Towards I. P. R. Violations 191 
8.5 Choice of Importing Foreign Labour 197 
8.6 Choice of Investment in South-eastern Countries and China 198 
8.7 Production Activities in Europe and the US 201 
8.8 Choice of Diversification 204 
10.1 Formal Research Interviews 229 
10.2 R&D Expenditure by Types of Organisation, 1981-1991 235 
vi 
Acknowledgement 
A lot of people have helped me to make this thesis possible. My MBA adviser 
Dr. Chih-Wen Huang who encouraged me to go abroad to study for a doctoral 
degree. The 50 or so managers, government officials, academics, consultants and 
journalists were so generous with their time and knowledge during my field research. 
My English tutor David Hardy and colleagues Bryan Mase, Graham Sadler, Roger 
Courtenay and Mark Albrighton read the earlier drafts and helped correct the English. 
In particular, I am greatly indebted to David, who has regularly acted as a consultant 
during the course of my writing. I should mention especially Ching-Fen Chung who 
helped me collect a lot of secondary data and has been involved in this all-consuming 
PhD work. Throughout this undertaking, she provided very important moral support 
that enabled me to get it done in time. 
In addition, I must sincerely thank Dr. Richard Whittington, who supervised 
the thesis. Over the last three and half years, his supervision in modest manner, 
academic confidence and intellectual inspiration shaped more precisely the theory of 
ideas and gave me authoritative encouragement. His contribution to the thesis is 
resourceful and substantial. Lastly - and perhaps most of all -I want to express my 
deep gratitude to my parents. I have received limitless support from them on my 
seemingly never-ending studying journey. In a society where the ethics of education 
prevail, I hope this thesis will enhance their social life. The thesis is dedicated to them. 
Shih-Chang Hung 
University of Warwick 
March 1995 
vii 
Abstract 
The thesis develops a sociological theory of strategy that is then applied 
empirically to nine firms within the Taiwanese PC industry. It aims to show why and 
how firms within the same industry and country pursue different strategies. 
This thesis begins by arguing the relative failure of economics to explain 
strategic difference because of the socially-embedded nature of economic action. This 
kind of argument calls for the use of sociology to analyse firm behaviour in order to 
help reconcile society with agency. Because society embodies a wide range of social 
structure, firms are able to draw upon a plurality of structural rules and resources in 
order to gain their strategic agency. Informed by this pluralistic account of economic 
action, the thesis goes on to suggest three sets of structural sources, namely, policy 
style, business recipe and technology paradigm. The patterning of the three structures 
constitutes an industry system which highlights the significance of social conflicts in 
structuring firm behaviour. In order to negotiate the conflicts, firms have to choose to 
conform to certain social structures. Here, choice is possible, because in the industry 
system there is more than one social structure providing social rules and resources for 
guiding and empowering firm behaviour. 
While recognising the possibility of choice, the thesis continues to argue that 
this agentive potential of doing otherwise is different for each company. The 
difference is a product of corporate identities which establish firnis' structural links 
with their attendant industry system and so provide them with both access to specific 
social resources essential to strategic choice, and certain particular rules about how to 
exercise their choices. Consequently, the concept of corporate identities provides an 
institutional linkage between structure and agency and it is through this linkage that 
we examine why firms make different strategic choices. 
viii 
Abbreviation 
ASI Aquarius Systems Inc. 
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CHAPTER ONE: WHY SOCIOLOGY IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT? 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Clevo and Twinhead are two rival Taiwanese notebook PC manufacturers. 
Both companies are industry leaders in innovation; both are dependent on the overseas 
market; both were set up in the early 1980s; both are still owned and run by the 
entrepreneurs who built them; and top managements at both companies are highly 
dominated by engineering professionals. Though superficially so similar, these two 
companies pursue different strategies: for example, in the area of product strategy, 
Clevo is totally concentrated on OEM contracts, and Twinhead is more involved in 
own-brand marketing; in the area of diversification, Clevo focuses on the notebook PC 
segment, while Twinhead has diversified into the workstation market; in terms of 
intemationalisation, Clevo has expanded its operations in Malaysia, but Twinhead 
simply operates its factories in Taiwan. Despite these divergences in strategies, both 
companies have expanded successfully during-the past decade-. -ý) 
This contrast between the strategies of Clevo and Twinhead takes us to the 
central issue of this thesis: why do firms pursue different strategies, and how are 
they able to sustain them? Certainly, this is a difficult problem for both traditional 
economics and for recent sociological accounts of organisations, e. g. institutionalism 
(Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) and the business systems approach (Whitley, 1992a, b). 
According to neo-classical microeconomic theory, the notions of perfect competition 
and market equilibrium set the standards for industrial organisation (Nelson, 1991: 64- 
5; Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1992: 40,378,735-6). These two notions together 
indicate that all firins within the same industry are forced ultimately to be 
homogeneous and that they earn zero economic profits. The only differences the 
theory admits are assumed to reflect differences in the markets on which firms depend 
(Carroll, G. R., 1993: 240; Nelson, 1991: 61). But the market opportunities that Clevo 
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and Twinhead faced were initially very similar. Market equilibrium and perfect 
competition do not explain the divergent strategies these two companies have pursued 
over the last ten years or more. 
On the other hand, many organisational theorists have recently attempted to 
explain the nature of the ma or organisational patterns current throughout advanced 
industrial societies, particularly those in the Far East (e. g. Hamilton et al, 1990; OffU' et 
al, 1991; Whitley, 1992a). Major themes include the institutional school of 
organisational analysis (e. g. Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Zucker, 1988) and the 
business systems approach (Whitley, 1992a, b). Both these underline the cultural 
embeddedness of organisations, arguing that appreciation of social institutions is 
critical to explaining firm behaviour. The tendency of both, however, is to insist on 
institutional pressures towards organisational isomorphism, each country's institutional 
set defining common characteristic forms of organisation (Whitley, 1992a: 8-9). But 
again insistence on isomorphism. within particular national "business systems" does not 
help explain the strategies of Twinhead and Clevo. Both are strongly Taiwanese, yet 
still they diverge. 
Arguing against both economic equilibrium and organisational isomorphism, 
this thesis emphasises that firms' differences are important, and they will respond 
differently to their immediate economic and social environments. As we shall see later, 
differences in the social identities of economic agents affect economic outcomes. Since 
economic outcomes are the result of firms' actions, how firms make decisions is 
economically significant and a matter of firms' uniqueness. In this thesis, I develop a 
framework for comparing such uniqueness across firms on the basis of an analysis of 
the Taiwanese PC industry. In analysing the histories of nine Taiwanese PC firms, I 
shall argue that fin-ris' unique identities make a difference to their strategic choices. 
First, however, in this opening chapter I shall demonstrate why the relationship 
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between firms and society is important, and accordingly provide an overall 
appreciation of a sociological approach to strategy. 
1.2 THE FIRM IN SOCIETY - PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
In order for a finifs strategy to exist, the concept of the firra must be 
meaningful (MacCrimmon, 1993). The study of the firm has been the long time 
concern of the economics profession (Kay, 1991). The interest in it dates back to the 
neo-classical theory of the firm (Hodgson, 1988: 196). The firm appears to be a 
problem for neo-classical econon-dcs because of the implied failure of the price 
mechanism (Coase, 1937). Coase (1937: 388-9) argues that the key feature of the firm 
is its "internal supersession of the price mechanism" and the allocation of resources by 
command rather than price. Within economics, Coase was generally credited with 
recognising the importance of the firm. But why are activities internalised within firms, 
when they could be organised through market transactions? The integrative analysis of 
firms' internal activities and market transactions in this sense has been neglected in 
Coase's argument (Hodgson, 1988: 199-201). The economists who followed Coase 
then have taken a rather different approach to the benefits of integration and their 
contributions to strategy are highly influential (Rumelt et al, 199 1). 
1.2.1 Economic Approaches to Strategy 
As Rumelt et al (199 1) and Kay (199 1) observe, economics represents a major 
stream of strategic management thinking. Within strategic management, there have, of 
course, been different schools of economics. But the most important contributor to the 
development of strategic management is probably oligopoly theory, with its interest in 
explaining a rational approach to strategy from a classical viewpoint (Clutterbuck and 
Crainer, 1990: 167-70; Kay, 1991: 60). Two themes from this field are currently 
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influential: industrial organisation and game theory. Industrial organisation (1.0. ) 
developed from Bain's (1968) concern with how structure (concentration/mobility 
barriers) determined conduct and in turn determined performance (S-C-P). This model 
has been developed by Porter (1980,1985) into a more general model of competitive 
strategy to assess the profit potential of industries. And, it has been brought closer to 
the firm level in a strategic groups approach (McGee and Thomas, 1986) or case study 
(Harrigan, 1980). 
Game theory has also been influential in strategy ever since the first time it was 
applied to business (Von Morgemstern and Neuman, 1944). Game theory has been 
picked up by Porter (1985) with his discussion of good and bad competitors, and in 
textbooks such as Oster (1990) and Dixit and Nabeluff (199 1). Camerer (199 1) claims, 
despite problems of both over-simplification and over-complexity, game theory has a 
great potential in strategy research. 
The main assumption of the theory of the oligopolistic firm - both 1.0. and 
game theory - is a rational process, designed to maximise long-term advantage. The 
notion of market equilibrium sets the standard for this theory and provides the 
foundation for the premise that firms pursue monopolistic market power in order to 
maximise their profits. Despite its widespread influence on strategic management 
thinking, many of its premises have come under dispute recently. For example, it is 
alleged that the general equilibrium analysis of both 1.0. and game theory sheds little 
light on decision-making processes in a real world firm (Jacobson, 1992: 783; Kay, 
1991: 58-9; Nelson, 1991: 64). The tendency to ignore a firm's decision-making in part 
reflects that the theory is not interested in behaviour at the level of firms, but rather in 
broader aggregates - industry or competing groups of firms (Kay, 1991: 58; Nelson, 
1991: 62). In addition, this theory offers an under-socialised view of firms because of 
an inadequate theory of static, non-competitive view of business environments (cf. 
Jacobson, 1992). Its conceptions are under-socialised in that they do not allow for the 
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extent to which pre-existing social structures are essential to the constitutions of 
human action (Wrong, 1961: 188). Thus, the theory of the oligopolistic firm fails to 
explain heterogeneous firms whose agentive potential derives from the complex 
structures of society (Whittington, 1989: 87-91). As I shall argue in the following 
chapters, this failure is rooted in a neglect of agency which concerns episodes in which 
human actors could have acted differently (Giddens, 1984: 9). 
Another stream of strategic thinking, transaction cost economics, can be added 
to the above economic approaches treating the firrn as a rational economic actor. 
Perhaps no one has done more to develop this area than Oliver Williamson (1985, 
1988) who proposes an evolutionary or Darwinian approach to strategy. In general, 
this stream of strategy emphasises unbeatable market forces that allow only efficient 
competitors to survive (Whittington, 1993: 17-22). For Williamson (1991: 74), 
"economy is the best strategy" because any differentiation in "strategizing" is 
redundant in a system in which the environment is too efficient to tolerate the different. 
Although not neo-classical, the evolutionary approach is likewise indifferent to 
individual firms and, as a result, downplays the role of agency in organisational 
adaptation to business environments. Overall, as we have seen, both the theories of the 
oligopolistic firm and transaction cost economics fail quite to establish an adequate 
account of firms and strategic differences. 
Up until recently, national sources of difference have been particularly 
neglected. Increasingly, however, economic theorists recognise that previous universal 
generalisations have been inadequate and that national specificities matter to business 
competition. For example, picking up again his discussion of competitive advantage, 
Porter (1990) extends the organisational power base from industry structure to home 
nation boundary. Kay (1993), too, argues that good strategy depends on the skilful 
manipulation of national architecture. Both of them urge us to emphasise the national 
differences that must be handled if success is to be sustained. Drawing wide 
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disciplinary support, they view the organisation as dependent upon resources from its 
immediate environment in order to survive. Strategy based on national resources has 
intuitive appeal, and national differences on resources have certainly played a key role 
in determining patterns of competitiveness in many industries. Yet these economic 
strategists have focused just on resource differences, not national differences in norms 
and utility functions. Within the economistic notion of markets' natural processes, these 
strategists see only the rule of efficiency or profit-maximisation governing action, and 
thus neglect the alternative rules available. Indeed, each of these rules is associated 
with different outcomes yet each is compatible with the pursuit of resource. As I shall 
argue in the following chapters, plural social structures possess a variety of social rules 
and resources by which firms may act. 
On the other hand, while emphasising uniqueness, the new resource-based 
theory of the firm directs attention inside the firin (Grant, 199 1; Mahoney and Pandian, 
1992; Penrose, 1980; Wernerfelt, 1984). It stresses the influence of unused 
organisational resources, especially the skills, capability and intangible assets of fmn 
managements, which are unique to each firm. In a general sense, the resource-based 
approach is a theory of factor monopolies, at one level down from market monopolies 
of 1.0. theory. Unlike 1.0. theory, however, the resource approach emphasises a great 
deal the significance of firm differences. But recognition of firrn differences on 
resource availability still fails to reconcile social structural complexity with agency. Not 
only does this theory not recognise distinctive social rules, but also it does not explain 
where resources come from. As I shall argue in the following chapters, social 
structures provide firms with both rules and resources that together are essential for 
the possibility of agency. 
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1.2.2 Sociological Rationales of Strategy 
Seeking a repudiation of economic approaches to strategic difference, this 
thesis argues that firms may be agents who could respond differently to their 
environments. Viewing firms as agents, they may have control: internally they enjoy 
the capacity for constructing strategic objectives for themselves; externally they hold 
the power to mobilise social rules and resources in order to achieve these objectives. 
Towards the end of this thesis, I define firms as semi-autonomous social actors who 
manage plural sets of rules and resources in a variety of ways, thus reaching various 
economic and social outcomes (cf. Granovetter, 1985,1992; Morgan, 1990; Reed, 
1989; Whitley, 1987; Whittington, 1989). This approach calls for the use of sociology 
to analyse firm, behaviour, in a form that goes "beyond traditional business elite and 
intercorporate network studies to account for variations and changes in the actions of 
firms as economic agents, and their consequences" (Whitley, 1987: 142). 
Against the economic approach ignoring complexity in the business 
environment, the central argument of a sociological approach to strategy is to 
recognise that the "embeddedness" of economic action is an on-going network of 
social relations, not some abstract set of market forces (Granovetter, 1985,1992). 
These networks, involving perhaps the state, families, professions, religion and 
ethnicity (Whittington, 1992: 705), influence both the ends and means of strategy, 
defining what is appropriate and reasonable behaviour and furnishing particular 
resources. Furthermore, in considering the significance of firms as economic agents, 
their activities are coordinated with those of other social groups (Waarden, 1992: 33). 
Thus competing firms are not immune to the external influences of their immediate 
social context. This kind of argument highlights the importance of social institutions in 
structuring firms'behaviour (cf. Whitley, 1987; 1992a: 2-9). 
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This stress on firm-society relations has so far led institutionalist sociologists to 
insist on isomorphism, determinism and conformity to the norms of dominant social 
institutions (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Zucker, 1988; Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990), 
particularly professional bodies and the state (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 
1987). This approach depicts organisations as impelled by normative pressures 
deriving from the environment. For example, organisations are viewed as following the 
dominant pattern valued by the industry at large (cf. Dyson, 1983; Romme, 1990; 
Spender, 1989; Whipp and Clark, 1986). Much of this argument can be traced to 
Parson's (1960) functionalism in which Parson asserts that social legitimacy is an 
equally compelling consideration to the primary objective of an organisation's function. 
In Parson's notion, organisations are legitimate to the extent that their goals, purposes, 
and methods mesh with those of society: "an organisation ... 
is a part of wider social 
system which is the source of the 'meaning, legitimation, or higher-level support which 
makes the implementation of the organisation's goals possible" (1960: 63-4). In other 
words, the emergence of particular strategy tends to reflect the demands and 
expectations of the institutional environment that offers legitimacy. Thus Brunsson 
(1990) has declared, legitimacy is an equally important output of an organisation as its 
product (cf. Habermas, 1973; Champagne, 1992: 120; Scott, 1991: 169-72; Singh et 
al, 1986). 
What is legitimate clearly depends on the immediate social context (Oliver, 
1991: 149) - hence a concern with dominant professional groups or national 
differences. Three examples can illustrate this concern. First, the split between 
ownership and control in advanced societies makes a difference, with Gedajlovic 
(1993: 733) suggesting that managers may pursue growth (Marris, 1964; Nichols, 
1969), perquisites (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), personal power (Simon, 1945) and 
risk reduction (Amihud and Lev, 1981) instead of maximising shareholder profit. 
Therefore, within an organisation, the interests of dominant groups are important in 
explaining firm behaviour. Secondly, it is alleged that the dominance of the accounting 
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profession in Anglo-Saxon societies has left businesses typically over-reliant on 
financial techniques in their strategic planning and multi-divisional structures in their 
strategic controls (Armstrong, 1987; Espeland and Hirsch, 1990; Fligstein, 1990). 
Accordingly, within a society, the dominant professional body likewise plays a key role 
in structuring firm behaviour. 
Thirdly, and more broadly, studies of the Far East have revealed very 
considerable differences in the typical strategies and organisational structures of fu-ms 
in different countries - from the Keiretsu of Japan, the Chaebol of Korea to the family 
businesses of Hong Kong and Taiwan (Clegg and Redding, 1990; Hamilton and 
Biggart, 1989; Whitley, 1992a). Particularly important in the Far East have been 
entrepreneurial states in governing strategy (Amsden, 1989; Johnson, 1982; Wade, 
1990). Here in Taiwan's case, the combination of an exclusionary Kuomintang state 
with the peculiar culture of Chinese family business has created a mercantile economy 
of small and medium-sized firms, loosely linked by familial networks (Whitley, 1992a; 
Wade, 1990; Wong, 1985). This broad emphasis on the particular social context has 
led to significant insights regarding the importance of institutional environments that 
allow for the explanation of certain organisational structures and processes in market 
economies, such as those in Taiwanese society. Overall, the institutionalists' concern 
for legitimacy has so far led them to emphasise the significance of institutional norms 
or social rules - such as strong state and family business - in helping explain firm 
behaviour. 
Partly informed by the institutional school of organisational analysis, Whitley 
(1992a, b, e) suggests that the socially constructed nature of national business systems 
or recipes has important implications for the analysis of business organisations. These 
recipes embody particular arrangements of hierarchy-market relations that become 
established in different contexts; "they reflect successful patterns of business behaviour 
and understandings of how to manage economic activities that are reproduced and 
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reinforced by crucial institutions" (Whitley, 1992a: 7-8). This macro-level framework, 
assurning generalised recipes throughout the country, can be seen as a combination of 
various logics (cf. Spender, 1989). In this way, however, Whitley's business systems 
approach "plays down all the sources of diversity within a country other than the 
general national institutions" (Rds5nen and Whipp, 1992: 52). This point suggests that 
the study of business systems should focus more on a sector perspective which goes 
beyond the positions of cultural relativism (Rdsdnen and Whipp, 1992). 
For example, Spender (1989) introduces the notion of industry recipes into 
accounts of firms by stressing how the knowledge-base of an industry is interrelated so 
as to constitute specific rationalities of management. He asserts that "competitive 
advantage generally lies in this knowledge-base rather than in a tangible resource, no 
matter how idiosyncratic" (Spender, 1989: 1-2; cf. Grant, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Dosi (1982,1984) proposes the notion of technology paradigm that defines the 
dominant pattern of organisational activities set by the most successful fin-ns, in their 
particular areas (cf. Jones and Womack, 1986; Nelson and Winter, 1977,1982; Sahal, 
1985; Whipp and Clark, 1986). In order to demonstrate their modernity, firms have a 
tendency to follow the paradigm. Apart from the influence of industrial technology 
paradigm, firms are also likely to conform to state policy in order to seek state 
subsidies and contracts. Thus, alleging that the allocation of state resources may be 
restricted to a limited number of privileged actors, political corporatists emphasise the 
importance of policy style or networks in structuring firm behaviour (Richardson et al, 
1982; Kenis, 1992; Schubert and Jordan, 1992; also see Cawson, 1986; Williamson, 
1989). Consequently, a key task in strategy is to understand how different kinds of 
business rationalities develop and become established in different societies. As we shall 
see in Chapter 3,1 suggest that policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm 
are central to the variety of social structures which firms have to deal with and 
manage. 
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In particular, variations in the nature of overlapping structures may result in 
systemic tensions or conflicts and so affect the relationships between firm and society. 
In other words, a society may exhibit a variety of established business rationalities that 
may conflict with one another. The role of the nation state in structuring furn 
behaviour, for example, may conflict with some features of the business recipe, as the 
development of political institutions is continual and dynamic, and so is the interaction 
between the state and well-established patterns of business recipe. Equally, the role of 
the dominant technology paradigm may conflict with some features of the local recipe, 
as the paradigm is oriented towards an international context. In this view, the diversity 
of social structures is likely to lead to the rise of systemic conflicts that impinge upon 
the activities of economic actors who operate within the same industry. This in turn 
raises the general question of what firms do in order to negotiate the conflicts. As I 
shall argue in this thesis, how to negotiate the conflicts depends on the identities of 
firms whose power bases derive from their attendant social context, including policy 
style, business recipe and technology paradigm. 
Another important point concerning structural diversity is that firms within the 
same industry and country have access to a variety of social resources that make 
strategic choice possible and sustainable (Whittington, 1989,1992). The acquisition of 
these social resources is the result of firms' conformity to social rules. Thus Goodstein 
(1994) and Oliver (1991) have recently declared, firms do not blindly conform to 
institutional forces, and this conformity is not necessarily a wholly deterministic 
position. Carroll et al (1990) observe that firms in strong institutional environments, 
such as Hungary, can also behave proactively in order to overcome institutional 
obstacles and that this behaviour can create a social structure of its own. 
Consequently, a "strategizing" effort (Williamson, 1991) can be effective, because 
institutional environments are not an "iron cage" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), but are 
produced and reproduced through human action (Giddens, 1984). It follows that 
economic agents "may be expected to exercise 'strategic choice' (Child, 1972) in 
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relating to their institutional environments and responding to institutional pressures" 
(Scott, 1991: 170). 
This claim for strategic choice affords firms the opportunity of "doing 
otherwise". Accordingly, as well as permitting genuine choice, a sociological approach 
to strategy allows the possibility of strategic difference. This emphasis on difference 
accounts for strategy with reference to social relationships that are inherently unique to 
each firm (cf. Hellgren and Melin, 1993). Certainly, the firm's uniqueness is an essential 
aspect of strategic analysis. This uniqueness contributes to the foundations of 
corporate identities. The identities, while "providing an institutional link between 
structure and agency" (Cohen, 1989: 207), not only afford firm access to plural social 
resources empowering their actions, but also connect them with a plurality of s9cial 
rules that govern or constrain their actions. In other words, the identities associate 
firms with certain social forces that will cause them to make strategic choices 
differently (cf. Mattsson, 1988: 247). 
I shall base my argument for strategy upon the structurationist sociology 
developed by Anthony Giddens (Cohen, 1989; Craib, 1992; Giddens, 1979,1984). 
Over the last decade, his structuration approach has gained considerable influence 
within management studies. The distinctive quality of this structurationist perspective 
is its grounding of human action in the society while acknowledging social structure 
and without dissolving into pure individualistic voluntarism (Giddens, 1984; Knights 
and Morgan, 1991; Pettigrew, 1985; Whittington, 1992). Thus, this combination of 
action and structure offers a possible framework for analysing strategic difference or 
agency through the socially constructed nature of economic action. As I shall argue in 
chapters 2 and 3, social structures concern the ways in which social actors behave and 
develop relationships with one another. These ways constitute institutionalised patterns 
which can be broken down into social rules and resources. The structurationist account 
of strategy refers to the rule-following and resource-empowered nature of agency. 
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Following rules in their action, firms are legitimate and then have access to resources 
for competing. However, the extent to which, and ways in which, firms are effectively 
legitimate depends on the exploitation of firms' distinctive identities in their immediate 
social context. 
To conclude, this thesis contains two parts - first it proposes a theory and then 
it applies this theory empirically to the Taiwanese PC industry from which nine case 
study firms are drawn. Generally, the thesis concerns one major issue. That is, arguing 
against both economic approaches to strategy and organisational isomorphism, it wiU 
try to explain why firms within the same industry and country pursue different 
strategies. In particular, the thesis will demonstrate that firms have access to a range of 
alternative strategies, each associated with different processes and outcomes and yet 
each capable of achieving systemic legitimacy. 
1.3 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
Figure 1.1 is used to surnmarise briefly the whole content of the thesis, and, will 
be subsequently elaborated throughout the thesis. Just as this figure shows, the thesis 
deals with four conceptual categories - social structures, industry system, corporate 
identities and strategic choices. The four concepts will be integrated in a complex 
framework in order to understand the socially structured nature of strategies whigh is 
specific to every individual firm. 
In so doing, the thesis will be organised into three parts. Part one covers 
chapters 1 to 4. In this opening chapter, I have introduced the importance of a 
sociological approach to strategy while acknowledging the socially-embedded nature 
of economic action. Chapter 2 will contain a more detailed review of the literature. I 
shall argue that Giddens' structuration theory is significant in overcoming the 
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Thesis title: Social Structures, Industry System, Corporate Identities and Strategic Choices 
Questions: Why dofirms pursue different strategies? 
and how are they able to sustain them? 
Main issues for each chapter: 
Ch I Why sociology in strategic 
Why a sociological approach to strategy? 
What contributions are about to achieve? 
Ch2 Ileoretical Foundations 
CM Conceptual Framework 
Why a specifically structurationist sociology? 
Why a corporatist state theory? 
Why an a priori classification scheme? 
Developing an alternative strategy theory 
(tripartite structural theory of strategy) 
* Why structurationist comparative case studies? QCh4 
Methodology * Why Taiwanese computer industry? 
* Data gathering 
Ch5 Social Structures: * Social structures analysis 
(empirically) 
Taiwanese Policy Style Taiwanese Business Recipe PC Technology Paira * Revealing structural sources di 
I I. " available for firms' action 
Ch6 Industry System * The social formation of an industry system j* The rise of systemic conflicts 
* The introduction of nine case PC firms 
Ch7 Corporate Identities *The analysis of firms' social identi es 
(Firms' links to social structures) 
CH Strategic Choices * The comparison of firms'strategic choices * The reasoning behind firms' strategic divergences+-j 
Ch9 Implications and Conclusions 
Implications for corporate strategy and industrial policy 
Conclusions for firm-society relations 
Figure 1.1 Organisation of the thesis 
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limitations upon theorising organisation, by virtue of transcending dualistic foundations 
of subjectivist and objectivist paradigms. This investigation of structuration theory 
provides an apt introduction to the recent accounts of strategy theory of organisational 
sociology and corporatist theory of political sociology. I shall argue that these 
accounts should be integrated in a framework for researching the relationship between 
Taiwanese PC firms and their attendant social context. Chapter 3 will, therefore, 
develop an alternative structurationist approach to strategic management, one which 
grounds the potential agency of firms on the complexity of the society in which they 
operate. In particular, a tripartite scheme of social structures - policy style, business 
recipe and technology paradigm - will be elaborated providing a variety of social rules 
and resources by which fkms can choose to act. Lastly in this part, Chapter 4 win 
examine the basic methodology and describe the method of approaching the empirical 
material in detail. 
Part two contains the main body of the thesis, which consists of the data and 
the empirical analyses. Chapters S will examine the three social structures - Taiwanese 
policy style, Taiwanese business recipe and PC technology paradigm - particularly 
relevant to the evolving Taiwanese PC industry of 1980-1993. Chapter 6 will examine 
the patterning of the three structures which constitutes the system of the Taiwanese PC 
industry within which my case firms cooperate and compete. Chapter 7 will go on to 
introduce the social identities of nine PC companies that will make up my PC case 
studies. Chapters 8 will proceed in a thematic way - around various strategic 
discrin-dnators - both to examine how the social identities of the nine case study firms 
all made a difference to their strategic choices and elucidate the identities or forces 
behind them. In particular, I shall explain, for most of these companies, how their 
various strategic choices relate to my three structural "axes", and how the relevant 
corporate identities of my case studies help explain these choices. 
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Finally, part three contains the synthesis and conclusion. Chapter 9 will begin 
by considering the case studies' implications for the practice of strategic management 
and for government industrial policy. Last of all, I shall discuss the generality of my 
tripartite structural theory of strategy, and examine this theory's implication for our 
understanding of how firms operate in our societies in general. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
SOCIOLOGICAL STRATEGY RESEARCH 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter, I introduced the importance of a sociological approach to 
strategic management. In this chapter, I shall examine more explicitly the theoretical 
foundations of sociological strategy analysis that inform our thinking for developing a 
framework to study Taiwanese firm. strategy. Much of the work in this chapter 
originates from reflection on "the philosophy of social science". The philosophy of 
social science concerns itself with two issues: the nature of the world and the nature of 
the explanation. The former can be classified under the headings of ontological 
questions, whilst the latter pertains to epistemological questions. The dualism of 
ontology and epistemology connects us to the realisation of the real world in a 
straightforward manner: different forms of existence require different theories of 
knowledgefor explanation. 
Accordingly, I begin assembling the particular theories that I found important 
for researching the relationship between Taiwanese PC firms and their immediate 
social context. In the next section, I will begin by arguing my approach to the 
construction of a strategy theory. Once my approach to theory is decided, I will move 
on to review the paradigmatic diversity of organisation research, focusing in particular 
on the various ways in which the organisation has been conceptualised as the basis for 
organisational analyses. While arguing that traditional organisational analyses insist too 
much either on the subjectivity of human action or on the objectivity of social 
structure, I shall note that the structurationist sociology of Anthony Giddens has 
developed a radically different approach in which dualistic formulations of the 
relationship between action and structure are superseded. Furthermore, in seeking to 
develop a theory designed to explain Taiwanese PC firms' strategies, I shall argue that 
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structurationist sociology alone is unlikely to link together the substantive components 
of a firm-in-society model, therefore calling for the use of political corporatist theory in 
the research. On the whole, my purpose in this chapter is to explore theories critical to 
the evolving Taiwanese context since 1980 when the Taiwanese PC industry has 
emerged. This sets the scene for Chapter 3 in which I develop a tripartite structural 
theory of strategy for researching strategic differences across my case study firms. 
2.2 APPROACHES TO STRATEGY THEORY 
One of the important missions of organisational scholars' work is to conduct 
research that contributes to theoretical progress on the one hand, and to apply that 
theoretical achievement to the practice of management as a profession on the other 
(Montgomery, et al, 1989: 191). To do this well, we need to elaborate our research in 
order to provide an intimate understanding of the practical problems concerning with 
modem capitalist enterprises. Also, we need to strengthen our skills to advance 
academic knowledge that is relevant to both the discipline and the profession. The 
construction and mastery of a strategy theory is therefore itself a hermeneutic task, a 
form of practical activity that must take its place alongside other forms of activity. But 
at the same time it also has to be related to its own backgrounds and frameworks 
which are already established and employed in the social world (Trigg, 1985: 195-6). 
Having said this, I suggest that an innovative variant of strategy theory is best 
promoted under conditions of accommodation and communication through existing 
social theories (cf. Popper, 1959; Poole and Van De Ven, 1989). 
This suggestion is consistent with Merton's (1968) emphasis on a functionalist 
paradigm of inquiry. Following Merton, conventional philosophies of science argue 
that advances in science are facilitated by researchers building and refining each other's 
work over a period of time (cf. Montgomery et al, 1989; Wieviorka, 1992: 169; 
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Weick, 1989). Viewing science as such an evolutionary and cumulative process 
engenders norms of co-operation among researchers. Theories with their emphasis on 
gradual development through periodic consolidation, are highly consistent with the 
paradigm in which "the constructs are related to each other" (Bacharach, 1989: 498). 
The identification of this evolutionary nature of scientific knowledge calls for 
the use of middle-range analysis in organisation theory (e. g. Ginsberg and 
Venkatraman, 1985; Jemison, 1981; Pinder and Moore, 1980; Weick, 1989). 
Originating from Merton's (1968) study, the use of middle-range theorising is to 
reduce the scope or coverage of a set of interrelated propositions (a theory) to a level 
that can be empirically evaluated. In particular, the basic idea is to narrow the 
theoretical domain of the propositions to a point where they can be supported on 
empirical grounds (Pinder and Moore, 1980). Weick (1989: 516) calls this a building 
process portrayed "as imagination disciplined by evolutionary processes analogous to 
artificial selection". Bearing this process in mind, my approach to the construction of 
an alternative middle-range theory of strategy is logical, cumulative to the existing 
organisational theories of knowledge and also specific to my empirical research. What 
is logical, cumulative and specific then depends clearly on the exploration of paradigms 
in organisation/strategy analysis followed by the task of choosing theories required to 
make sense of my case studies. With this reasoning, first of all I will move into a 
paradigmatic exploration for organisational analyses in the next section. 
2.3 PARADIGMS OF ORGANISATION ANALYSIS 
Strategy research constitutes one sub-discipline of organisation analysis. In 
noting this, the construction of strategy theory should be inherently determined by its 
relation to a paradigmatic understanding of organisational analysis. In recent years the 
development of organisation theory has been full of reflection on its paradigmatic 
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status and many rival modes of analysis (e. g. Aldrich, 1988; Ansoff, 1987; Ashmos and 
Huber, 1987; Donaldson, 1985,1988; Gioia and Pitre, 1990; Hassard and Pym, 1990; 
Reed and Hughes, 1992). We have seen numerous works analysing the study of 
organisation by reference to alternatives to the traditional orthodox paradigms. This 
identification of paradigm debates highlights the importance of understanding the 
meta-theoretical assumptions underpinning empirical studies. These efforts can be 
traced to Thomas Kuhn's history of science. In his renowned book The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn (1970) uses the term "paradigm" to indicate a dominant 
single conceptualisation that incorporates theory, method and standards in a research 
area. 
Since Kuhn's work, much research has been done on the development of a 
paradigmatic understanding of organisation in advanced societies. Perhaps the most 
important one was developed by Burrell and Morgan (1979). In their book, Burrell and 
Morgan argue that social theory can usefully be conceived of in terms of four broad 
paradigms, differentiated by their espousal of contrasting philosophies of science and 
theories of society. As Willmott (1990: 49) observes, its appearance has heightened 
awareness of the theoretical foundations of organisation research; it has also identified 
"the existence of vast expanses of intellectual terrain" that have been ignored by 
organisation research. 
In Burrell and Morgan's (1979) scheme, assumptions about social science are 
arrayed in two dimensions, which may be ascribed to a subjective-objective distinction. 
Specifically, a subjective approach to social science encompasses a nominalist 
ontology, anti-positivist epistemology, a voluntarist approach to human nature, and 
ideographic methodology. In contrast, an objectivist approach to social science 
encompasses a realist ontology, positivist epistemology, determinist approach to 
human nature, and nomothetic methodology. Assumptions about society and derivative 
sociologies are arrayed in a second dimension. A sociology of regulation represents 
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one end of the dimension and is based on assumptions of a society in which order, 
integration, consensus, and stability are the natural state. A sociology of radical change 
represents the other end of this dimension; it rests on premises of societal conflict, 
disintegration, and coercion. Taken together, the two dimensions result in four 
paradigms. The radical humanist and radical structuralist paradigms reflect assumptions 
of a society in conflict and a subjective and objective social science, respectively. The 
functionalist and integrative paradigms reflect assumptions of an orderly society and 
subjective and objective social science. 
However, the core argument of the framework falls in an "either/or" cast, with 
points between poles all but ignored. Theories and their categorical forms are 
represented as subscribing to either a subjectivist or an objectivist view. In the field of 
organisational studies, for example, research has been split into two directions that 
emphasise either a voluntaristic or deterministic view - the former affirming, the latter 
denying strategic choice (Whittington, 1988: 521). As mentioned earlier, the 
deterministic perspective stresses the importance of the objectivist approach to human 
nature and the voluntaristic view refers more to the subjective experience of 
individuals. As Berger and Luckmann (1967: 149) argue: "Since society exists in both 
objective and subjective reality, any adequate theoretical understanding of it must 
comprehend both these aspects". The paradigms of Burrell and Morgan's scheme in 
this sense ignore the very possibility of analysis which is much more sensitive to the 
mutually reinforcing nature of action (subjectivity) and structure (objectivity) 
(Willmott, 1990). 
Rather than start with a separate definition of subjective and objective reality, a 
number of attempts to transcend dualistic foundations of subjective and objective 
paradigms can be found in the sociological literature. Basically, sociology is a sort of 
general discipline dealing with social actors' relations in modem society. It could be 
said, however, that the incorporation of sociology within management has centred on 
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the relative weight to be given to the deterministic contingency and population ecology 
(cf. Bryman, 1993). Recently however, this stress on a sociological approach to 
strategy is becoming much more elaborate and prevalent, with its challenges ranging 
from interpretive understanding (e. g. Knights and Morgan, 1990,199 1; Morgan, 1990; 
Whittington, 1993), and ideological critiques (e. g. Shrivastava, 1986) to the general 
applicability of theories (e. g. Boyacigiller and Adler, 1991; Whitley, 1992a, b). 
In particular, over the past decades, various sociological approaches to 
management have arisen from the desire to explicate ontological, epistemological and 
methodological assumptions underlying different forms of organisational. analysis. 
Here, Giddens' structuration sociology is elaborated in the following section not only 
because of its rigorous standpoint in illuminating the above arguments (cf. Cohen, 
1989: 209; Willmott, 1990), but also because of its usefulness in providing this 
research with an adequate account of human agency. Note my ultimate objective in this 
thesis is to deny isomorphism and assert strategic difference and agency. My concern 
is mainly about the relationship between firm behaviour and social structures in the 
Taiwanese PC industry. In this way, structuration theory has gained considerable 
influence within management studies, informing accounts of both strategic agency and 
social structuresl. However, as Whittington (1992: 707) has recently argued, "the 
advocates of (strategic) agency have relied on Giddens' notion of structuration", yet 
neglected his commitment to the complexity of social structures. In the next section, I 
shall therefore link this structuration sociology with the analysis of strategic agency. 
lFor example, Barley (1986); Bouchikhi (1993); DiMaggio and Powell (1983); Hamilton and 
Kao (1990); Hodgson (1988); Knights and Morgan (1991); Pettigrew (1985); Ranson et al 
(1980); Smith (1983); Whittington (1992); Willmott (1990), among others. 
23 
2.4 FROM STRUCTURATION TO SOCIOLOGICAL 
STRATEGY THEORISING 
The theory of structuration was worked out as an attempt to transcend, 
without discarding altogether, three prominent traditions of thought in social 
theory and philosophy: hermeneutics or "interpretative sociologies", 
functionalism and structuralism. Each of these traditions, in my view, 
incorporates distinctive and valuable contributions to social analysis - while 
each has tended to suffer from a number of defined limitations. 
(Giddens, 1981: 26) 
Giddens' work is remarkable, not only for its quantity, but also for the range of 
ideas it brings together. For example, in developing a grand theory to integrate the 
dualism between "subjectivity" and "objectivity", Giddens (1976,1979,1984) has 
stressed the role of agency in the reproduction of social institutions. In addition, it is 
exceptional too, in that Giddens' writings on structuration theory have been in the 
forefront of developments in social theory for the past two decades. 
2.4.1 From Duality of Structure to Sociological Strategy 
An important concept that helps us understand structuration sociology is that 
of the linkage between action and structure. Structure and action are the two main 
determinants of social outcomes that are generally recognised in sociology, but whose 
relative importance is much debated as a central issue in sociological theory. 
According to Jary and Jary (1991), in the writing of traditional social scientists, this 
problem is allegedly resolved in one way or another. Such resolutions of structure- 
action relation generally amount to the emphasis of one term at the expense of the 
other: either social structure is taken as the principal object of analysis and the agent is 
effectively eclipsed, as in "structuralism, some forms of functionalism and althusserian 
Marxism"; or the reverse is emphasised, stressing "instead the capacity of individual 
agents to construct and reconstruct their worlds and the necessity of explanations in 
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the actors' terms", as in "methodological individualism, social phenomenology and 
ethnomethodology" (Jary and Jary, 1991: 636; cL Craib, 1992: 13-32). 
In place of this argument, Giddens proposes a shift from a static to a dynamic 
perspective, namely, from the theory of structure to the theory of structuration. He 
notes that society is produced and reproduced through human action, and he rejects 
any form of structural explanation and any notion that a society might have an 
existence over and above individuals. This covers any explanation which grants a 
society emergent properties, or talks about determining human action. This in turn 
leads to a wholesale rejection of functionalist (e. g. Parsons) and evolutionary (e. g. 
Marxism) explanations. 
By making a virtue of formulating a coherent account of both human agency 
and social structure, structuration theory thus provides an elucidation of the 
constitution of society with which the social sciences at large are concerned. 
Throughout Giddens' work, this elucidation is mainly built around the concept of 
duality of structure. The duality of structure means that it is not possible to talk of 
action without at the same time referring to structure and vice versa. As Giddens 
argues, sociology usually sees structure as a constraining or determining feature of 
social life, but in fact it is also enabling (Table 2.1). Structures are "enveloped" in 
actions, which produce, reproduce and change them. He defines structures in terms of 
"rules" guiding action, and "resources" empowering action. Analogous with this 
concept of duality of structure, as far as strategy research is concerned, is that strategic 
action should be seen as channelled through the complex structures of society 
(Whittington, 1989,1992,1993: cf. Pettigrew, 1985; Whitley, 1987; Granovetter, 
1992). Largely infon-ned by Giddens' structuration theory, Whittington (1993: 28-39) 
explicitly points to the "relativistic" nature of firm behaviour, enabled and constrained 
by the social construction of structural properties. 
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Table 2.1 Structure and Agency in the Structuration Theory of Anthony Giddens 
Structuralist or 
Voluntarist Theories 
Giddens' Structurationist 
Alternative 
Characterisation of Structure or Agency Duality of Structuration; the 
Structure Interrelation of action and 
structure 
Characterisation of Agents as supports of Knowledgeability of 
Actor structure or as purely actors/conscious intentionality - 
voluntaristic but in context of structure as 
medium and outcome of agency 
and interaction 
Source: Partly adapted from Jary (1991: 120) 
This relativistic approach emphasises that firm behaviour is socially situated 
and constructed with both the ends and means of strategy channelled through a 
multiplicity of existing structural rules and resources. In more detail, structures are the 
institutionalised rules and resources fmns use in interaction and they are analysed as 
dualities: they are both the medium and the outcome of interaction. They are the 
medium because structures provide rules and resources firms must draw on to interact 
meaningfully. They are the outcome because rules and resources exist only through 
being applied in interaction. As Giddens (1979: 7 1) explains: "According to the notion 
of the duality of structure, rules and resources are drawn upon by actors in the 
production of interaction, but are thereby also reconstituted through such interaction". 
Implicit in Giddens' formulation, but more explicit in Whittington's thesis, are 
the rule-following and resource-empowered nature of agency. Thus, it would seem 
clear here that the emphasis of a sociological approach to strategy demands that we 
also conduct our analysis in terms of rules and resources with which firms have to deal 
in their immediate social context. Rules and resources are bound up with issues of 
structural sources and their deployment becomes the basis of strategic power. In terms 
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of synthesis, the resources are normally deployed by agents according to the rules 
society provides for the guidance of action. Such action Giddens refers to as "social 
practice" and it is by taking social practices as objects of study that sociology can 
overcome the traditional dualism of action and structure. 
From here, Giddens continues to indicate that these practices can be looked at 
from two sides, concentrating on one and bracketing the other: we can engage in 
"strategic conduct analysis", looking at what actors do, how they reflexively constitute 
their activity, the implicit rules they follow; or we can engage in "institutional analysis", 
the analysis of social systems. Social systems, existing in time-space boundary, are 
constituted by social practices. In more detail, the concept of social system refers to "a 
relationship in which changes in one or more component parts initiate changes in other 
component parts, and these changes, in turn produce changes in the parts in which the 
original changes occurred" (Giddens, 1979: 73). Here, the movement from talking 
about social practices and structures to social systems is important for Giddens' 
attempt to go beyond the scope of a purely voluntarist theory of action. For Giddens, 
structures are chronically reproduced rules and resources. In turn, social systems are 
defined by different clustering or patterning of structures. Thus, when applied to 
sociological strategy analysis, the structurationist sense of agency can be approached 
by recognising the patterning of social rules and resources by which firms' actions are 
governed and inspired. 
2.4.2 Rethinking Rules and Resources 
The discussion above notes that, without rules and resources there can be no 
strategies. But what are these rules and resources, explicitly? As we can see in 
Giddens' work, rules and resources are separate notions, both related to various 
aspects of power formation. But at the same time, Giddens also mentioned that we can 
not conceive of rules without reference to resources (Giddens, 1984: 18). In general, 
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social rules are thought of in connection with games, as formalised conventions or 
logics. They are understood procedures or interpretations of human actions as well as 
interactions (Giddens, 1984: 19-25; 1989: 19). The procedures or interpretations can 
be conceived of stocks of knowledge, enabling social actors to understand how to 
proceed in a meaningful way. In the case of economic action specifically, they are 
particular ways of directing and organising firms that become established as dominant 
patterns of economic rationalities in different societies. This indicates the rule- 
following component of firm behaviour. 
On the other hand, firrn behaviour is not simple rule-following: the application 
of a social rule involves competition for different access to resources and it is the 
resources that make behaviour or action possible and sustainable. As Scott (1991: 169) 
asserts, by obeying rules, firms are legitimate and then have access to resources (cf. 
Whittington, 1989,1992). In this view, the acquisition of social resources is the result 
of firms'conformity to social rules (Giddens, 1977: 134; 1979: 69). 
All rules are thus enabling, because they provide access to social resources. 
Essential to strategic choice, resources supply agents with two kinds of facilitating 
capabilities: allocative and authoritative resources (Giddens, 1984: 258-61). Firstly, 
allocative resources are capabilities that generate command over material objects (raw 
materials, means of production, produced goods). Secondly, authoritative resources 
are capabilities that generate command over persons (spatio-temporal positioning, 
organisation and relations between human beings, life-chances). Taken together, the 
resources of allocation and authorisation, as elements in a social structure, provide 
social agents with the power to reproduce and even transform the social structures that 
enable them. Consequently, the above analysis of social rules and resources reinforces 
my critiques of economic and institutional approaches to strategy, described in the 
previous chapter. It could be said, in general, that most economic strategists (e. g. 
Ansoff, 1965; Grant, 1991; Kay, 1991; 1993; McGee and Thomas, 1986; Porter, 
28 
1985,1990; Wernerfelt, 1984) focus on the side of resources, emphasising both the 
individualistic position of strategic behaviour and the enabling nature of national 
environment. On the contrary, the institutionalist authors (e. g. Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991; Zucker, 1988) insist on organisational confon-nity to social rules, stressing both 
the determined nature of strategy and the constraints of institutional isomorphism. In 
this way, a structurationist sociology approach to strategy is innovative and distinctive, 
as it can combine both rules and resources. 
2.5 ADDING CORPORATISM TO THE TAIWANESE CONTEXT 
In the last section, I have shown that the structurationist perspective on 
strategy provides valuable insights into the explanation of the linkages between firm 
behaviour and social structures (rules and resources). But when applied to a particular 
social context, such as that of Taiwanese society, this structurationist sociology is 
obviously so abstract that it is unlikely to link together the substantive components of a 
firm-in-society model, as a means of expanding the explanatory capacity of the model 
and extending understanding. A useful way of tackling this problem is to "prescribe a 
particular way of conceptualising something" (Sayer, 1984: 50). It requires us not only 
to bring interpretive skills, but also some kinds of pre-understanding of what the 
context might be about. In this way, this research further calls for the use of corporatist 
political theory to help explicate particular aspects of the Taiwanese state while 
acknowledging the importance of the role of the state in structuring firrn behaviour. 
The corporatist theory of the state has already proved important to explaining the 
character of Taiwan's industrialisation experience as a whole (e. g. Bello and Rosenfeld, 
1990: 221; Gold, 1986; Tien, 1992: 37; Wade, 1990; Zeigler, 1988), and is therefore 
likely to be particularly appropriate to understanding firm-state relations in the 
Taiwanese PC industry. 
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In recent years, corporatism as a form of political analysis has had enormous 
impact on a number of disciplines (Cawson, 1986; Williamson, 1989). But, as Panitch 
(1980: 159) argues, there is a profound lack of agreement on what the concept of 
corporatism actually refers to. Some writers concentrate on economic developments 
alone, others focus on the structure and role of the state, whilst others use it to 
distinguish between different types of pressure group activity. Here in applying this 
concept to the study of a novel system of political economy in the Taiwanese context, I 
shall examine only some key points which are particularly important to this thesis: 
corporatism as a state form will be discussed in Section 3.3.1; the remaining part of 
this section will examine the varieties of corporatist forms in which interests are 
organised and interact with the state. 
Summarising the corporatism literature, we can identify as the essential feature 
of corporatism a distinctive conceptualisation of the relationship between the state and 
interest groups (Cawson, 1986; Williamson, 1989). For instance, Cawson (1986: 38) 
defines corporatism as "a specific socio-political process in which organisations 
representing monopolistic functional interests engage in political exchange with state 
agencies over public policy outputs which involves those organisations in a role that 
combines interest representation and policy implementation through delegated self- 
enforcement". Thus we can see this concept of corporatism combines an important key 
feature: interest intermediation. The term "interest intermediation" was coined by 
Schmitter (1979) to capture the reciprocity of the relationship between corporatist 
organisations and state agencies. In particular, the development of corporatism is 
regarded by its major theoretical proponents as a middle-range approach to the study 
of interest intermediation (Grant, 1985; Williamson, 1989). 
The way in which organised interests relate to the state raises some of the 
central questions facing modem societies, not least the distribution of political power 
and state resources within them, and how the divergent claims of different social 
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groups can be reconciled. In answering these questions, there are always debates on 
the different forms of corporatism. It is generally agreed that during the early years 
much of corporatist theoretical analysis and empirical observation was concerned with 
the important macro-political questions of system stability through bargaining between 
the state and peak organisations of labour and capital (tripartism). To some authors, 
tripartism is the constitutive feature of corporatism, in which it forms a kind of state- 
imposed class collaboration upon labour, or a means of controlling labour. 
By the early 1980s, however, there occurred something of a realignment of 
corporatist interest. Increasingly, a number of corporatist writers began to argue that 
the attention afforded to national pacts - or the macro-level - has been unduly narrow, 
if not actually misleading. These writers (e. g. Wassenberg, 1982) suggest that, below 
national-level arrangements, between peak associations and the public authorities there 
exist numerous examples of corporatist arrangements involving associations concerned 
with more specialised interests and representing particular ones. In addition to "macro- 
corporatism" there is, less visible but possibly more enduring, "meso-corporatism" 
based on intervention in individual sectors. Similarly, it is noted that a considerable 
amount of intervention in industrial policies is negotiated between the public 
authorities and individual firms, raising the prospect of "micro-corporatism" as well 
(Williamson, 1989: 164-5). As a result, corporatism can develop at different levels, and 
the organisations which represent functional interest can vary in the scope of their 
membership and the degree of inclusiveness of the collective definition of their 
interests. In short, all the above discussions suggest that the allocation of state 
resources can be differentiated either at the sectoral level or at the level of the 
individual firm. 
When one applies the diverse literature to empirical research, the presence of 
notions of meso- or micro- corporatism has two important implications. First, at the 
end of the previous chapter, I identified one of my subsidiary aims in this thesis as 
31 
providing an effective strategy model for government industrial policy. This requires 
detailed research on industrial policy which represents sectoral as opposed to class 
interests. Following the discussion in this section, the nature of interest organisations at 
the meso-level can be studied by identifying a logic of membership and influence and 
analysing the organisation itself as subject to both sets of opportunities and constraints 
informed by the structurationist sociology. In particular, I argue that meso-corporatism 
may be seen as a possible strategy for government to adopt in response to international 
competition. Similarly, firms embedded in their particular industry can pursue micro- 
corporatist strategies in order to secure the support of the state. 
Secondly, and more importantly, I argue that appreciation of micro- 
corporatism is critical to explaining the relationships between Taiwanese PC firms and 
their immediate social context. In Taiwan's case, beginning in the mid-1980s, the liffing 
of martial law, the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo and the enlargement of 
election systems have led Taiwan's political leaders to develop a new system of 
political institutions that reflects a more autonomous civil society (Cheng and Haggard, 
1992; Chou, 1991: 50-1; Long 1991: 180-202; Moody, 1992). On the one hand, this 
political reconstruction has, of course, added to the possibility of conflict between state 
policy and the business recipe. On the other hand, this reconstruction of Taiwanisation 
has strongly impinged upon the connections between state agencies and individual 
firms and, as a result, state direct support can be restricted to a limited number of 
indigenous firms, such as Acer in PCs, Kennex in tennis rackets and Eva Airline in 
aerospace (cf. Pennells, 1994). This in turn raises the prospect of "micro-corporatism" 
(Williamson, 1989: 163-4), and we are therefore interested in understanding how this 
bilateral relationship between the individual firm and state is characterised in 
Taiwanese society. 
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2.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have reviewed different forms of knowledge that might be 
employed to arrive at a useful explanation of strategic differences across Taiwanese PC 
firms. Any reasoning on this matter depends on how I logically and cumulatively 
uncover different approaches leading to the characterisation of the empirical world. In 
examining these issues, I have been drawn into a wider discussion of different methods 
of strategy theorising, paradigmatic analysis of organisations, a structurationist 
approach to strategy and a corporatist perspective on a firm-in-society model. The 
major theme this chapter has revealed is the rule-following and resource-empowered 
nature of strategic agency. It has also discussed the value of corporatist theory for 
researching state-firm relations in the evolving Taiwanese PC industry of 1980-1993. 
The implications of this are more fully discussed in the next chapter in which I develop 
a tripartite structural theory of strategy. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE FIRM IN SOCIETY: 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 21 reviewed the theoretical foundations of sociological strategy 
research. These theoretical investigations suggest the need for a substantial 
reconsideration. We must look more carefully at the plural rules and resources that 
inform firms' strategic agency. What we require is a model that is sensitive to the social 
complexity in which strategy is being made. This model must also be able to link 
together the behavioural and institutional levels of analysis that are evident in the 
sociology of organisation and be sensitive to time-space specificity, important to the 
evolving Taiwanese PC industry of 1980-1993. In this way, the interrelationships 
between Taiwanese PC firms and their immediate social context can become more 
systematically theorised and researched. 
In this chapter I develop an alternative strategy typology for how empirical 
work based on this sociological strategy perspective should proceed. In so doing, this 
chapter will take four parts. To begin with, I will argue the need for a classification 
scheme in order to approach the empirical material. This provides a basis upon which 
the following section will introduce three concepts - policy style, business recipe and 
technology paradigm - that constitute the social structures analysis. The patterning of 
the three structures indicates the formation of an industry system which leads us to 
recognise the significance of systemic conflicts in influencing firm behaviour. That 
done, I shall move on to examine the corporate identities that provide an institutional 
link between agency and structure. By introducing the conceptual categories of social 
structures, industry system and corporate identities, I shall argue that these three 
categories should be brought together in order to explain the different strategic choices 
that have become established in the Taiwanese PC industry. After all this, a conceptual 
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framework -a tripartite structural theory of strategy - for this research will be drawn in 
detail. This chapter will close with a summary leading to the presentation of the 
remaining chapters of the thesis in relation to this framework. 
3.2 THE NEED FOR A CLASSIFICATION SCHEME 
As a social science student, I have been active in management discipline for 
more than twelve years. Despite the breadth of my discipline, I regard myself as a 
strategist at heart, interested in questions which are of particular interest to researchers 
in strategic management. However, doctoral programme training enforced me to begin 
questioning the functions of categories of doctrines, in which we experience diverse 
disciplines and use our own unique perspective to explain social phenomena. To a 
certain extent, I came to understand that the confines of one traditional discipline were 
inadequate to comprehend real-world phenomena. 
Researchers in many fields are likewise beginning to recognise that traditional 
boundaries between fields are limited in studying business competition or firm 
behaviour (e. g. Cawson et al, 1990; Coombs et al, 1992; Jernison, 1981; Pennings, 
1985; Pettigrew, 1992; Porter, 1990). This recognition calls for the use of a more 
integrative approach which is considered to be more eclectic and multi-disciplinary in 
the perspective that it brings to the empirical inquiry and mode of analysis (Ansoff, 
1987: 514). While the various models in different disciplines are useful for identifying 
and interpreting strategic aspects, there is obviously also a great need for integrative 
models that incorporate the accomplishment of different disciplines in order to allow 
the field to advance theoretically (Shrivastava, 1987). 
In this sense, this research is suggested to be interdisciplinary (cf. Cawson et al, 
1990: 9-13; Pennings, 1985). The central point of the interdisciplinary approach, as a 
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research strategy, is the selection of a methodology and an appropriate set of concepts 
which transcend, rather than reproduce, the boundaries set by academic disciplines. 
Synthesis between fields then are treated as necessary components of social inquiries. 
The process of carrying out such an interdisciplinary approach reflects on the 
requirements of a priori theory that not only gives meaning to observations 
(Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1989: 190), but also gives us the basis for a typology of 
relationships (Doty and Glick, 1994: 244). The challenge at this point is how best to 
unite theory and experience. Implicit in this challenge is the view that a good a priori 
theory depends on some past observations which are consistent with a body of existing 
theories. 
So when doing empirical study, by drawing on a set of taxonomic categories 
and some concepts of relevance, the researcher needs to develop a classification 
scheme that incorporates the holistic principle of enquiry into organisational research 
(Archer, 1988: 285). Such a categorical classification system is important because it 
contains commensurate concepts or typologies (cf. Doty and Glick, 1994; Hambrick, 
1984) that are internally consistent within the system. Relatedly, these typological 
principles offer us a broad idea of what we might be looking for and some ways of 
thinking about the object of our study (Weick 1990; Huff, 1990). It is thus important 
in the following sections to make clear how these internally consistent typologies are 
developed to construct a classification scheme. 
3.3 SOCIAL STRUCTURES ANALYSIS 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the influence of the social environment on action is a 
key factor for researching strategy from a sociological point of view. Addressing how 
this social environment should be conceived, institutionalist authors have approached 
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various aspects of contextual structures with which to explain firm behaviour. In the 
early years, the sociologist Habermas (1973) refers to the late capitalist societies in 
terms of three key institutions - the economic, political and socio-cultural. More 
recently, the scope of analysis of social institutions or structures with regard to firrn 
behaviour has widened still further. Technology has been shown as a social force for 
structuring the institutional environment (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1982; Dosi 
et al, 1990: 241). On many issues of national importance, corporate political behaviour 
is proposed to illustrate the successful pursuit of competitive advantage on political 
action (Yoffie, 1987,1988; Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). Studies of industry 
organisation have demonstrated international competition as a significant factor to 
illustrate firm behaviour (Porter, 1980). Viewed as a strategic weapon, managing time 
is introduced to represent the most powerful new external source of competitive 
advantage (Stalk, 1988). Typical institutionalists such as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
and Scott (1987) stress the importance of the state and professional groups in 
explaining firrn behaviour. Yet each social scheme of institutional strategy research 
generally has precluded agreement on which of the social structures are the most 
meaningful to explain firm behaviour. 
At the broadest level, it is alleged that social context is too complex, too 
fraught with diverse factors, to be fully conceived in concrete terms (Cohen, 1989: 30, 
88). In addition, it is beyond the scope of a single piece of research to trace all the links 
between different social forces. Partly as a result, some researchers tend to adopt the 
idea of "empiricism" (Jary and Jary, 1991: 191) as a means to study the influence of 
social structures on action. DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 65), for example, suggest that 
the structures of institutional environments "cannot be determined a priori but must be 
defined on the basis of empirical investigation". It is similar to what Rdsdnen and 
Whipp (1992: 56) propose, that with respect to a national business recipe, it "should 
not be decided a priori what is the most essential principle and unit of collective action, 
but the actual combination of principles should be generated from the case itself'. 
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Yet the conceptualisation of social context as a phenomenon of interest to the 
sociological account for strategy seems to deserve more systematic and logical 
thinking. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, it is evident that Giddens (1979, 
1984) treats structural concepts - rules and resources - as an analytical abstraction 
from concrete procedures of structuration. The identification of social concrete reality 
is therefore important because it can give empirical flesh to the notion of rules and 
resources, thereby illuminating the possible interplay between firms' behaviour and 
their immediate social rules and resources. Secondly, such a concrete identification can 
usefully help to examine the enduring roles of structures clustering or patterning which 
are critical to explaining the dynamics of institutional environments. Thirdly, this 
identification can also ensure that the relation between various theories of knowledge 
and structuration theory remains a paradigmatic one, in which accumulated knowledge 
is applied to an independently constituted set of phenomena. Informed by a set of 
interpretive typological theories, such a paradigmatic analysis should be more useful 
for thinking about the ontological reality and the interpretation of research results. 
Therefore, in considering the significance of social structures in explaining firm 
behaviour, a concrete identification is necessary. Methodologically, in the process of 
moving from the relevant concepts towards the concrete, it is the intimate connection 
with empirical reality that permits the development of a relevant and valid theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b). Eventually, a triple classification of social structures - policy style, 
business recipe and technology paradigm - was evolved by means of "successive 
approximations" (Sayer, 1992: 189). In the following three sections I shall demonstrate 
why the three social structures putatively represent a useful scheme for a sociological 
approach to the study of firms' strategic agency. 
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3.3.1 The State and Policy Style 
Bringing the State Back In 
In recent years, there has been a growing demand to "bring the state back in" as 
a key explanatory variable in social analysis. As Skocpol (1985) suggests, there has 
been a paradigm switch in the Western social sciences in the 1970s: from society- 
centred work, which treated the state as a dependent variable, to theories which treat it 
as an independent variable. Increasingly, this switch has been highlighted in an 
outpouring of theoretical and empirical studies from diverse disciplines. Partly 
informed by this trend, institutionalist theorists call attention to the nation-state as one 
of the primary modem shapers of institutional forms (DiMaggio, and Powell, 1983; 
147; Scott, 1987; Brint and Karabel, 1991: 347-8). As subsequently applied to strategy 
(e. g. Whittington, 1993: 144), this tendency is seen to combine both state strategies 
and business strategies in a framework by reference to which the competitive 
advantage of nations can be truly built (cf. Fligstein, 1990: 7-8; Porter, 1990). 
In retrospect, the state has been defined in diverse ways, with substantial 
variation among approaches. As called upon by Evans et al (1985: 363), instead of 
promoting more grand theorising about the state in general, scholars from various 
areas are encouraged to use wide-ranging studies to improve conceptualisations, and 
generate new hypotheses about the structures and actions of states under various 
circumstances. Because concepts are fallible (Osigweh, 1989), any set of proposition, 
shQ! ýýsubject to the ontologiSýljest,,. of reality. In this sense, my research shows 
that in a vast and of the role of the state 
generally range from the extreme pluralist view (which sees no structure) through a 
corporatist conception to an orthodox Marxist belief (which sees no agency) (Cawson, 
1986: 7; Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). In this distinction, pluralist and neo-Marxist's 
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perspectives are treated as society-centred approaches to social research; while the 
corporatist's is a state-centred one. 
In considering the linkage of the state into the Taiwanese PC industry, both 
pluralism and neo-Marxism are rejected as over-general theories, with the former 
defining the state as the factor of cohesion in society, whilst the latter sees it as the 
mechanism for reproducing the relations of class domination (cf. Gold, 1986; Zeigler, 
1988). Both theses are eventually forced to recognise the role of the state: pluralists 
chance upon the importance of initiatives by politicians and government agencies; and 
neo-Marxist or structural-functional studies tend to conclude that state-building is the 
product of struggle, rather than the automatic result of functional differentiation or 
political modernisationl (Skocpol, 1985: 4-5). 
In contrast to the pluralist and neo-Marxist approaches of society-centred 
theories, the corporatist approach highlights the importance of the state, assuming that 
the state can be treated as a relatively independent actor pursuing its own distinctive 
goals that do not necessarily reflect the interest generated from the society. It has 
drawn upon the idea of the state having an internal structural logic, being constrained 
by dominant social forces and being an autonomous organisational entity in its own 
right (Williamson, 1989: 121-4). Because of its relative autonomy, the state could 
transcend structural boundaries of society to act for ends opposed to the interests of 
the dominant class, and so transform the social structure. In other words, in contrast to 
both the pluralist and neo-Marxist approaches, the corporatist approach believes that 
the state is not necessarily a passive recipient of social pressure, though it may have 
special relations with certain social groups - such as industry firms. State policy at any 
time and place thus can be considered more or less independent of action by the 
I For more on the pluralist and Marxist's political theories, see Clark (1991) and Dunleavy and 
O'Leary (1987). 
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individuals or groups occupying strategic positions in the state apparatus, though it 
may be a response to certain social demands (Gold, 1986: 18-9). 
Policy Style 
In the previous section, I identified the state as a key variable in social analysis 
for understanding the scope of institutional processes. This emphasis on the role of the 
state brings our attention to the area of policy-making and the implementation process. 
From here, we see one important social structure - policy style - that represents the 
ways in which the state, or policy-makers, develops "standard operating procedures for 
handling issues which arrive on the political agenda" (Richardson et al, 1982: 2-3). On 
the basis of policy style, the policy agents share a perception that comes from sustained 
attention to a given policy debate. The policy style is the political sub-culture with its 
associated rules that "legitimate negotiating, bargaining, log-rolling, give and take, the 
gaining of consent as against unilateral power of coercion" (Richardson et al, 1982: 5- 
6). For example, the Taiwanese policy style, as we shall see, provides firms with rules 
associated with the interests of the KMT party, developmental state, technology 
venture, respect for I. P. R. and own-brand marketing. Insofar as firms conform to 
policy style rules, they become legitimate and the policy style provides them with the 
state resources that are capable of empowering their actions. By conforming to policy 
style rules, for example, firms may get access to state contracts, government subsidies, 
assistance and social prestige. 
In general, the metaphor of policy style is also understood as policy networks, 
policy communities or administrative culture (Kenis, 1992; Marin and Mayntz, 1991; 1 
Mazey and Richardson, 1992; Waarden, 1992). Though used by different scholar , 
these notions have in common their emphasis on dealing with the configurative aspect 
of interest intermediation behind corporatist arrangements (Schubert and Jordan, 
1992: 1). 
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However, as a means of distinguishing among these notions, I will use 
Richardson et al's (1982) term of policy style to denote politically institutionalised 
patterns that are capable of generating structural rules and resources available for 
to RiZhhýardson et al (1982: 13), the policy style refers to the 
interaction between (a) the government's approach to problem-solving and (b) the 
relationship between government and other actors in the policy process. It is worth 
noting that this notion of policy style is not exhaustive, but can be used at different 
levels. Raab's (1992) analysis of education policy and Smith's (1992) study of 
agriculture demonstrate that the concept is useful either at a functional aggregated 
(e. g. finance, labour and education) or industrial area. In addition, according to 
Giddens (1989: 19), the notion of social structure is defined as institutionalised 
patterns "in how people behave and in the relationships in which they stand with one 
another". As a consequence, in order to apply this notion of policy style to help 
characterise the relationships between political structure and firm strategy, I shall 
define policy style in terms of two features, i. e. in terms of how state institutions 
operate in the process of economic development and in terms of the relationships 
between the state and business. Not only can this definition be consistent with Giddens' 
(1989: 19) concept of social structure, but also it can embrace Whitley's (1992a: 119- 
65) discussion of political institutions and state policies, critical to the function of the 
business recipe that has become established in the process of economic development. 
Here, the structure of business recipe represents another important social structure for 
constructing firm behaviour, and it will be discussed in the next section. 
3.3.2 Business Recipe 
In DiMaggio and Powell's (1983: 47) fonnulation, the nation-state and 
professionals are the primary modem shapers of institutional forms. While both are 
forces for strategy rationalities, they do not necessarily espouse similar institutional 
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forms (Scott, 1991: 508-9). In fact, in addition to introducing policy style as an 
important institutional structure, organisational sociologists are conceptualising the 
business recipe, or system, within which organisations of varying types operate. The 
notion of business recipe, or system, was proposed by Whitley (1990,1992a, b). 
According to Whitley, a business system is a distinctive configuration of market- 
hierarchy relations that become established in its specific social context. As Lane 
(1992: 64) observes, the notion of Whitley's term 'system! "does not imply a 
functionalist equation of system durability with effectiveness or success". In order to 
integrate social structures into patterning as a means of erecting boundaries between 
'structures' and 'system' as complementary approaches to strategic choices and 
differences, I shall therefore prefer to use the term 'business recipe' instead of business 
system. In fact, throughout Whitley's work, the two terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably (e. g. Whitley, 1992e: 125) 
Compared with Spender's notion of industry recipes, Whitley's (1992a, b) 
interest in business recipes represents a shift in unit of analysis from the industry to a 
broader national framework. These business recipes are the result of the institutional 
environment in which they are developed. For example, there seem to be significantly 
different business recipes in East Asia (Whitley, 1992a) and Europe (Whitley, 1992b). 
Once established, these recipes offer rules of the game by reference to which fu-ms' 
behaviour is evaluated and business organisations achieve their meaning. For example, 
Taiwanese business recipe offers rules of strong family control, opportunistic growth 
patterns and low commitments to market exchange partners that govern firm behaviour 
(Whitley, 1992a). Following these business recipe rules in their actions, firms are able 
to communicate with local business partners and workers. While the recipe offers 
guidance for firm's, action, it also points to a set of appropriate resources, as well as 
being a source of legitimacy. For example, once legitimate in conformity to business 
recipe rules, firms may get privileged access to business recipe resources, such as 
business contracts, loans, market networks, skilled workers and so on. 
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According to Whitley (1992), the major characteristics of business recipes can 
usefully be described under three broad headings derived from the major components 
of hierarchy-market configurations: the constitution of firms as key economic actors, 
their interconnections in markets, and their internal systems of authoritative, 
coordination and control. First, the nature of firms as dominant economic actors has 
two key features. These two features include the ways in which decision-making 
discretion is allocated and exercised and patterns of firms' growth. The second area 
concerns the structure of market relations. This includes the ways in which firms 
compete and cooperate with each other, both within and between industrial sectors. 
Finally, the nature of authoritative coordination within firms, including the type and 
degree of mutual employer-employee commitment and loyalty. Taken together, these 8 
characteristics2 constitute a particular type of social structure, referring to the ways in 
which firms function as economic actors, and to the relationships both between fu-mS 
in the nation state and between owners, managers and workers within the 
organisations. Within the scope of social structures analysis, both the concepts of 
policy style and business recipe are thus internally consistent in relation to Giddens' 
(1989: 19) definition of social structure. 
3.3.3 Technology Paradigm 
The emergence of new technologies, or innovation, and the diffusion of their 
effect through society are one of the main reasons why in modem societies we have 
not seen a stationary state (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Porter, 1985: 164; Schumpeter, 
1934). The rapid world-wide spread of technology is upsetting established power 
hierarchies, sharpening economic competition, bringing new actors into the game and 
21t is true that Whitley continues to elaborate these characteristics. In his recently edited book - 
European Business System (Whitley, 1992b), for example, Whitley introduces 16 
characteristics of business recipes, or systems. In noting this change, my strategy in employing 
his concepts is designed to focus on the 8 characteristics which are central to his work. 
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weaving a web of much tighter interdependence among nations. The advent of 
microelectronics, for example, was enormously important in empowering Japanese 
firms in numerous electronically based industries. The emergence of the PC gave Apple 
the opportunity to become one of the largest computer companies in the world. In my 
case studies, it also provided an opportunity for Taiwanese firms to gain a position. In 
order to provide a truly sensitive designation of social structures analysis, I suggest 
therefore that technological knowledge cannot be isolated from the broader 
institutional context. 
Like policy style and business recipe, I propose the technology paradigm as 
another significant type of social structure influencing firms' behaviour in'modem 
societies. Viewing -soc-151-s-frfuctu- as ot process and form, technology is not treated 
as a physical object but is viewed as "an occasion that triggers social dynamics" 
(Barley, 1986: 79) which, in turn, shape organisational activities. The notion of 
technology paradigm was firstly used by Dosi (1982). Based on Kuhn's concept of 
scientific paradigm, Dosi (1982,1984) defines a technology paradigm as an exemplar, 
a particular scientific problem-solution that is accepted as successful and which 
becomes the basis for future work. Based on this paradigmatic idea, technological 
changes or innovation are generally based on a variety of knowledge sources which 
inevitably include an accumulation of the competence of technological and industrial 
actors. 
Closely related to this paradigmatic idea of innovation is the concept of 
evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1977,1982; Saviotti and Metcalfe, 
1991). In a somewhat similar way, although starting from quite different premises, 
Nelson and Winter (1977) introduce the concepts of technological regimes and natural 
trajectories, Sahal (1985) that of technological guideposts and Whipp and Clark (1986) 
that of repertoires. In general, these concepts all point towards some degree of 
invariance in the technology paradigm. 
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Here my use of technology paradigm is quite consistent with Dosi and Nelson's 
ideas of paradigmatic changes in technology, though I extend this approach to embrace 
also major breakthroughs in the management of a particular industry during its history 
(Jones and Womack, 1986). The latter refers to both internal operations of the firtn 
and the external industrial organisation of the suppliers, distributors and consumers 
that feed the knowledge pool of the industry. In general, the technology paradigm is 
made up from industrial activities which define the standards of organisational 
set by the most successful firms in their particular fields. With respect to 
the structures of policy sty paradigm is specifically defined as recipe, 
a particular type of social structure, referring to the ways in which industrial per_ators 
býehave in industry 
ýd 
to the dominant exchange relationships. 
Overall, then, the notion of technology paradigm is to be conceived as 
predominantly sectoral, although it may interact with the national policy style and local 
I--- 
business recipe in a polity. As discussed, the paradigm is structured within an industry, 
and it builds cumulatively to shape industry actors' future search for innovation. When 
defining the innovation processes through which institutions shape organisational 
structure and action, the technology paradigm is both an exemplar and a set of 
hetidstics-N(Dosi, 1988a: 1127). In order to demonstrate their correctness and 
modernity, firms thus have a tendency to follow the technologyyparadigm. 
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Given this concept of evolving technology paradigm, it becomes necessary not 
only to discuss it in terms of a technical trajectory which provides rules that can be 
followed, but also in terms of resources to be used meaningfully. In particular, when a 
technology paradigm becomes institutionalised, it brings with it rules of conduct to 
firms, offering the d and forming the 
grounds for formulating technology more surely. Also, it provides resources in the 
sense of legitimacy, which too will encourage the acquisition of other structural 
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resources. For example, PC technology paradigm provides firms with overall rule of 
open systems (McKenna, 1989: 163-7; Grove, 1990). By adopting an open systems 
rule, firms have easy access to technical knowledge, choice of off-the-shelf 
components, distributors and skilled labour. The three social structures - policy style, 
business recipe and technology paradigm - will be further compared and empirically 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
3.4 FROM SOCIAL STRUCTURES TO INDUSTRY SYSTEM 
3.4.1 Structures Patterning 
In the foregoing three sections, I introduced three sets of social structures - 
policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm - each structured in both rules 
and resources for guiding and empowering firm behaviour. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, rules are procedures of action and interaction, enabling firms to 
understand how to proceed in a meaningful way. In order to adapt to the environment, 
firms need to conform to certain rules of conduct, with the acquisition of available 
resources. Comprising rules related to strategy content and resources associated with 
power bases of action, these three structures provide a wide range of options that 
permits genuine choice. Though these are not the only ways in which society is 
structured, I shall demonstrate in later chapters that the three structures are particularly 
important in explaining strategic differences amongst my nine case study firms. 
As well as delimiting certain domains of acknowledged structural properties, 
this tripartite scheme of social structures emphasises the socially constructed nature of 
corporate strategy. According to this scheme, society not only provides a diversity of 
structural rules between which economic actors can choose for deliberate action; it 
also provides a plurality of structural sources of power essential to strategic choice. In 
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searching for possible courses of action that are capable of generating social 
legitimacy, firms can pursue policy style-oriented, business recipe-oriented or 
technology paradigm-oriented strategies. 
Accordingly, my position on strategy analysis emphasises that fin-ris' agency 
depends upon the three social structures that offer a variety of social rules and 
resources available for action. However, these structures are not mutually exclusive, 
but are more or less overlapping depending on the degree of structures clustering or 
patterning in a particular locale. This aspect of structures patterning leads to the 
analysis of social system. According to Giddens (1984), a system is an arena of social 
activity, with the patterning of social structures taking place. With a social system, the 
term "patterning" refers to "the degree to which each part of a social system has direct 
ties or interchanges with every other part" (Giddens, 1977: 124). Because patterning 
refers to ties and interchanges, tensions or conflicts between social structures are thus 
critical to explaining the dynamics of institutional environments. In other words, what I 
suggest is to integrate the structures (policy style, business recipe and technology 
paradigm) into patterning so as to examine the significance of systemic conflicts in 
explaining firrn behaviour. As a mode of social activity, we may then consider an 
industry system which is understood as a particular type of social system, with a 
formation of social structures of its own. The implications of this are further discussed 
in the next section. 
3.4.2 The Formation of An Industry System 
Investigating how managers deal with uncertainty, Spender (1989) identifies 
management function as the task of directing and manipulating a shared knowledge- 
base of an industry (cf. Child, 1988; Hellgren and Melin, 1992: 186; Shearman and 
Burrell, 1987). He calls this knowledge-base 'industry recipes'. But where do industry 
recipes come from? In view of the connecting of industry recipes within attendant 
(7 
7 
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social formations, there is a vagueness and looseness in this group-level concept which 
subsequent writers have not been inclined to remedy. 
In addition, Spender is restrictive in suggesting that "competitive advantage 
generally lies in (the) knowledge-base rather than in a tangible resource" (Spender, 
1989: 1-2). It seems to me, then, that this knowledge-base refers only to rules of the 
game. As I have argued so far, appreciation of both rules and resources is critical to 
explaining firm behaviour. 
By combining both rules and resources into the account of firm behaviour, I 
suggest that there is an industry system which affords firms certain definite powers 
with which to-e ower their- tions. This system is made up of the structures of 
policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm. Each of the structures is critical 
to explaining the formation of an industry system. In more detail, in view of the 
0 
emergence of an industry, there must be a structure of policy style that regulates types 
of interest intermediation. Equally, there must also be a structure of business recipe 
within which firms of varying types operate. Finally, there must be available a 
technology paradigm that triggers social dynamics and defines innovation directions. 
All three of these structures refer singly to a variety of institutionalised patterns that 
come together in a given social locale to direct industry activities. 
Within an industry system, the structures are interconnected. Even the most 
insulated business recipe cannot divprcý its!! 
_Yqm-ýýdFr 
policy style and 
technolog p adigm wiltmh whhiiýcýl is interrelate . In Taiwan's PC industry, for 
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c nol paradigm tendency towards international marketing and the 
policy style search for international respectability have led to conflict with the business 
recipe tendency towards cloning and counterfeiting. It may seem that this conflict is to 
be found in the patterning of social structures. In other words, in moving from the 
notion of social structures to industry system analysis, structural intersecting implies 
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potentially the rise of systemic tensions or conflicts. How firms negotiate the conflicts 
then is of significance to understanding the relationship between agency and structure. 
In order to demonstrate how firms deal with the conflicts, I shall introduce the concept 
of corporate identities that provides a linkage between the individual firm and its three 
attendant social structures. This concept will now be discussed. 
3.5 CORPORATE IDENTITIES 
An adequate theory of strategy requires attention both to the external 
environment and to the internal organisation (Pettigrew, 1985). Early versions of 
institutional theory placed particular emphasis on the character of institutional 
isomorphism, thereby ignoring the active capacities of human agents. Increasingly, 
there has been a tendency to recognise that fkm diversity is an essential aspect of 
organisational analysis (e. g. Goodstein, 1994; Oliver, 1991). Central to this concept of 
firm diversity is the intrinsic human potential for agency. For instance, an explanation 
of strategic action in terms of managerial agency involves the claim that the action was 
self-determined by the agent, rather than being solely determined by any structural 
conditions (Greenwood, 1991: 70). Such explanations imply that the firm has a more 
or less free choice in deciding which means and ends of action to engage in, and 
thereby formulates a number of possible courses of action (Whittington, 1989,1992). 
Essentially firms are strategic actors whose internal traits are central to the 
choices exercised by them. These internal traits construct their uniqueness which is a 
'C' 
product of firms' institutional links with the society. The uniqueness of firms offers 
ý]Tat -cau shared organisational beliefs th i's-elHe"i-m-1-50-crin order to respond to institutional 
pressures. The focus then is on different social relationships, in so far as firms' capacity 
to respond derives from the complex structures of society. Throughout this thesis, I 
shall define these social relationships as corporate identities that carry with finns a 
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certain range of forces or inspirations that establish the objectives towards which firms 
should direct their activities, excluding others (Giddens, 1984: 84; Cohen, 1989: 207- 
10). Having said this, I suggest that strategic choices should be understood as shaped 
by the peculiar social identities of the company. In other words, given their particular 
identities that confine them within social structural complexity, firms are exposed to 
the influence of systemic conflicts, and they are consequently forced to choose 
between them. Recalling my discussion of social structures and industry system, firms' 
identities in this sense are positioned in their immediate industry system constituted by 
the structures of policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm, and in relation 
to other agents (Giddens, 1984: 83). 
Lfvý 
While allowing both rules and resources into the account of agency, this notion 
of social identities of heterogeneous firms additionally provides a reformation for the 
recent resource-based theory of strategy (Penrose, 1980; Wernerfelt, 1984; Grant, 
1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992). The resource-based approach stresses the 
significance of organisational capabilities that are unique to each firm. Also, firtn 
uniqueness matters, and firms will respond differently to industry structure conditions. 
In broader terms, organisational capabilities can only be distinctive if they are derived 
from characteristics which other firms lack. What appear to be unique characteristics 
then are obviously "made on the basis of some definite social criterion or criteria" 
(Giddens, 1979: 117-8), such as political links, business relationships, reputation, kin 
relation, education and age-grade (cf. Giddens, 1979: 118; Kay, 1993: 65) - hence a 
concern with the social context. In this way, the resource-based approach must be 
modified in certain respects, and elaborated in others, in order to embrace the diverse 
and contradictory nature of social structures proposed by the structurationist ontology. 
In general, the resource-based approach of strategy emphasises the influence of 
organisational resources, such as core competences and strategic assets, which serve as 
the driving force for the growth of the firm. (Wernerfelt, 1984: 17 1). Such an emphasis 
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tends to see organisational resources as valuable while minimising the significance of 
the constraining aspects of "resources". Indeed, even exponents of the resource-based 
theory, Mahoney and Pandian (1992: 365) admit that these firm-specific resources may 
not only "enable the firm to generate rents from a resource advantage" but also "limit 
the choice it may enter and the levels of profits it may expect". It is, after all, certain 
modes of organisational resources that can only be effectively performed by firms. 
Therefore, I suggest that "finn! s unique characteristics" (Grant, 1991: 133) are not to 
be identified solely with distinctive resources; Instead, they should rather be seen as 
social identities which refer to the "positioning" of the firm within a particular social 
category (Giddens, 1984; 89). This category in turn connects the firm both with a 
variety of social resources that empower its action and with certain rules that govern 
or constrain its action. Finns' identities are thus socially structured by their immediate 
social context, and these identities establish their social positions that will lead them to 
make strategic choices differently. 
3.6 THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Before going on to outline the overall theoretical framework within which the 
relationships between firms and society can be analysed, a brief discussion of time and 
space notions is necessary. Undoubtedly, all social interaction research in social science 
is confined within time-space boundaries. Throughout his work, Giddens (e. g. 1979: 
53-65) makes a great deal of these notions, arguing that sociology (e. g. functionalism 
and structuralism) has never come to grips with their importance. Here in my 
formulation of the structurationist ontology of strategy, the time-space unit offers a 
way of mapping structures into system and connecting choices with identities. 
Considered from a different angle, a system is not a structure in itself. Rather, a 
system exhibits social structures in the procedures whereby it is reproduced (Giddens, 
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1984: 17). Thus, because a system always is in the process of being reproduced by the 
patterning of social structures, it cannot be abstracted from time and space. Equally, a 
finTfs strategic choice is influenced by its social identities that establish its earlier 
strategic positions. To understand corporate strategic differences, analysis thus needs 
to introduce a particular series of events that provide methodological points for 
entering the processes linking corporate identities and strategic choices - the former 
explaining the latter (Giddens, 1979: 228-9; Whipp and Clark, 1986: 18). 
Where are we now? Originally, in trying to build a socially-embedded theory of 
strategy, I introduced several elements that have proved the ontological relevance of 
the subject-matter. Let me now summarise these elements in one coherent framework 
that can be analytically operationalised for researching corporate strategic differences. 
In so doing, Figure 3.1 is drawn for discussion in detail. 
As Figure 3.1 shows, I suggest that the combination of the four conceptual 
categories - social structures, industry system, corporate identities and strategic 
choices is critical to explain strategic differences. In the social structures analysis, I 
proposed three sets of social structures - policy style, business recipe and technology 
paradigm - each referred to a collection of rules and resources for guiding and 
empowering firm behaviour. Following rules in their actions, firms are legitimate and 
then have privileged access to resources for competing. 
As well as providing the dynamic of industrial change and firms' activities, the 
patterning of the three structures constitutes an industry system that leads us to stress 
the significance of systemic conflicts in structuring firm behaviour. In moving from 
macro/meso levels analysis to micro level analysis, I emphasise that firms' particular 
identities are important, and they will respond differently to the three axes in order to 
negotiate the conflicts. 
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Social structures - Industry system - Corporate identities - Strategic choices 
\ 
(Technoloj aradigm Rules) 
(Technology aradigm Resources) 
FInn 
(Busines Recipe Rules) (Policy Styl Rules) 
(Busine ecipe Resources) (Policy Style Re rces) 
Figure 3.1 The conceptual framework: A tripartite structural theory of strategy 
In relation to Figure 3.1, the three circles indicate types of strategy legitimate 
within each of the policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm, and therefore 
affording access to particular resources. In this example, the three axes are orthogonal, 
indicating that greater conformity to one of the sets of rules can isolate it from the 
legitimacy and resources of the others. As an agent, a firm can thus choose to optimise 
its strategy on any one of the three dimensions, or some mix between, in order to 
negotiate the conflicts. Three examples can illustrate. As point A of Figure 3.1 shows, 
a firm can choose to optimise its strategy by conforming to certain technology 
paradigm rules. The point A implies an area where technology paradigm rules conflict 
with both policy style and business recipe rules. Therefore, by pursuing the point A 
oriented strategy, the fmn is legitimate in conformity with technology paradigm rules 
and so may have the advantage of access to technology paradigm resources. However, 
this pursuit may not enable the firm to have access to resources from the policy style 
and business recipe. 
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As point B of Figure 3.1 shows, this is an area where business recipe rules 
coincide with technology paradigm rules but conflict with policy style rules. Therefore, 
by pursuing this point B oriented strategy, a firm may get resources from both business 
recipe and technology paradigm but may not get as many as policy style resources. 
Equally, point C of Figure 3.1 indicates an area where policy style rules and 
business recipe rules coincide but conflict with technology paradigm rules. Therefore, a 
point C oriented strategy implies that a fkm chooses to conform to the rules of the 
policy style and business recipe instead of pursuing a technology paradigm-oriented 
strategy. This conformity in turn would enable the fmn to have access to policy style 
and business recipe resources but would not enable the fkm to have access to 
technology paradigm resources. 
In relation to Figure 3.1, it is in this conception of society that firms operate, 
and this will underlie the presentation of my case studies. Following Figure 3.1, the 
overall question for this research is to ask: how do we explain corporate strategic 
differences in terms of these three structures? At a more theoretical level, the central 
inquiry will be to assess the utility of the framework itself and its potential for 
elaboration into a more comprehensive model of fi ions through th 
empirical findings of this and future research. I]_: 
rvi 
3.7 CONCLUSIONS 
I have now constructed the conceptual model. Chapter 2 reviewed theories 
implicit in sociological strategy research but sensitive to the study of Taiwanese PC 
fkm strategy. Informed by this review, this chapter began assembling the theoretical 
pieces that contribute to the building of an alternative theory of corporate strategy. I 
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argue that social structures, industry system, corporate identities are interrelated in a 
complex framework which is central to understanding the nature of strategic choices 
and differences. 
Such a framework suggests that the formation of strategy depends on the 
character of the prevailing social context. It further proposes the three structural 
principles of policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm, each deeply 
structured in both rules and the resources they offer actors. Basically, this is the mental 
map I shall use to explore the object territory. In Chapter 5,1 will discuss these three 
structures in terms of my case studies. In Chapter 6,1 will examine how these three 
structures are interrelated in the Taiwanese context and so constitute the system of the 
Taiwanese PC industry. That done, in Chapter 7,1 will introduce the social identities of 
my nine case PC firms. These identities will be used to help explain my case firms' 
divergent strategic choices discussed in Chapter 8. First, however, I want to outline 
some methodological issues and principles and determine what is appropriate for this 
research. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 31 built a tripartite scheme of corporate strategy in order to take 
into account the structures of policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm. 
The patterning of the three social structures constitutes an industry system which 
emphasises the significance of systemic conflicts in structuring firrn behaviour. In order 
to negotiate the conflicts, firms have to choose to conform to certain social rules in 
order to acquire resources necessary for action. Here, choice is possible, because in the 
industry system there are three social structures providing social rules and resources. 
The grounds for why firms choose their particular strategies can be analysed in terms 
of their social identities. The identities position the firms in a social place in which their 
different connections with the three structures drive their actions. In sum, because of 
varying corporate identities, firms will make their strategic choices differently from one 
another within the industry system. In this chapter I will describe a method for 
researching and comparing such differences across my case study firms. 
To begin with, I will discuss the relevance of structurationism as a 
methodology for guiding empirical research. I will also consider the usefulness of 
comparative case studies as applied to studying corporate strategic differences. 
Secondly, I will justify the selection of nine Taiwanese PC firms. Thirdly, I will 
examine the main features of my method, including the techniques of data collection 
and validity problems. The following four chapters will show that synthesis of the four 
conceptual categories - social structures, industry system, corporate identities and 
strategic choices - is critical to explaining strategic differences across the nine case 
study firms. 
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4.2 BASIC METHODOLOGY - 
STRUCTURATIONIST COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES 
4.2.1 Structurationism as a Methodology 
For years, scholars in a diversity of fields have made use of concepts drawn 
from structuration theory in pursuing empirical enquiries. Aside from what has been 
discussed in previous chapters, an earlier example is by Charles Smith (1983) who 
uses some of the general ideas of structuration theory to examine the pure-bred beef 
business in Canada. But while many have attempted to employ structuration theory in a 
direct way in empirical research, others have taken a more negative attitude. In other 
words, they have stressed the irrelevance of structuration theory to empirical research, 
in that theory provides few, or no, useful pointers to the conduct of empirical research. 
For example, Cohen (1989), though basically sympathetic to Giddens, argues 
the difficulty of developing a research program in a conventional sense from 
structuration theory. According to Cohen (1989: 280-3), structuration theory is 
designed to address a set of issues that arise before decisions are made on the kinds of 
knowledge it is appropriate to pursue. The ontology proposed by structuration theory 
establishes generalisation at a range of levels that cannot be made in the empirical 
social sciences, because any generalisations are subject to a clear historical and 
geographical specificity. Therefore, Cohen concludes that structuration theory does 
not propose empirically relevant accounts of substantive circumstances or events, it 
does not provide a method of theory construction, and it is not a "grand theory" for the 
systematic integration of concepts, or the progressive accumulation of social scientific 
research. In a similar vein, applying structuration theory to ontology rather than 
epistemology, Gregson (1989) contends that concepts connected with structuration 
make up a "second-order theory", concerned with conceptualisation of the general 
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constitution of human society and distinct from "first-order theory", which generates 
concepts that apply directly to specific empirical setting. 
As we can see, the above discussions touch on one of the hotly debated issues 
in social science in recent years, namely, the relationship between theory and empirical 
work. For researchers, who see theory as a way of conceptualising something, theory 
provides an explanation for empirical founding. For them, in Giddens' own words, 
"structuration theory will not be of much value if it does not help to illuminate 
problems of empirical research" (1984: xxix). 
From this perspective, Giddens himself declares structuration theory plays a 
"sensitizing" role in relation to social theory. The concepts "should for many research 
purposes be regarded as sensitizing devices ... useful for thinking about research 
problems and the interpretation of research results" (Giddens, 1986: 326-327). He 
translates this sensitizing role into a series of propositions about empirical social 
research that are set out most completely in The Constitution of Society (1984). He 
begins with a summary of the aspects of structuration theory that he considers most 
relevant to empirical research. These include his emphasis on the knowledgeability of 
agents and their boundaries; the importance of day-to-day life in understanding the 
reproduction of institutions, and of routine activity and ontological security; the 
importance of the context of action and of position-practices; the variety of possible 
meanings of constraint; the importance of structural principles in specifying types of 
society; the centrality of studying power; and the importance of the fact that the 
knowledge produced by social scientists can be learrit by the lay actors and 
incorporated into action (Giddens, 1984: 281-4). 
However, for those scholars like Cohen and Gregson, these abstract conceptual 
schemes are too far removed from the groundwork of empirical research to be of much 
value in guiding it. That is to say, they lack the degree of specification required for 
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empirical work. Since all social scientists ultimately are concerned with the production 
of knowledge, it may seem peculiar that structuration theory does not begin with 
postulates regarding the methods and objectives of theory and research. 
Again, in a reply to some critical reactions to his statements about empirical 
research, Giddens makes a rough distinction between theory, as a generic category, 
and theories, with the latter term referring to explanatory generalisations. Structuration 
theory therefore clearly belongs to the first type rather than the second: 
As I have pointed out in the Constitution of Society, the significance of 
"theories", as compared to "theory", can easily be exaggerated. Some writers 
are prone to pour scom upon the tendencies of the social sciences to produce 
abstract conceptual schemes at the expense of explanatory generalization - 
theory, rather than theories - but I do not think such complaints for the most 
part are justified. No doubt many and conceptual webs are spun, but so also 
are many vapid or uninteresting generalizations proposed. "Theory", in my 
view, is at least as important in the social science as theories; I would not 
accord one logical priority over the other. 
(Giddens, 1989a: 295) 
It is evident here that Giddens treats "theory" as grand abstraction as 
contrasted to a set of generalised "theories" focused only on empirical grounds of the 
individual types (Merton, 1968; Pinder and Moore, 1980). Rather than proposing 
structuration as an empirical method, Giddens (1989a: 296) suggests an eclectic 
approach to method, which "rests upon the premise that research enquiries are 
contextually oriented". The eclectic research methods adopted should be the ones 
relevant to the aims of research, and all methods have their appropriateness. He again 
elaborates on possible research guided by structuration. theory, going as far this time as 
outlining a "structurationist programme of research". 
60 
Such a programme would look at the patterning of social structures across time 
and space. Also it would be open to the way in which reflexive intrusions of 
knowledge influence social reproduction, and to its own impact on its object of study 
(Giddens, 1989a: 300). Thus, when applied to empirical research, structuration theory 
represents the solid form of prescription that catalogues the elements which make up 
the social world. It provides in a sensitive way the major building blocks to help 
construct empirical research in social science which should be concerned with 
understanding social phenomena, as opposed to producing general theories. 
In order to employ this sensitising device and thereby expose a subject-matter 
to the structurationist notions of action and structure, Giddens identifies two forms of 
methodological bracketing which can facilitate analysis of these practices: we can 
engage in "strategic (conduct) analysis", looking at what actors do, how they 
reflexively constitute their activity, the implicit rules they follow; or we can engage in 
"institutional analysis", the analysis of the patterning of social structures. The point of 
such methodological bracketing for Giddens is to indicate two principal ways in which 
the properties of society may be approached. In this, his suggestion is methodological 
rather than substantive (Giddens, 1979: 80). Specifically, strategic analysis means 
studying the way "in which actors draw upon structural properties in the constitution 
of social relations, while 'structure' here appears as actors' mobilisation of discursive 
and practical consciousness in social encounters". In contrast, institutional analysis 
"places an epoche upon strategic conduct, treating rules and resources as chronically 
reproduced features of social systems" (Giddens, 1979: 80). Since this is a difference 
of emphasis, there is no clear-cut line that can be drawn between these, and each has to 
be in principle rounded out by an appreciation of the duality of structure. 
For Giddens, these two types of analyses therefore are not two sides of 
dualism, but in fact part of one "moment": the setting out of sets of concepts, and 
understanding our subject of study. When subject to careful research design, the idea 
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of methodological brackets can play an important bridging function between the 
ontological insights of structuration theory and the specific detail of empirical research 
(cf. Stones, 1991). Accordingly, against the inappropriateness of ontological relevance 
but seen in terms of being filtered into the empirical material, the practical application 
of structuration theory is profoundly characterised. 
Informed by this structuration programme, research into corporate strategic 
differences should therefore proceed from two directions. Fundamental is an analysis 
of strategic conduct - an attempt to see how firms draw upon rules and resources in 
the process of social construction. However, this understanding must be tempered by a 
detached institutional analysis. Institutional analysis should be directed at recognising 
the patterning of social structures which govern and constrain firms' actions (cf. 
Whittington, 1989: 118). It is at these points that structurationism as a methodology 
has most to contribute to firm-society relations. 
4.2.2 Comparative Case Studies 
The nature of the subject-matter determines the choice of appropriate 
methodology (Aldag and Steams, 1988; McGuire, 1986). In this way, the 
structurationist framework as a methodology for this research has been specified in the 
previous section. In this following section, I will focus on the research design to be 
situated between grand theory and empirical setting, at one level down from general 
principles of methodology. 
The theoretical discussion of the last three chapters establishes the basic 
grounds for deciding how strategic difference should be researched and in what sorts 
of human agency and social structures. Against the institutionalists who are at too high 
a level of aggregation and tend to be deterministic, I asserted in Chapter 3 the 
importance both of examining the strategic diversity of individual firms and of 
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investigating the processes by which this diversity emerges. The challenges for the 
empirical research then come in trying to make sense of the diversity across firms in a 
way that allows similarities and differences to be analysed and explained in terms of my 
tripartite structural strategy of ideas. Research should therefore proceed by case- 
oriented comparative analysis on particular firms, rather than by variable-oriented 
statistical survey: the former normalising, the later particularising variant relations 
across firms. 
In practice, case-oriented studies have been used recently as an innovative 
approach into strategy research by virtue of their rigorous techniques of inquiry that 
are sensitive to complexity, and historical and geographical specificity (Dyer and 
Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989,1991; Harrigan, 1983; Mitroff and Mason, 1982; 
Pettigrew, 1992; Ragin, 1987; Yin, 1984,1993). They are suited for addressing 
empirically defined sociological outcomes, and they are often used to generate new 
conceptual schemes as well. In terms of comparison, the deductive use of mathematics 
concepts may try to deal with social phenomenon and context (Camerer, 1985), but its 
ability to investigate the context is circumscribed, with the researcher struggling to 
limit the number of variables to be analysed (Ragin, 1987; Yin, 1984: 23). Because 
research into strategic differences is concerned with socially-constructed deliberate 
action which firms can explain, statistical survey research, by its very nature, is not 
suited to elucidate these. Instead, they can only be revealed by research methods which 
make the firm's rational response an integral part of study (Wallace, 1993: 107). 
Furthermore, mathematics modelling that departs from a more objectivist paradigm 
which assumes variables can be extracted from their context (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979), is less likely to explore "holistic explanations" (Pettigrew, 1992: 10) and, in 
particular, variant relations within and between cases. Because causation in holistic 
explanation based on sociological strategy research is neither linear nor singular, 
mathematical models, limited to a few variables and statistical tests constrained by 
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available data, thus make it impractical to examine the motives or forces which really 
inspire and govem firms' actions. 
On the whole, in contrast to surveys relying on statistical generalisation, case 
studies rely on analytical theorising (Yin, 1984). The use of case study in the 
development of theory is a two-sided process, involving "grounding" (Glaser, 1978; 
Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Rock, 1979; Strauss, 1987) as well as "imagination" 
(Morgan, 1986). This type of interpretive research approach advocates an inductivist 
view of theory construction which is more sensitive to exploring the social 
construction processes which create organisational phenomena (Archer, 1988: 290; 
Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Mintzberg, 1979; Morgan and Smircich, 1980). In 
particular, comparative case studies are used in this research to provide the 
"description and explanation" theory of the "how and why" questions (Whetten, 1989: 
49 1) - how firms draw upon rules and resources in order to respond to social conflicts 
and why firms respond differently. It calls for a "fine-grained" methodology (Harrigan, 
1983: 399) described in social real-life context so that strategic difference or agency 
can be properly understood in its own terms. 
4.3 THE CASE FIRMS: MICROCOMPUTERS 
For a doctoral researcher, empirical work starts from a fundamental question: 
what is the research site that will suit best? This is not as simple a question as it seems. 
The selection of research sites involves issues from personal interests, academic 
relevance, data availability and explicit network building to gain access to research 
sites (Pettigrew, 1990: 274). 
With respect to these issues, first and foremost, this research has its roots in my 
personal background as a "Taiwanese" who will lecture on a "Strategic Management" 
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course at one of Taiwan's universities. In terms of academic reasons, since the nation- 
state of Taiwan has proved important to explaining firms' behaviour (Whitley, 1992a), 
the country is selected as a research site serving to integrate the crucial sets of social 
structures. In Whitley's (1992c: 37) term the nation state is "the dominant collectivity 
for organising so many institutions which impinge directly on economic activities, such 
as legal, education and financial systems ...... In addition, studying 
firm-society 
relationships in a relatively small country - Taiwan, R. O. C. - helps to make the 
development and provision of such a multi-level perspective in a single study a quite 
feasible proposition (Leavy, 199 1). 
Once the research site of Taiwan was decided, the target industry of 
microcomputers was selected to reflect a variety of concerns. First, given a focus on a 
within-sector comparison of firrns' behaviour, I needed an industry that has a 
reasonable number of firms. Secondly, in order to provide as rigorous a test of 
discretionary firm differences as possible, I needed an industry that is not dominated by 
monopolistic or oligopolistic concerns. Thirdly, given a focus on state-firms relations, I 
needed an industry in which the state is deeply involved. Finally, I wanted to look 
beyond how the structure of technology paradigm applied to the structures of policy 
style and business recipe as a whole. An industry with dynamic technological change 
thus became the target of the research. 
Since the 1980s, the rise of PCs has been one of the biggest transformation in 
the IT revolution. Therefore, this PC case provides a good opportunity for examining 
how PC technology paradigm is structured and how this paradigm is interacted with 
the other two social structures. In Taiwan's case, the PC industry is a highly 
fragmented industry which has about 250 firms manufacturing PC integrated systems. 
Therefore, this industry provides a good opportunity for examining and contrasting 
strategic differences across firms. In 1981, it was listed as one of the 8 strategic 
industries. Partly as a result, industry and firm. actors were in almost constant 
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communication with state officials, and we are interested in the scope and intensity of 
these relationships; and, we are also concerned to understand how these interrelations 
were shaped, and what structural factors constrained and enabled those strategic 
actions. 
The validity problem, involving the selection of only one industry in a local 
society, is justified in the nature of the subject-matter itself. On this point, Leavy 
(1991: 203) notes that the generic value for descriptive and explanatory theory 
developed from an incident depends upon whether it is the phenomenon itself which is 
of interest or the particular example being chosen for study. Ragin (1992: 8-11) further 
makes this clearer, arguing that for a case understood as a specific phenomenon, it can 
be conceived as an empirical unit or as a theoretical construct. If the latter informs 
research design, the researchers are influenced by the interaction between ideas and 
evidences and this interaction will gradually lead to a progressive refinement of an 
important subset of theoretical instances. Thus for researchers who approach by this 
way, "constructing cases does not entail detennining their empirical limits .... but rather 
pinpointing and then demonstrating their theoretical significance" (Ragin, 1992: 10). 
For example, the study of Allison (197 1) provides a classic illustration (Ansoff, 1987: 
5 10). The Cuban Missile Crisis was a unique historical episode, but Allison chose it for 
intensive study in order to gain fresh insight into a more generic process, the process of 
decision-making in a complex socio-political context. The Allison study has been one 
of the most influential in decision-making literature, and the insights generated from 
this single case have been widely referred to by subsequent theorists using more 
extensive research designs. 
With regard to case samples, Ragin (1988) suggests a small number of cases 
should be good to stick with in achieving careful comparison. Specifically, Eisenhardt 
(1989) gives the reasonable number of cases chosen on a range of four to ten in terms 
of researching availability and comparative degree. Likewise, Pettigrew's (1990: 276) 
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methodological position on studying strategic change rests upon between four to six 
cases with the possibility of some flexibility in these. For this research, as a result of a 
set of deliberate considerations and practical experience, nine PC firms were chosen as 
case study units. 
In practice, my access to the nine case studies firnis (out of 17 finns contacted) 
can be addressed in two stages. 
First, the leading 17 firms of the Taiwanese PC industry were contacted by a 
letter of enquiry, written in English (with the logo of Warwick Business School) 
individually in early 1993 when I was doing my course study at Warwick. These letters 
were all addressed to the chief executive by name and briefly explained the purpose 
and methods of the research and asked for their co-operation. Also, summaries of the 
eventual research results were promised to participants (see Appendix 1). Out of these 
17 letters, only two firms responded - one (Tatung) rejected and the other (Twinhead) 
accepted. Then, after I returned to Taiwan, I came to know that four out the remaining 
15 firms (Acer, Mitac, FIC and Compal) had listed their stocks on the exchange 
market and therefore were obliged to release news to the public. Meanwhile, they all 
set up public relations (P. R. ) divisions to deal with communications matters such as 
our interests. On the suggestions of P. R. staffs, the researcher should therefore contact 
whomever he is interested to interview. This is more realistic than to ask for co- 
operation from the chief executives on the grounds that the firms are unlikely to grant 
the researchers a "go-ahead" on the field sites. Taking the suggestion of Buchanan et al 
(1988: 53-5), the practice of field research is the art of the possible. Therefore, an 
"opportunistic" approach to fieldwork in organisations is permissible as it is necessary 
to exploit the opportunities available. So I included the four firms as case study units 
since I believed data gathering (including necessary interviews) was no longer a 
problem. 
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On the other hand, the remaining II firms were contacted again by an 
introductory letter, with the logo of Warwick Business School, addressed to the chief 
executives. This time, however, these were all hand-written in Chinese and they were 
all under the recommendations of the General Secretary for the TCA (Taipei Computer 
Association) and Director for MIC, III. The letters were followed up three or four 
days later by a telephone call to explain my research purpose. From this contact, four 
out of 11 firms agreed to assist. 
A total of thirty-three face-to-face interviews was carried out during May to 
July, 1993; and a further eighteen interviews w re conducted during January to 
February, 1994.1 also attended a one-day seminar of "Infon-nation Development and 
Market Opportunities in the East/Pacific Region", held by MIC, III; a three-day 
conference of "Computer Technology 1993", provided by ITRI; as well as five 
computer exhibitions (twice a year) held by trade associations. In addition, I attended 
six speeches held by the TCA. Two of the six were addressed by the chairmen of my 
case firms - Acer and Elitegroup. Considering the difficulty of gaining access to key 
personnel of the case firms, I had no choice but to use these opportunities to ask 
questions. Over all, a total of 5"1 formal interviews (each averaging 1 hour) had been 
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done by the end of February, 1994; together with numerous occasions to discuss with 
senior managers, industrial experts and state officials. There were also numerous 
follow-ups by telephone for clarification, elaboration upon interview discussions or 
supporting material. I have listed the details of these interviews in Appendix 2 of this 
thesis. 
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4.4 DATA GATHERING 
4.4.1 Multiple Sources of Data Collection Design 
Empirical research in strategic management depends heavily on the creative use 
of multiple sources of information (Jick, 1979; Pettigrew, 1990; Snow and Hambrick, 
1980). Given this, my approach to data collection was to strive to combine, as best I 
could, some of the methods and perspective of the organisational analyst with those of 
the business historian and cultural anthropologist (Pettigrew, 1985; Spender, 1989). 
Data were collected primarily through field personal interviews, published annual 
reports, contemporary press information and a variety of other archival materials 
(Harrigan, 1983). Data collection from all these sources was continued until I was able 
to contrast strategic differences across the nine case study firms with a comprehensive 
description and to explicate the social identities or forces behind these differences (cf. 
Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988: 739-740). 
Field interviews and archival searches were designed to provide richness in 
understanding a particular firm's strategy, as well as understanding variances from 
those of others. The collection of interview and archival data was interleaved, rather 
than carried out at separate points in time, and they complemented each other in a 
number of valuable ways. Interviews led to the unearthing of more archival data, which 
in turn led to some fresh lines of inquiry for further interviews. Interview data 
unavailable from other sources would provide valuable insights into the intentions and 
strategic behaviours of key actors and valuable interpretations of key events, and what 
they meant to the major participants. Enquiries into how firms coped with similar 
problems could establish firms' social identities on a common base date, and compare 
their subsequent strategic choices up to a common future point. 
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Archival data were used to help establish proper chronologies where 
recollections were doubtful, and this data could also provide good evidence of the 
actual outcomes of each process, such as financial performance. Secondary sources 
also could supplement and verify data gathered in field interviews. The importance of 
published material has been suggested in studying firms'past strategies. As Pettigrew 
(1992) notes, understanding the sequence and flow of events over time is important for 
scholars of the strategic process. This search is to "catch reality in flight" (Pettigrew, 
1992: 11). Therefore, in addition to each firm's financial statements, comparisons of 
how various firms in the same industry responded to strategic issues could be 
established by searching company annual reports, news media and trade journal 
coverage of key events. 
4.4.2 Document Data Source and Availability 
Secondary documents were collected mainly through libraries and from 
informants in the field (see Appendix 3). However, the fact that the Taiwanese capital 
market was little computerised made it difficult to trace the earlier financial statements 
of my case fin-ns. Instead, only the past five years' records can be found in companies' 
annual reports. The researcher had asked certain interviewees to provide the 
companies' earlier financial figures, but they were more or less reluctant to deal with 
this request as it was too laborious to carry out. Thus, only the past five years' critical 
financial records (turnover, profit margin, and R. O. E. ) for case firms are presented in 
Appendix 4. 
4.4.3 Personal Interview issues 
In many ways the pivotal link in the whole data collection process is the 
personal contact and interviews with key individuals, both within or associated with 
the organisations and institutions under this study. How these contacts are established 
70 
and developed are important elements in the whole process of empirical investigation. 
Indeed, for this research, once a particular industry and fmn is chosen, one important 
question then is to determine how should such industry or firnfs dominant actors be 
identified and how many interviews are enough. This is a question of validity (Dane, 
1990: 34,148-9). 
In practice, strategic management can be studied at different levels, with Grant 
(1988: 6) identifying at least a hierarchy of four levels - collective, corporate, business 
and functional analysis. At the level of collective or corporate analysis, one tends to 
regard strategy as the organisational character (Venkatraman & Grant, 1986), by 
which managers and scholars often discuss strategy in such organisations. This 
tendency, in turn, implies the rejection of methodological individualism. As Giddens 
(1984: 220) alleges, methodological individualists such as Popper "are wrong in so far 
as they claim that social categories can be reduced to descriptions in terms of 
individual predicates" (cf. Giddens, 1979: 94-5). Corporate strategy in this sense can 
be regarded as an organisational level construct that has characteristics distinct from 
those of the individuals who constitute the organisation. In other words, as there exists 
a fundamental distinction between a class unit and the individual members, corporate 
strategy should be treated in terms of being different from constructs, such as locus of 
control of managers and leadership styles viewed at an individual level of analysis. 
The above distinction then implies a further question, raised by the debate over 
data collection - that is, how can responses from a single manager be treated as valid 
representations of the collective phenomenon? Even senior managers cannot be relied 
on to know and control everything. Additionally, power within collectives does not 
correlate in an orderly fashion with hierarchical position. To overcome these 
limitations, some strategy quantitative researchers collect data from multiple managers 
within an organisational unit. By treating individual managers as random subjects, a 
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statistical mode (analysis of variance) of all responses is calculated and then an 
aggregated organisational value is obtained to provide sufficient justifications. 
In using the comparative case studies method to examine corporate strategy, 
the work of interviewing differs considerably from that associated with quantitative 
skills. Whereas the latter tend to be normalised and standardised, qualitative case 
research interviews are not guided by a pre-existing structured scheme. Here in this 
research, contrary to statistic skills in normalising strategy constructs, I proceeded with 
a series of grounded enquiries to identify dominant actors' behaviours within each of 
my case study collectives. In this way, the number of interviews conducted is 
determined by Glaser and Strauss's (1967) concept of "theoretical saturation", that is, I 
stopped interviewing additional informants when I was getting quite repetitive answers 
that did not dig any deeper. In addition, given the limited access to the field itself, I 
was also flexible in collecting primary empirical data on the use of inter-actors' 
confirmation. As a consequence, during the grounded process, I had conducted more 
than fifty face-to-face interviews and numerous casual conversations with senior 
managers and industry experts (over conferences, on factory tours and exhibition 
visits, etc. ), in order to both confmn strategic choices of my nine case firms and 
contrast their strategic differences. 
The face-to-face interviews were conducted broadly according to the principles 
of the "focused interview" as developed by Merton and Kendall (1946). The focused 
interview combines unstructured interviews with a loose pattern of agreement with the 
interviewee about the context of inquiry. Interview guides were prepared before each 
interview according to the stage of the research and the position of the subject. These 
guides would only specify areas of interest and leave the interviewer free to follow 
subjects' lines of thought. In this sense, the interviews have what Merton and Kendal 
(1946) call "range", permitting the subjects themselves to raise unanticipated areas of 
concern. The interviews also have "specificity", that is, they encourage subjects to 
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express fully their own definitions of situations and actions. Importantly, "depth" is 
also sought, in order to maximise self-revelatory comments concerning how the 
stimulus materials are experienced (Merton and Kendal, 1946: 555; cf. Whittington, 
1989: 127; Spender, 1989: 79). 
Most interviews were taped so that the interviewer could feel free to 
concentrate on the subject. These tapes were later transcribed verbatim for analysis. In 
fact, it is generally acknowledged by academics that studying Taiwanese company 
behaviour through the use of personal interviews is a challenge as most managers win 
tell you only part of the story and are unlikely to review crises and to talk about 
critically specific strategic triumphs in detail. Instead, it is possible for managers to tell 
other people's stories, or for former employees to disclose information of companies 
they had worked for. In recognition of all these conditions, I was flexible in the content 
of discussions among my interviewees in attempting to identify accurately firms' 
behaviours within each of my case studies firms. For example, the choice of journalists 
as important interviewees is coherent with the grounded theory approach because they 
provide a balanced account of company strategy and cover a wide range of related 
phenomena and inside information important to understanding corporate strategic 
differences across firrns on the basis of very different social structures. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have noted that the basic methodology used for this research is 
that of structurationist comparative case studies. First of all, I elaborated on the 
distance between structuration theory and empirical research in order to incorporate 
Giddensian concepts into sociological strategy research. Since the use of structuration 
theory at a methodological level does not rule-out the quantitative approach (Riley, 
1983: 416), 1 then argued comparative case studies should be used for examining the 
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strategic diversity of individual firms in terms of my three social structures. The 
remaining sections of this chapter covered various practical matters, such as selecting 
the samples, collecting secondary documents, and setting up, conducting and analysing 
interviews. While based on my empirical investigation, the next four chapters then will 
try to show how the four conceptual categories - social structures, industry system, 
corporate identities and strategic choices - can be integrated into a framework, capable 
of explaining corporate strategic differences. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SOCIAL STRUCTURES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I start to deal with the concrete empirical setting of the 
Taiwanese PC industry. The last four chapters have established a tripartite structural 
theory of strategy in order to study the industry from which the nine case study firms 
are drawn. Informed by structurationist sociology, the theory suggests that strategy is 
channelled through social structures. The social structures refer to institutionalised 
patterns "in how people behave and in the relationships in which they stand with one 
another" (Giddens, 1989: 19). In Chapter 31 have identified three sets of social 
structures critical to explaining strategic choices and differences in general. These are 
policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm. The policy style is made up of 
two features. One is the ways in which state institutions operate in the process of 
economic development, the other is the relationships between the state and business 
(cf. Richardson et al, 1982; Whitley, 1992a: 119-65). The business recipe refers to the 
ways in which firms function as economic actors, and to the relationships both between 
firms in the nation state and between owners, managers and workers within the 
organisations (Whitley, 1992a, e). The technology paradigm is the institutionalised 
knowledge base of an industry which includes the ways in which industrial operators 
behave in the industry and the relationships in which suppliers, distributors, customers 
and other business partners associate one with another within the industry (cf. Dosi, 
1984; Jones and Womack, 1986). Thus, the policy style, business recipe and 
technology paradigm have much in common. They all concern the ways in which social 
actors behave and develop relationships with one another. These ways constitute 
institutionalised patterns which can be analysed as rules of conduct and resources 
available for action. 
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Rules offer firms a set of guides to act, and resources empower firms' actions. 
The extent to which fums depend on the three sets of social rules and resources to 
guide and empower their actions varies one with another, as firms' links to the 
structures differ from one another. These links constitute firms' identities that will 
connect strategic choices to social structures in a certain way. It is therefore important 
to examine the criteria used to examine the degree to which firms have developed 
different structural links with their attendant social structures. 
To surnmarise, there are two elements - actions and relationships - that 
constitute the social structures of policy style, business recipe and technology 
paradigm. These structures provide both social rules and resources for guiding and 
empower firms' action. Also, the structures provide specific criteria by which we can 
examine firms' links to the social rules and resources. All of these elements are 
surnmarised in Table 5.1, and will be used to drive my analysis of the three social 
structures in this chapter. 
Table 5.1 Social structures 
Policy style Business recipe Technology paradigm 
Actions State Firms Industrial Operators 
Relationships State-business 
relations 
i) Inter-firm relations 
(within a nation state); 
ii) internal authority 
Exchange relations 
within an industry 
Rules Policy rules Business rules Technology rules 
Resources Policy resources Business resources Technology resources 
Firms'links to 
social structures I 
Identification 
with the style 
dentification with 
tIhe e recipe 
Identification with 
the 2aradigm 
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Informed by Table 5.1, this chapter will take three parts. First, I will introduce 
the Taiwanese policy style. Second, I will discuss the Taiwanese business recipe. 
Finally, I will examine the PC technology paradigm. Beginning in each section, I win 
use "actions and relationships" to carry out my analysis of the three social structures. 
Next, I will turn to examine in detail the social rules and resources generated from my 
discussion of each social structure. That done, I will briefly examine some criteria that 
will be used to examine fkms' links to each of the social structures. First, however, I 
want to outline a table surnmarising the whole contents of this chapter so that I can 
integrate it into the subsequent empirical analysis. It is in this table that I shall 
demonstrate the possibility of conflict, discussed in the next chapter. In general, Table 
5.2 will be systematically elaborated as I discuss each of the three social structures. 
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Table 5.2 Taiwanese policy style, Taiwanese business recipe and PC technology paradigm 
Policy rules Policy resources I Identification with 
the s! j e 
One KMTparty-state: Legitimate coercion; Connection to the KMT 
authoritarian-corporatist, Cheap land, labour and capital; (esp. the chairman); 
developmental state; bank loans, government Good, high education 
subsidies; degrees (esp. those of 
respect for I. P. R.; the stockmarket; the US); 
technology venture and high the HSIP; connection to the KMT 
R&D commitment; state contracts and the KMT business group; 
national-champion branding; business group; Stock-exchange listing; 
internationalisation, but not in social prestige and publicly free Taiwanese ethnicity 
China advertisement 
Business rules Business resources Identification with 
the recipe 
Strong family control; Capital ownership; A highly familial top 
low levels of vertical paternalism, entrepreneurism and management; business- 
integration and high levels of trustworthy family managers; groups firms vs. single 
opportunistic diversification; networks, satellite manufacturing form of family business; 
volume expansion, cost system, trading agents and curb personal relations of 
leadership and OEMs; markets; owner-managers; 
pluralistic, opportunistic, industry externalities; Taiwanese or American 
personal exchange hard-working employees higher degrees of owner- 
relationships; managers 
opportunistic external 
acquisition of expertise 
Technology rules I Technology resources Identification with 
the paradigm 
Open systems or standards; Network externalities; US degrees (esp. in 
continual growth; access to technological leaders Engineering and/or 
outsourcing; (e. g. Intel, and Microsoft and California! s 
standardised design and cheap Japanese LCD suppliers); universities); 
production; access to US distributors; Contracting or 
rapid product change and business contracts and investment linkages; 
strategic alliances; innovation partnerships; Long-standing 
respect for I. P. R.; highly skilled engineering labour component supply 
non-integration into 
distribution; 
flexibility and entrepreneurism 
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5.2 TAIWANESE POLICY STYLE 
In devising a typology of policy style, Richardson et al (1982) indicate two 
primary features. The first feature refers to a government's approach to problem- 
solving. The second primary feature refers to the relationships between government 
and other actors in the policy process. It is evident that Richardson et al's conception 
of policy style is at a relatively high level of abstraction and that this conception can be 
used at different levels or in different social areas (Mazey and Richardson, 1992; Raab, 
1992; Smith, 1992). Relatedly, in considering the major proximate social institutions 
which are closely related to the Taiwanese business recipe, Whitley (1992a) suggests 
that the organisation and role of the state are critical. This suggestion adds to my use 
of Richardson et al's notion of policy style which needs to take into consideration "the 
role of the state in the economic development.... how state institutions developed in 
the course of industrialisation and how particular state-business relations became 
established" (Whitley, 1992a: 119). Accordingly, I extend Richardson et al's (1982) 
notion of policy style to embrace Whitley's (1992a: 119-65) discussion of political 
systems and state-business relations. As a result, I will use two aspects of policy style 
to structure my analysis. One aspect of policy style concerns the development and role 
of state institutions in the process of economic development. The second aspect 
concerns the state's relationships with firms in this process. Taken together, the two 
aspects will provide the framework of my following analysis of the Taiwanese policy 
style. 
5.2.1 The Role of the State and State-Business Relations 
Economic development during the past four decades has substantially changed 
various authority patterns in Taiwan's society. But the structure and role of the 
Taiwanese state and its absolute authority to direct the path of economic development 
have been relatively extended and continuous (Gold, 1986; Wade, 1990; Whitley, 
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1992a: 133-42; Winckler, 1992). C nsequ/etly, Taiwan possesses a relatively stable, 
higher-order authofitarian-zporatist rule (Winckler, 1984,1992; Chu, 1987; 
Johnson, 1987; Wade, 199(22 igler, 1988) that underpins its commitment to 
state-led industrialisation and state-business relations. In considering the significance of 
the state in structuring firm behaviour, this authoritarian-corporatist rule pinpoints an 
important element of continuity, depending greatly on the regime of the Kuomintang or 
the Nationalist party (hereafter KMT) I whose military force and economic elites are a 
source of stability and growth in the country (Whitley, 1992a: 134-6). Despite the 
increasingly active role of the opposition2, the ruling KMT remains in solid control 
through a mixture of reform, co-optation and suppression. In a sense, one KHTparty- 
state rule prevails in the system of state institutions and governs the channelling of 
policy style resources from the state to industry and business organisations. 
Under the influence of one party-state rule, the KMT party-state has dominated 
the bureaucracy, and has enjoyed unusual power to carry out sustained programmes in 
the course of economic development. The state has sustained its economic position 
through extension of state ownership and control of industry, bank and financial 
systems (Wade, 1990: 159-62,175-82; Whitley, 1992a: 153-5). The movement of 
organised labour was tightly under the repression and control of the state (Zeigler, 
1988: 164-72; cf. Bello and Rosenfeld, 1990: 215-30; Fields, 1992: 405-20). The 
combination of strong state commitment to economic growth and a less autonomous 
civil society has led the wide configuration of social classes to encourage industrial 
development and investment. Overall, in considering the role of the Taiwanese state in 
industry, we can see that it functions as a developmental state which adopts a highly 
elaborate, resourceful and centralised administrative apparatus for planning and 
managing national resource distribution over the process of industrialisation (Chu, 
1989: 654-6). 
1 For further discussions of the KMT background, see Moody (1992: 16-20). 2For the development of political oppositions, see Lu (1992). 
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Acting as a development state, the Taiwanese state "governed the market" 
(Wade, 1990). This involved initiating and co-ordinating economic policies, helping to 
ensure that resources went into industries important for future growth. Indeed, 
according to neo-mercantile interpretation of the NICs (Cumings, 1987; Moon, 1990: 
156-7), Taiwan was regarded as the technological free-rider basing its economic 
expansion on selected manufactured goods (cf. Chou, 1991). However, through the 
long outward-oriented period, state influence was focused on the upstream large-scale 
firms, leaving the downstream small-scale firms much freer (Wade, 1990: 73). Mostly 
state-owned, the upstream firms enabled the state to have direct control over strategic 
material and provided economic safety for the loyal mainlander followers (Amsden, 
1985: 92). Partly to prevent the concentration of local economic power and partly 
because of the ethnic conflict separating the ruling party from the private sector, the 
state largely avoided the policy of backing conglomerates. Relatedly, with access to the 
high saving rate of the local economy, the curb financial institutions have enabled small 
and medium firms to achieve their export success despite state resources mostly 
favouring home-oriented large firms (Wade, 1985: 107-11). This loose, non- 
interference style of industry policy planning had left the export economy in Taiwan 
free to work out its own patterns (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988: 580). Under this 
circumstance, Taiwan's export-oriented firms were more independent and autonomous, 
but equally had to bear enterprise risks and uncertainty. As Gold (1986: 126) explains 
it, 
"Government-business relations in Taiwan differed substantially from Japan and 
Korea ... in Taiwan planners retained an aloof posture. 
They met to formulate policy 
and then relayed their decisions and attendant mechanisms to implement it to the 
business community and watched what happened. Although cadres did meet with 
entrepreneurs to exert some pressure and pick some favourites, Taiwan's private sector 
has been much more anarchic and self-directed than its Japanese and Korean 
counterparts. " 
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This kind of state-business relations traditionally m ilitated against the 
emergence of favourite groups or national champions in the international economy, as 
state elites retained significant independence from business in the formulation of public 
policy (Chu, 1989: 666-7; Haggard, 1988: 264; Hamilton and Biggart, 1988: 580; 
Wade, 1990: 256). But the relations have changed significantly since the mid-1980s, 
just as the development of state institutions has. The impetus for change was enforced 
by the lifting of martial law, the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo, the restructuring 
of parliament and the rise of Taiwanisation in the party-state (Cheng and Haggard, 
1992; Economist, 4 Dec. 1993: 81; Long, 1991: 180-202; Moody, 1992). The rise of 
capitalism in mainland China exacerbated this change and reinforced the willingness of 
private business elites to invest in China in defiance of the state (Chu, 1992: 152-3). 
In particular, on the side of the state, since the mid-1980s when Taiwanisation 
has restructured the system of state institutions, together with the increasingly apparent 
desire of the state to establish its international legitimacy (Clark, 1993: 126; Hu, 1994: 
3-24), there has been a more pragmatic and aggressive industrial policy under 
President Lee Teng-hui and Premier Lien Chan. Both have concentrated on promoting 
native businesses as the means of both justifying the Taiwanese controlled regime and 
promoting international respectability. This recent change in the state attitudes towards 
the management of national champions has substantially restructured state-business 
relations in Taiwan, and so has differentiated the legitimate process of competition for 
access to state resources. In addition to this policy change, the political power of firms 
has increased, in so far as private business elites seek to expand their economic power 
into political activities while challenging the supremacy of the state in the process of 
economic development. Partly because the rise of Taiwanisation has reversed the 
allocation of political resources in the state and partly because the restructuring of the 
election system has made the expansion of interest groups more possible, the business 
community has begun to be accorded a more preeminent recognition in the party 
power structure. To illustrate, for the first time, two members of CSC - the highest 
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power body of the KMT - are businessmen. The combination of the increased political 
power of firms and the increased desire of the state to support national champions has 
facilitated the willingness of private business elites to enter into the political pursuit of 
competitive advantage. 
Overall, then, Taiwanese firms now have a tendency towards competition for [access 
to political advantages because the distribution of state resources can be 
d rent for individual firms. This change of state-business relations has reinforced 
endency to conform to policy rules of the state as the competition for access to 
ta resources can be brought down to the level of individual firms, and has become 
more important to firms. These policy rules, which are particularly critical to explaining 
strategic choices of Taiwanese PC firms, will now be discussed. 
5.2.2 Policy Style Rules 
Respectfor LP. R. 
In considering the Taiwanese policy style for guiding firms' action, a number of 
important rules deserve special mention. The first one is the rule of respect for I. P. R. 
(Intellectual Property Rights). In fact, the state's concentration upon international 
relations within the world has influenced the R&D practices of many private business 
elites since the late 1980s. As the pace of joining international organisations such as 
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) (Feinerman, 1994) accelerates, state 
restrictions on counterfeiting have become much more considerable. Indeed, as one of 
the worst offenders of intellectual-property rights partly because of its traditionally 
weak legal protection, Taiwan is being made into an example for Washington's world- 
wide war against I. P. R. theft (Baum, 8 April 1993). In its I. P. R. negotiation with the 
U. S., however, Taiwan is vulnerable because of its diplomatic isolation and its pending 
application to join the GATT. Partly as a result, since the late 1980s, the state has 
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created many pressures on firms' counterfeiting and other illegal practices. To 
illustrate, currently, Taiwanese PC firms pay half of their earnings to foreign firms for 
patent expenditures3 and numerous I. P. R. legal cases are in process (Ristelhueber, 
Sep. 1993; Soong and Kovar, I Sep. 1993). Overall, in competition with one another 
for access to state resources, private business elites need to conforrn to the rule of 
respect for I. P. R., as this conformity is at the least supportive of their pursuit of 
political resources. 
Technology Venture and High R&D Commitment 
Before the late 1970s, in order to improve the competitiveness of industry, the 
state in Taiwan tended to concentrate on controlling factor costs and the exchange rate 
through intervention in factor and currency markets. The focus was on improving the 
general framework for business. Since then, state support of technology venture and 
firms' commitment to R&D activities has intensified, in so far as the state makes a 
priority of upgrading industrial technology in selected industries and firms. 
In May 1978, a new "Science and Technology Development Plan" was 
formulated and passed by the Executive Yuan. While primarily designed to spur 
industry's own efforts, this plan laid out a programme that entailed greater investment 
in R&D, education, industrial restructuring and improved linkages between defence 
and civilian industries in high-technology fields. Since then, state support of industry 
specialisation and modernisation has become more distinctive, as the state promotes 
the activities of technology venture, inter-firm cooperation and high R&D 
commitment. For instance, in order to intensify its efforts towards upgrading industry 
technology, in the late 1990, the state promulgated the Statute for Promotion and 
Upgrading of Industries (SPUI) to replace the Statute for Encouraging Investment 
3Quoted from a speech by Tze-chen Tu, Director of MIC, Hl. 
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(SEI), which was enacted for thirty years between 1961 and 1990 (Wade, 1990: 182- 
5) 
According to SPUI, fiscal incentives are used to help promote activities of 
manufacturing automation, technology ventures, pollution control and international 
marketing (Hobgood-Brown and Clinton, 1994: 193-5; Huang, 1994: 493-500). In late 
1992, the Program for the Development of Critical Components and Products (DCCP) 
was further declared by the state to encourage long-term commitments to R&D. In 
contrast to the SEI which aims to build up the manufacturing sector, the newly 
announced SPUI and DCCP seem to focus on promoting the elevation of 
manufacturing ability to the level of innovation potential. The SPUI and DCCP have 
been distinctive in their emphasis on modernisation of equipment and specialisation 
between firms within the same industry, leading to intense industrial reorganisation, 
technology ventures and the promotion of research and development projects and 
own-brand marketing (Hobgood-Brown and Clinton, 1994: 193). In this, own-brand 
marketing is worth singling out for further discussion. 
National-champion Branding 
As discussed above, the state is increasingly promoting own-brand marketing. 
Traditionally, this pursuit of international marketing has been deliberately neglected by 
Taiwanese firms, as several factors constrain the willingness of business owners to 
market their own products in the international economy. For example, Taiwan's 
traditional political isolation has long constrained firms' activities in the world. The 
MIT (made in Taiwan) products have been for a long time been cheaper in-dtation with 
their prices regularly implying "30 percent off'4. However, in order to underpin its 
efforts towards international recognition, the state has been highly involved in directing 
4Quoted from a speech by Stan Shih, CEO of Acer. 
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the flow of company resources into international marketing, particularly through state 
encouragement of national champions. 
Partly because of the increased desire of the state to encourage international 
marketing, there are now some Taiwanese firms (e. g. Acer in PCs, Kennex in tennis 
rackets and Proton in TVs) which are pursuing more the own-brand route. To achieve 
sustainable international advantage, most of these firms have a tendency to secure the 
support of the state. This tendency has, of course, exacerbated the competition 
between firms for access to political advantage. In the nation state, some firms may be 
recognised as national champions and so are more likely to depend on the policy style 
to guide and empower their action. 
Internationalisation, but not in China 
Just as the creation of national-champion brands is critical to underpinning its 
search for international recognition, the state is increasingly encouraging the 
internationalisation of corporate activities. This is also encouraged by the large-scale 
currency appreciation and rising wages that have forced many firms to move 
manufacturing operations offshore to neighbouring Pacific Rim countries, where less- 
expensive labour and land are still available. With growing policy concern regarding 
the importation of foreign labour as an alternative source of cheap labour, the 
combination of political uncertainty and geographical isolation has led the government 
to limit the import of labour within strict yearly quotas. Foreign direct investment 
overseas, then, is left as the most obvious means to accessing cheap labour by 
Taiwanese finns. 
Obviously, Taiwan's political isolation operates in some ways that constrain 
firms' internationalisation. Still, some features of policy style are involved in its 
production of power bases for firms' competition in the international market. Taiwan's 
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long dependence on the US, for example, provides firms with a familiar English- 
speaking community that steers their international activities. In addition, Taiwan's good 
relationshi s with the overseas Chinese (Long, 1991: 150-1) enable firms to invest in &i 
40LIV% 
S( ; rn countries. In a sense, the rationale of internationalisation is thus partly 
associated with the English language and south-eastern countries. On the other hand, 
this rationale is certainly not supportive of investing in China. 
As a purely economic matter, the mainland China, with its common language 
and certain other cultural traits, as well as its investment incentives, has offered 
Taiwanese firms a natural outlet (Zich, 1993: 24-6). However, indirect trade with the 
mainland prior to 1988 had been traditionally viewed under a long-standing statute on 
Taiwan as a seditious act, equivalent to financially aiding Chinese Communism. 
However, social movements in Taiwan since 1988 have changed the relationships 
between the state and firms in the area of China investment policy. The tug-of-war 
between the state and the export-oriented sectors illustrates how business people were 
leading, rather than being led by, Taiwan's policy makers. In general, China investment 
is an area where the individualistic interest of economic actors and the security 
interests of the state clash. The state has resisted the persistent call from the private 
export-oriented sector to loosen the restrictions on economic exchange between 
Taiwan and mainland China (Chu, 1992: 152-3). None the less, since the mid-1980s, 
local firms have begun to find ways to circumvent the existing legal barriers. The 
trickle of the triangular trade through Hong Kong soon turned into a torrent. The state 
was later forced to modify its policy to accommodate the "existing situation". The ban 
on indirect trade concerning exports to the mainland was lifted, with the restrictions on 
imports substantially eased in 1989. In 1990, the state also formally eased the ban on 
investment through overseas subsidiaries. In considering the styles of Taiwan's Chinese 
investment policy, we thus observe that the evolving relationships between the state 
and business have been a series of confrontations and practical actions. 
87 
Overall, then, because of its reduced autonomy and implementation capacity, 
the state has been losing its control over private business elites who are eager to go to 
China for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, a key weapon in the state's ability to govern 
the private sector is its control over financial system and stockmarket institution. In 
detail, banking loans are reduced for firms which have operational activities in China. 
The regulations concerning Chinese investment have been especially strict for the 
handful of publicly listed companies. Accordingly, the floated companies may be able 
to get access to local public capital resources, but their identities as PLCs in turn 
considerably associate them with the state and so constrain their access to China! s 
cheap natural resources. 
5.2.3 Policy Style Resources 
Legitimate Coercion 
In Taiwan, state-business relations are partly based on the role of the KMT 
party-state to legitimate the state system of rule. At a fundamental level, business 
activities in the nation state are thus subject to the approval of the KMT party-state. In 
, _' 
considering a variety of policy style resources for empowering firms' action, the basic 
one then is "control over the means of violence" (Giddens, 1985; cf. Whittington, 
1992: 704-5). 
Cheap Land, Labour and Capital 
In addition to legitimate coercion, the state offers firms a society with high 
mercantilist sentiment among the populace by controlling the movements of other 
social classes (cf. Koo, 1987: 177). Operating in such a society, Taiwan firms have 
enjoyed privileged positions in the allocation of national natural resources - land, 
labour and capital - and have for decades been blessed with a national consensus about 
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the importance of economic growth. To illustrate, in the process of industrialisation, 
economic growth was always given advantage over environment protection (Hsiao, 
1992: 60). Strikes, which were banned under martial law, continue to be illegal despite 
some revision of the Labour Dispute Law (Cohen, 1988: 129). The price of industry- 
use electricity is much cheaper than that for family-use. The Fair Trade Law (FIL) was 
not enacted until early 19915. In comparison with natural sciences, agriculture and 
social sciences, engineering remains a focal point of the government's education 
investment (NSC, 1993). In order to help industries in export expansion, the state has 
developed a closely regulated system of floating exchange rates in which the NT dollar 
was always under-valued. Overall, Taiwanese firms benefit from a policy style which 
has firinly established a sophisticated infrastructure, favourable to creating economic 
resources, including cheap land, labour and capital. 
In addition to this general framework, the state has directed the flow of 
financial resources into particular areas and provided various kinds of discriminated 
assistance in industry. In general, the assistance includes access to bank loans, 
subsidies, the stockmarket, the HSIP and the KMT business group. These resources 
will be discussed below. 
Bank loans and Government Subsidies 
In Taiwan, the channeling of national high saving through state-controlled 
financial systems has been a key instrument of industrial management. The financial 
systems are virtually dominated by the banks (Wade, 1985: 112), the majority of which 
are directly and indirectly controlled by the state and are extremely conservative. Until 
recently, the banking sector is very bureaucratic, insisting on conformity to state policy 
(Hou Liang and Skully, 1982; Wade, 1985). In a sense, any bank loan in Taiwan is 
5TIe FIL covers a wide range of market practices and targets unfair competition practices 
(East Asian Executive Reports, 15 Mar. 199 1). 
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preferential because the alternative is curb market credit at a price at least 50 percent 
higher (Wade, 1990: 165). 
By indicating priority industries or products for bank lending, the state is able 
to impose its wishes on the private sector. In order to promote R&D activities, for 
example, the state announced a list of 145 strategic products that qualified for a 
preferential loan (which was to be two percent lower than that of the regular long-term 
loan) in 1985, covering 49 machine industry products, 9 auto parts, 29 electrical 
products and 58 products in the information industry. In 1986, the number of strategic 
products was extended to contain 198 further items including materials, 
pharmaceutical products, and computer software, as falling under the strategic 
industries. 
In addition to bank loans, the state has created special purpose funds, such as 
the Development Fund of the Executive Yuan, together with other fiscal incentives to 
assist the development of industry. These incentives include devices such as tax 
holidays, accelerated depreciation, investment tax credits, duty-free import of capital 
goods, and reduced rates of business tax (Wade, 1990: 182-5). In order to encourage 
investments in the information industry, for example, the state appointed the Bank of 
Taiwan and Medium Business Bank of Taiwan to offer low-interest loans to 
information companies. During the 1982-1989 period, there were 363 cases in which 
information and electronics companies obtained a total of NT$22.8 billion in bank 
loans through the state's assistance, accounting for 22.4 per cent of the total loans for 
strategic industries (111,1990: 2). 
The Stockmarket 
Apart from the banking sector and special purpose funds, the Taiwan 
stockmarket since the late 1987 has been increasingly important to firms seeking long- 
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term equity sources. The Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE), the only centralised 
securities trading market in Taiwan, was open for business in 1962, and has become a 
major capital institution since the mid-1980s. The weakness of Taiwan's money market 
and other capital market institutions, together with the rapid accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves and national savings, has fostered the TSE's development (Lai, 
1994). 
Comparison between the years 1986 and 1990 illustrates the significance of 
TSE. In 1986, the weighted average index for the first time reached 1,000 points, with 
an average of 130 million shares traded every day and NT$2.4 billion in daily trading 
volume. In February 1990, the index reached an all-time high, soaring to 12,495.34 
points, with an average of 993 million shares traded daily and NT $132.98 billion in 
daily market turnover, making the TSE one of the busiest markets in the world (The 
Yearbook on the Stoclanarket of the Republic of China, 1990: 223). It is estimated that 
one-fifth of Taiwan's population engages in the trading of stocks (Yu, 1992: 3). This 
rapidly growing stockmarket capitalisation has played an important role in helping 
PLCs raise cheap capital through public funding. The TSE is virtually state-controlled, 
with its company shares mostly owned by state-operated financial institutions and the 
KNIT business group. Partly through public regulations and partly through the 
influence of the KMT business group, the KMT is able to reinforce its ability to govern 
private business elites which are fuelled by a "floating dream". In order to encourage 
firms' conformity to the state's promotion of industrial upgrading and reorganisation, 
for ýexample, the state stipulates two items in the DCCP (the Program for the 
Development of Critical Components and Products) to help increase firms' access to 
capital resources of the stockmarket. As the DCCP indicates: 
.... (2) Where a publicly listed company increases its capital to produce the critical 
components and products selected pursuant to this program, the Minister of Economic 
Affairs may recommend the Securities and Exchange Commission, MOF, to approve 
the company's application for capital increase". 
(3) Where a company whose stocks are not listed in the stock exchange house or not 
traded at the trading floor of securities dealers, the Ministry of Economic Affairs may 
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recommend the Securities and Exchange Commission, MOF, to agree to list the 
company's stocks as Class C stocks or approve such stocks to be traded at the trading 
floor of securities dealers6. 
To a considerable extent, the MOEA's approval is necessary for firms to 
become publicly listed, as the board of the TSE is partly incorporated by the MOEA! s 
officials. 
Additionally, it is important to note here that, precisely because the competition 
for access to the stockmarket is very high in industry, stockmarket regulations have 
often favoured business-group firms or national champions, working against SMEs. 
According to the practice and regulations of the corporate and security laws, only a 
company with a paid-up capital equal to NT$100 million or more could apply for the 
issuance of shares through public funding and negotiation in the open market. 
Therefore, only large companies were able to take advantage of the rapid rise in stock 
prices by raising funds through the issuance of shares. Although strong capital 
structure is an essential condition for gaining a position in the stockmarket, connection 
to the KMT appears to be critically useful in winning the competition for access to 
public capital resources7. As this connection can now be differentiated at the level of 
individual firms, private business elites with good political relations can thus maximise 
their opportunity in order to raise funds through the stockmarket which is virtually 
manipulated and controlled by the state. 
The HSIP (infrastructure) 
As I have discussed, the state has recognised the importance of licensing 
agreements and direct foreign investment to Taiwan's industrial growth (cL Pack, 
60n this point, refers to Article 7, Programfor the Development of Critical Components and 
Products, published by MOEA (Dec. 1992). 
7To take an example, by inviting Dr. Huang to chair the board, Elitegroup became publicly 
floated on the exchange market in the middle of 1994. Elitegroup is one of my case PC firms, 
and its new chairman Dr. Huang is believed to have very good relationships with the KNIT. 
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1992: 90). By adopting measures to encourage DFI in more capital and technology- 
intensive industries, it has actively used its sovereign power and its control of the 
domestic economy to assist the acquirement of advanced expertise resources (Huang, 
1989: 113). Perhaps the most important of such measures was the establishment of the 
Hsin-chu Science-based Industrial Park (HSIP). In 1980, the state established the 
HSIP in order to "help attract the services of first-rate Chinese scientists, to establish 
the introduction of key technologies, to accelerate the development of defence-related 
industries, and to promote a close working relationship between the academic 
profession and the industrial sector". The HSIP offers foreign investors a favourable 
environment for research, development and manufacturing that includes attractive 
incentives and a well-established infrastructure. For example, the freeway passes 
directly through the HSIP, offering rapid access to all major destinations. As of 
December 1991, the state had invested more than US$312 million in the Park, 
providing complete public utilities and services as well as industrial and executive 
districts. This type of knowledge transfer is an important resource in establishing 
linkages between local research institutes, local businesses and foreign ones in order to 
help local industries move towards the best business practices in the world. For 
example, one criterion of entry to the HSIP is that a firm engages in some development 
and engineering in the Park (Haggard and Cheng, 1987: 127). Gaining access to the 
HSIP is very competitive for local fmW8. In addition to accessible expert resources, 
there are several investment incentives available to firms situated in the HSIP (NSC, 
1993). These include a five-year income tax holiday, a maximum income tax liability of 
22% following the tax holiday, exemption from tariffs on machinery imports and from 
business tax on export sales, venture capital assistance and so on. 
8By 1991, among my nine case PC firms, only Acer, Mitac and Twinhead bad operational 
activities in the HSEP. As we shall see later in my case studies, partly because of their relatively 
high connections to the policy style, all these three firms tend to commit themselves to R&D 
activities, . 
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State Contracts and the KMT Business Group 
Partly through its extended control of state institutions, the KMT party-state 
has been a major buyer in some industries. State procurement has been unusually 
oriented towards promoting national champions since the late 1980s. For example, 
nearly all universities and public enterprises purchased PCs made by Acer, the first 
Taiwanese PC firm achieving international reputation. 
The KNIT party-state has also been able to associate itself with private business 
elites through extension of state ownership of enterprises, known as the KNIT business 
group. The group ranges from property development firms and financial institutions to 
a communications empire and so on. Although much of its investment is categorised as 
(e. g. mass communication) whose importance is not published, the KMT 
business group is still ranked as the sixth biggest business group in Taiwan. It owns 
about 70 major properties and corporations, with a total worth estimated at US$115 
billion. This makes the KMT one of the richest political parties in the world (Burton, 
1993). By developing a local business conglomerate under KMT control and ensuring 
party control of most national material resources, the party has succeeded in stabilizing 
its political regime and neutralizing a considerable amount of potential opposition. In 
particular, the group not only helps the KMT state to impose its policy decisions, but 
also acts as the interest channels from the government to the party itself. The KMT 
business group has been notable in directing the flow of business contracts and 
information resources into particular firms which are more willing to conform to the 
state policy (cf. Time, 23 Aug. 1993: 38). 
Social Prestige and Publicly Free Advertisement 
In addition to substantial fiscal incentives discussed above, some of the 
important resources provided by the state have been symbolic and informational. Many 
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awards and ceremonies were created to recognise success in international competition. 
Own-brand marketing was established as an explicit national honour. The state- 
controlled media were officially involved, making frequent and free advertisements to 
promote international own-brand stars (Pennells, 1994). The current president Dr. Lee 
Teng-hui and premier Dr. Lien Chan were personally engaged, making frequent visits 
to companies, trade exhibitions and attending most entrepreneurial awarding 
ceremonies. An example of a notable action to encourage own-brand stars was in the 
late 1990s when the President Dr. Lee first visited Singapore and he brought an Acer- 
made PC as a gift for the president of Singapore. As noted, Acer was the first 
Taiwanese PC fmn to market its own-brand, and its founder - Stan Shih - was the first 
Taiwanese businessman to be recognised as one the world's ten distinguished 
entrepreneurs by the International Entrepreneur Association (Wang, 1988: 301). 
5.2.4 Identification with the Style 
As discussed above, political restructuring since the mid 1980s has strongly 
impinged upon the connections between state agencies and individual firms. Because 
intervention can now be discriminated at the level of individual firms, some business 
elites might be viewed as specially legitimate in the nation state, and so are able to gain 
political advantage over their rivals. To understand the extent to which firms are likely 
to be able to find legitimation in regard to the nation state and so increase their 
connections to the state and its resources, the key is to examine the extent to which 
their identities match the collective political characteristics of the KMT party-state. 
Firstly, firms' connection to the KMT chairman associates them with the state 
in the strongest sense. Regularly acting as a highly centralised party executive in the 
CSC, the KMT chairman retains a superior position from which he could impose his 
wishes on the government. In a society where networks of organising relations are 
considered as a useful resource, connection to the KMT chairman is obviously a 
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premium one, enabling firms to gain access to a bundle of national economic and 
political resources. The current President Lee Teng-hui has been chairman since 
President Chiang Ching-kuo died in January, 1988. Unlike President Chiang Ching- 
kuo, President Lee Teng-hui's relationships with private business elites are complicated 
and, indeed, highly involved. For example, in addition to his personal friendships with 
several business entrepreneurs - such as Jung-fa Chang, the chairman of Evergreen 
group - the President is also a substantial shareholder of Acer, one of my case PC 
firms. 
Secondly, the education background of owner-managers is critical to 
connecting firms to the organisation of state agencies who are, indeed, well-educated 
themselves. In the bureaucracy of the KMT party-state, holding a bachelor degree is 
common, and most of them hold masters or even doctorate degrees from leading 
American universities. The degree-oriented virtue of bureaucratic scholarships has 
been more substantially reflected in the system of state institutions after Lee Teng-hui, 
who holds a Ph. D. degree in Agricultural Economiqýf Cornell University9, succeeded 
to the presidency of the ROC and chairmanship of the KMT. In 1993 when President 
Lee chose Lien Chan as the newly installed premier, the then new cabinet was 
organised with about half the ministers holding Ph. D. degrees. Thus, owner-managers 
with American higher education are more able to mix with, understand and exploit the 
dominant political elite. 
Thirdly, firms' connection to the KMT business group will lead them to develop 
a relatively high tendency to conform to state policy, hence increasing their connection 
to the Taiwanese policy style. This connection is mainly through cross-equity holding 
and long-term exchange relationships in the economy. Also, PLCs, provide a positive 
9Dr. Lee went to the US in his early forties to study for a PhD degree. Before that, he had been 
working in the government apparatus for a long while. President Lee is the first chief of state 
bom in Taiwan and since he has studied also in Japan and was educated during Japan's control 
over Taiwan, he also can speak fluent Japanese. 
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connection to the policy style which provides them with cheap capital resources but 
also constrains them to conform to state policy, particularly that related to the 
mainland China policy. 
In considering business connection to policy style, ethnicity provides a more 
complicated source of legitimacy. Mainlander ethnicity is still useful in winning 
material power resources, particularly those relevant to defence-related industries. On 
the other hand, the rise of Taiwanisation in the KMT party-state has led to some sort 
of demotion of mainlanders' political advantage. Taiwanese community values, intum, 7 
have deeply penetrated the country's political activities. As a result, Taiwanese 
ethnicity now imposes few constraints, and indeed may offer new advantage to a KMT 
state struggling for legitimacy in a changing economic environment. Consequently, as 
native businesses, some Taiwanese firms are increasingly likely to identify with state 
policy in order to access resources previously directed more to mainlander firms. 
5.3 TAIWANESE BUSINESS RECIPE 
In this section I examine the second structural concept of my theory - business 
recipe - that provides a further set of possible rules and resources, enabling firms to act 
in a certain way. In Section 3.3.2,1 propose this concept with reference to the 
discussion of Whitley (1992a, e) who defines business recipe under three major 
headings: (1) the nature of firms as economic actors; (2) market organisations; and (3) 
authoritative coordination and control systems. The nature of firms includes the ways 
in which decision-making discretion is allocated and exercised and their growth 
patterns. Market organisatiOns, or inter-firm relations, refer to the significance of long- 
term connections and obligations between firms, both within and between industrial 
sectors. The coordination and control systems of firms can be divided into four major 
characteristics. Those include the significance of personal authority and ownership 
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within firms, their reliance on impersonal and formal procedures for management, 
managerial type, and prevalent patterns of employees. These eight categories of 
Taiwanese business recipe will now be briefly discussed, and will be analysed as 
specific social rules and resources discussed afterwards. 
5.3.1 The Nature of Firms, Market Organisations and Internal Co-ordination 
Structures 
(1) Business Specialisation 
To begin with, we discuss the nature of Taiwan firms as economic actors and 
their development. In Taiwan, firms are predominantly family controlled and operated. 
These dominant economic actors are known as Chinese family businesses. Most of 
these family businesses are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)10. Although 
their contribution to the Taiwan economy has gradually declined during the past years, 
the impact of SMEs remains substantial, particularly with respect to exports and 
employment. These enterprises contribute about one half of the output, and over 57% 
of exports, and create over 61% of employment opportunities (MOEA, 1992)11. 
These SMEs are typically highly leveraged (chronically under-financed) in the sense 
that they depend more on borrowing than on equity capital 12. 
10 The features of SMEs and their scale of operation vary both from country to country and in 
different industrial cycles over a period of time. For a growing number of researchers and 
reporting organisations, the small business is generally considered to employ no more than 500 
persons and to have sales of less than $20 million (d'Amboise and Muldowney, 1988: 226). For 
Taiwan's particular definition with regard to its regulation environment, see Recognition 
Standardsfor Small and Medium-sized Business, issued by the MOEA on 25 Nov. 199 1. I lFor example, Taiwan's PC industry has a large number of SMEs; The top 20 firms account 
for only 56% of the island's PC production (see Section 6.4). 12For example, in 1990, SME sectoes liability over asset ratio reached about 70 percent, 
whilst large businesses' reached about 43 per cent (Bank of Taiwan, 199 1). 
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In addition to SMEs, business groups appear in the economy as another 
important economic actorl3. In the early 1970s, successful enterprising and individuals 
began to form business groups to invest in new companies or one another's firms, 
rather than to create large business conglomerates. Unlike Korean chaebol firms and 
Japanese enterprise groups, Taiwanese business groups comprise relatively small 
companies with only a few hundred workers (Hamilton and Kao, 1990: 140; Orrii et al, 
1991). One important reason for Taiwanese business groups lies in the typically 
paternalistic chairman's desire to let each of his sons be chairman of his own firm 
(Gold, 1986: 88; Greenhalgh, 1988: 235; Wong, 1985). These groups are owned either 
by a single family or by several individuals in family partnerships. In Taiwan's 
economy, this kind of partnership amounts to a form of family ownership (Wong, 
1985). 
Overall, then, whether in a business group, or a SME, the essence of the 
Taiwanese firm, or Chinese family business, is familism (Greenhalgh, 1988; Wong, 
1985; Hamilton and Kao, 1990: 142). The ownership of the family business is 
predominantly private, though many of the leading entrepreneurs have diversified large 
blocks of company shares to different generations to ensure obedience to company and 
securities regulations and to secure control of the company. Partly as a result, the 
entire family may be on the payroll. This significance of strong family control, together 
with the lack of a strong market for corporate control in Taiwan, results in a low 
degree of managerial discretion (Whitley, 1992a: 65). In considering the significance of 
owner-control and specialisation, Taiwanese firms are thus considerably specialised in 
authority hierarchies. 
13For the definition of East Asian business groups, see Hamilton et al (1989: 107-111). For a 
fuller discussion of Taiwan business groups, including relevant sources, also see Hamilton and 
Kao (1990) and Numazaki (1986). 
99 
(2) Growth Pattems 
The growth patterns of finns are generally discontinuous. In order to take 
advantage of market opportunities and maximise profits, Taiwanese firms prefer to 
pursue opportunistic diversification and typically grow through volume expansion into 
related areas (Whitley, 1992: 65,204). Partly because family interests are more 
important than personal prestige, partly because the concentrated ownership structure 
overrides the function of organisational hierarchy, the opportunistic aspect of 
entrepreneurism and the goal of profit maximisation are deeply built into the ideology 
of owner managers. 
(3) Relational Contracting; and (4) Inter-sector Coordination 
Turning now to consider the organisation of exchange relationships, inter-firm 
cooperation is scarce in Taiwan, and firms show a high level of reliance on 
entrepreneurial skills for access to expert resources. Inter-sector coordination is low, 
largely confined to personal ties. Subcontract relations are not necessarily long-lasting 
and tend towards reliance on multiple outsourcing. Overall, because of the low degree 
of mutual obligations between firms, access to resources largely depends on personal 
relations or family-like connections between the business owners (Whitley, 1992a: 7 1, 
205-6). 
This is true even for business groups. Though mostly controlled by the owning 
family through cross-shareholdings, these business-group firms are typically only 
loosely integrated. Within the groups, these firms are very personal, depending heavily 
on family-like relations of trust between the owner-managers of each firm or sets of 
firms. Outside the groups, they tend to rely extensively on subcontracting relations 
with non-group firms, whose connections to the groups are not necessarily long lasting 
(Orril et al, 1992: 385). To summarise, the development of market organisations is far 
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more fragmented, despite the existence of business groups constituting an important 
feature of the economy. 
(5) Significance of Personal Authority and Ownership and 
(6) Significance of Formal Procedures 
Finally, central to the nature of authority in Taiwanese firms is a high level of 
owner or family control. The internal co-ordination structures are strongly associated 
with ownership and are highly centralised. Personal relations are commonly the main 
bases for authority. The importance of personal connections is highlighted by extensive 
use of individuals related by blood or marriage and others with strong personal ties to 
the owner. The organisation of top management and the board are variations on each 
other. The high degree of owner control leads organisations not usually to function in 
hierarchies or rely on formal control procedures. 
All these business practices result in employment policies being less 
institutionalised and more dependent on the personal choice of the owner. Employment 
practices are not governed by standardised procedures and rules but rather are 
informal, suited to the particular relationship between the business owner and 
individual employees (Whitley, 1992a: 207). The long-term employer commitment is 
constrained by the focus of family loyalties. This lack of long-term commitment is 
likely to encourage limited delegation to middle managers in Taiwan's family 
businesses where the owner typically takes all strategic and major personnel decisions 
(Whitley, 1992a: 77). As a result, business leaders maintain considerable social 
distance from subordinates and rarely explain and justify their decisions. 
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(7) Managerial Style 
Trade unions are normally weak as the result of state oppression and control. 
Enterprise unions are integrated into managerial subordinates and often involved only 
in the organisation of company parties and excursions. The lack of strong unions in 
turn enables fums to enforce worker discipline and administer worker services rather 
than to represent their demands. The dominant managerial style here is very much 
didactic or paternalistic (Whitley, 1992a: 79). 
(8) Employee Commitment 
The considerable distance between the owners and workers constrained 
owners' development of mutual trust with their workers, except on a personal basis. In 
general, workers in Taiwan mostly obtain their jobs through their friends and relatives 
rather than through formal channels; and employers prefer to rely on personal 
recommendations for hiring a skilled and widely-experienced worker to fit an 
important managerial position. Loyalty among unrelated employees is often low and, 
as a result, this has created much higher rates of employee turnover. Ambitious skilled 
workers are eager to start their own business, as soon as they can obtain enough 
capital and business experience, rather than follow a career plan set by someone else's 
family business (Wong, 1985). Partly as a result of this, rates of new firm foundation 
and failure are both high (Whitley, 1990: 60). 
The preceding discussions of business recipe materials inform us of the ways in 
which the Taiwanese function as economic actors, inter-firms relations both within and 
across sectors, and owners-managers-workers relations. With respect to my case PC 
industry, all of these materials can be analysed as specific business rules and resources 
for guiding and empowering firms' actions, and will now be discussed. 
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5.3.2 Business Recipe Rules 
Strong Family Control 
The first and basic social rule of Taiwanese business recipe is strong family 
control, which leads to the development of owner-managers and their close 
identification with the family interest. As discussed above, the dominant economic 
actors in the society are family businesses. Central to the nature of family business is its 
highly concentrated ownership structure which promotes the rule of strong family 
control. The owning family is reluctant to bring in outside shareholders, in order to 
maintain independence and to avoid the need to separate clearly company and family 
finances. Partly as a result, the executive board itself is often like an extended family, 
where major shareholders are familiar with one another. This emphasis on strong 
family control has inhibited the growth of a professional non-shareholding class. 
As professional managerialism is by no means institutionalised, entrepreneurs 14 
or owner-managers are most important in co-ordinating economic activities. They are 
highly charismatic and intimately involved in all company affairs as well as in civic 
affairs. This emphasis on strong owner control also limits the scope of managerially 
integrated activities, because the owners prefer to have direct control of them 
(Whitley, 1992a: 203). The leadership performance of owners' wives is also distinctive, 
with their more careful character involved in day-to-day activities of the family 
business. While male owner-managers are responsible for purchasing, marketing and 
production, their wives are concerned solely with financial management. This emphasis 
of the owning family control has been connected to the interests of the owner- 
managers, critical to explaining Taiwanese firm behaviour. 
14For the discussion of Taiwan's entrepreneurship and its conception, see Li (1986). 
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Low Levels of Vertical Integration and High Levels of Opportunistic Diversification 
The second rule of Taiwanese business recipe concerns the development of 
firms which tend to be less vertically integrated and more opportunistically diversified 
than their Japanese and Korean rivals. Acquisition growth strategies are scarce in 
Taiwan, and hostile take-overs rare. 
Unlike in either Japan or South Korea, there are relatively low levels of vertical 
and horizontal integration (Whitley, 1992a: 205) and a relative absence of oligopolistic 
organisations in Taiwan's industries (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988: 560,565). In fact, 
the imperfect system of company law regulations has enabled Taiwanese businessmen 
to prefer to diversify their capital, resulting in elaborate tax-saving considerations. 
However, this diversification is by no means simply driven by tax incentives which 
favour new firms. Since economic uncertainty is a central feature in Taiwan's society, 
the small-to-medium size, single unit firm is so much the rule that when a successful 
firni moves to acquire another, no attempt is made at vertical integration in order to 
control the market-place or to reduce transaction costs; instead, firni acquisitions 
represent speculation in new markets and opportunistic diversification in a series of 
unrelated firms. 
Overall, then, the general pattern of growth in the family business is 
opportunistic and, indeed, speculative. As personal owner control restricts the 
development of professional management, the owning fan-dly tends to put a great deal 
of emphasis on short-term financial performance rather than market share. Company 
growth is based on a preference for setting up new firms for each new venture in 
different fields rather than integrating activities through a single managerial hierarchy. 
Thus, flexibility is paramount, and this focus on ability to shift resources has facilitated 
opportunistic diversification if suitable partners are available to offer expert resources 
of professional skills and facilities (Whitley, 1992a: 204). This emphasis on 
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opportunistic diversification, in turn, limits commitments to a particular industry by 
getting access to controlled network resources of suppliers and trade agents to 
coordinate complementary activities. Partly as a result, they are unlikely to pursue 
integration growth strategies, and low rates of R&D/sales are typical. 
Volume Expansion, Cost leadership and OEMs 
Another important rule concerning firms' growth patterns is that they tend to 
pursue volume expansion, cost leadership and the OEM route in so far as profit- 
maximisation and/or family interest drive their action. 
Instead of pursuing strategies of vertical integration and diversifying into 
unrelated areas, Taiwanese firms are very oriented towards volume expansion while 
concentrating on a restricted range of products (Whitley, 1992a: 66). The combination 
of this growth pattern and the export-oriented economy has boosted OEM processing 
business in the island. In order to get access to contracts, Taiwanese firms, while 
mostly OEM-based, tend to pursue a cost-leadership strategy with the acquisition of 
cheap economic resources available for action. Also, they tend to place emphasis on 
production adaptability as key strategic weapons, as opposed to the West's stress on 
Fordism - the mass assembly-line production of standard models in order to grasp 
economies of scale (Chan and Clark, 1992: 104). This emphasis on manufacturing 
ability, together with the political isolation of the state, has restricted the willingness of 
the owners to create internationally known brand names; even most of the leading 
firms have still made only nominal investments in developing foreign distribution 
organisations of their own. 
105 
Pluralistic, Opportunistic, Personal Exchange Relationships 
The fourth rule of Taiwanese business recipe concerns the organisation of 
exchange relationships which tend to be multiple, opportunistic and personal. As 
indicated above, inter-finn relations in Taiwan are typically neither long-term nor 
exclusive, nor do they cover a variety of cooperative activities (Whitley, 1992a: 704). 
There is a tendency towards pluralism and opportunism, rather than to being 
exclusively tied to particular business partners, though firms show a high level of 
dependence on suppliers, industrial consumers and distributors and rely heavily on 
personal contacts and trust. Cooperative ventures between firms are fairly rare. Such 
inter-finn cooperation as can be found is mostly the result of policy and technology 
forces, such as state-supported R&D consortia and shortening product life-cycles. The 
low-levels of inter-family cooperation and trust have restricted the development of 
peak associations or organised interests. This implies that Taiwan has more strikingly 
decentralised private sectors than both Japan and South Korea. We can also find the 
relative weakness of Taiwanese industrial leadership. Firms' relationships at the 
industry level normally do not involve representatives of large aggregations of business 
interests. Though there are some consortia which have built up a consensual 
identification for solving industrial problems, these always ended quickly because of 
disagreement. For example, the biggest inter-finn consortium in the development of 
the Taiwanese PC industry - Notebook Development Consortium, organised by 47 
local firms in 1990 - ended up with a radical price war between its members 
(Electronic Business Asia, Dec. 1990, July, 199 1; Lin and Wang, 199 1) 
The combination of low degrees of inter-firm cooperation and weak association 
leadership results in the family business being reluctant to develop long-term 
commitments to a particular industry. General lack of concern with business reputation 
and patent protection are common, and respect for intellectual property rights is not 
taken seriously. Operating in such an environment, Taiwanese firms have a tendency 
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towards counterfeiting products, fabricating accounts, and other illegal practices such 
as the use of bank loans to speculate in real estate. These sometimes get them into a 
great deal of legal trouble (Gold, 1986: 88). 
Opportunistic External Acquisition of Expertise 
The final rule of Taiwanese business recipe relates to the management of 
personnel practices which promote opportunistic external acquisition of technology 
and expertise. In Taiwan, entrepreneurism is the main base for innovation. To some 
extent, however, the nature of entrepreneurism constrains firms' exploitation of expert 
resources of managerial profession. As access to expertise is confined to the skills and 
experience of the business owners, the family as a whole sometimes needs to secure 
professional expertise from outside organisations in order to respond to major 
technological changes in its product and so make use of market opportunities. This 
pattern of opportunistic external acquisition of technology is facilitated by the high 
level of employee turnover, typical of the Taiwanese business recipe. As external 
recruitment of senior engineers takes place very frequently and very openly, quick 
technical diffusion makes it more difficult for any company to create a monopolistic 
position, and the result has been a lot of small firrns. 
5.3.3 Business Recipe Resources 
Capital Ownership 
The basic and dominant resource of Taiwanese business recipe is capital 
ownership which enables the owners to control the labour of their employees and the 
products of their work and so the owners can engage in production and market 
activities. In addition to capital ownership, firms or business owners can draw upon 
other business resources of legitimacy to reinforce the scope of their activities. In the 
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case of the Taiwanese business recipe, for example, we can see that there are resources 
of paternalism, entrepreneurism, trustworthy family managers, networks, satellite 
manufacturing system, trading agents, curb markets, industry externalities and hard- 
working employees. These resources will now be discussed. 
Paternalism, Entrepreneurism, Trustworthy Family Managers 
One important point for analysing business resources of the recipe is the 
paternalism of the owning family which is drawn upon to provide necessary resources 
for securing the obedience of its employees. By adopting a paternalistic managerial 
style, the owning family prevents the growth of professional authority and the 
autonomy of workers in order to maintain direct control of company activities. This 
emphasis on strong family control constrains the owning family's access to professional 
resources, but greatly opens up resources of hierarchy and entrepreneurial authority. 
The risk-taking, active aspect of entrepreneurism provides finns with the enthusiastic 
ability to learn faster than their competitors and the capacity to direct the path of 
company growth. As top management is mostly recruited through family-like 
connections, the family business is managed by trustworthy family managers who tend 
to operate according to the interest of the owning family. 
The combination of the highly concentrated ownership structure and a 
relatively small size of organisational structure provides the family business with ready 
access to chances, enabling them to be oriented towards immediate technological 
adaptability and to respond rapidly to newly-emerging market opportunities. They are 
thus likely to be able to move towards products which have just been developed or 
towards existing ones whose relative price has increased. In order to respond quickly 
to the emerging market, for example, many of these firms have established foreign 
subsidiaries by simply sending a member of the executive board abroad with complete 
autonomy to become established. Thus internally controlled resources can be combined 
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with strong entrepreneurial desire to seize new opportunities through the highly 
concentrated ownership structure. Overall, then, access to paternalism and 
entrepreneurism provides firms with the capacity of quickly adapting and evolving to 
the environment. 
Networks, Satellite Manufacturing System, Trading Agents and Curb Markets 
Another important resource of the Taiwanese business recipe is social networks 
which, additionally, provide subsidiary resources of satellite manufacturing system, 
trading agents and curb markets. The generation of these resources is particularly 
facilitated by the geographic density characteristic of the island. Indeed, the Taiwanese 
family business relies extensively on social networks of personal relations and family- 
like connections for resources such as land, labour, capital and information. 
As indicated above, as market organisations in Taiwan are highly fragmented, 
the family business has historically developed techniques to aid forward and backward 
linkages that co-ordinate economic activities. These techniques include satellite factory 
systems, and a variety of distribution networks which provide important sources of 
business contracts and market information. Informal and mostly organised through 
networks of personal ties and trusts, these market relations are very developed. The 
satellite factory system, for example, is an informal industry organisation for small 
firms joined together to produce finished products. Such inter-organisational networks 
are based on non-contractual agreement sometimes made between family members 
who own related firms, but more often between unrelated businessmen. These 
businessmen informally negotiate such matters as the quality and quantity of their 
products and the shipping date (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988: 566,585). 
In considering the networks resource of the Taiwanese business recipe, trade 
agents are also important. In Taiwan, there are a lot of small trading agents aspiring to 
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uncover export opportunities for the proliferating small Taiwanese manufacturers. As 
Levy (1988: 44-5) indicates, 
".. the relative ease with which Taiwanese firms across a wide range of industries enter 
into subcontracting relations with one another, and the presence of a large number of 
Taiwanese traders willing and able to explore the prospects for export of the products 
of nascent small and medium firms, imply that Taiwanese entrepreneurs can initiate 
production at a relatively small-scale, with little up-front investment required either for 
production facilities or for specialised market information". 
In general, the satellite factory system, together with a lot of small trading 
agents, constitutes a distinctive intermediary institution which provides ready access to 
new market information between a number of different firms. In addition to the satellite 
factory system and trading agents coordinating market transactions, unofficial financial 
institutions have helped to integrate Taiwan's SMEs into the national financial system 
with the availability of the high saving rate of the local economy. In an environment 
where most bank loans go to state-owned enterprises or big businesses, most SMEs 
depend more on the unofficial curb market at high interest rates, mostly through the 
use of personal contacts and family connections. Although as a source of finance it is 
not perfect, the capital of the curb market offers firms, at least, access to flexible 
financial resources. 
Industyy Externalities 
Another subsidiary resource which has arisen from the resource of social 
networks is that of industry externalities. In Taiwan, the family business almost 
invariably adopts a strategy of free-rider, which is facilitated by the resources of 
personal connections available and the proliferation of small firms in the industry. 
Technological diffusion becomes very rapid, as entrepreneurs get access to technical 
information by imitating their domestic rivals, or they learn the latest state-of-the-art 
from foreign firms. 
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Hard-working Employees 
The final significant resource of Taiwanese business recipe is the employee. 
Taiwan's employees are usually hardworking and have also been distinguished by a 
high average level of education. Absenteeism is low. They also assign very high status 
to teachers and authority figures. These attributes of Taiwan's workers are a result of a 
number of factors. One is the combination of family ownership with the authoritarian- 
corporatist state in Taiwan. Another important consideration is that almost every male 
worker must spend two years in military service. A final important underpinning of 
motivation and discipline is the Confucian culture that puts a high value on education, 
hard work, self-betterment and respect for authority (Chan and Clark: 1992: 103). 
5.3.4 Identification with the Recipe 
As indicated above, Taiwanese business recipe includes the ways in which 
Taiwanese family businesses function as economic actors and develop relationships 
with one another and owners-managers-workers relations within organisations. 
Though this recipe is mainly around Taiwanese firms, they vary considerably in the 
extent to which they rely on the recipe to guide and empower their strategic actions. 
Because top management and inter-firm relations are specific to particular firms, the 
significance of connection to the recipe varies between them. 
The first obvious identification in connection with the recipe is a highly familial 
top management. Although most Taiwanese firms are family-owned and -operated, 
there are still some firms which are managed by professional teams - such as the newly- 
created commercial banks, China Trust, Yu-San, etc. Fan-iily-managed firms in this 
sense provide a higher connection to the recipe than professional-managed firms. 
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Secondly, business-groups firms reflect a relatively higher connection to the 
recipe than single-unit family firms. In comparison with the single form of family 
business, subsidiaries of business groups show a relatively high level of business 
relations and so have the advantages of exploiting business recipe resources. Also, the 
high level of exchange relations between business-groups' firms has more strongly 
connected these firms to the dominant rules of the business recipe which guide their 
strategic choices. In general, the longer the groups operate in the society and the 
bigger their assets and size, the higher is their adherence to the recipe. 
Thirdly, the significance of personal relations through top management to 
market organisation also has a positive effect on connecting firms to the recipe. 
Necessary to secure the right to the networks resource, the relations are mutually 
reinforcing between firms and will drive them to rely on the recipe for offering a source 
of technical learning, market information and business opportunities. 
Finally, the education background of the owner-managers is also important. In 
a business environment where the ethics of education are revered, holding a Taiwanese 
or American higher degree is not only an important status symbol, but also a useful 
company identity, providing access to business recipe resources structured in the 
society. 
5.4 PC TECHNOLOGY PARADIGM 
In the last two sections I introduced two social structures: policy style and 
business recipe. In this section I will examine the technology paradigm, the third and 
last social structure, critical to explaining firms' strategic choices in response to the 
innovation process of a particular industry. Drawing on the concepts of evolutionary 
economics, the paradigm is a scientific problem-solution, utilised for the work 
according to what kind of product technology or management skill is to be used. As 
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applied to this empirical research, this paradigm is understoo as 
qthP 
technology 
paradigm. 
Just as the policy style and business recipe refer to both internal organisations 
and external relationships, the technology paradigm involves consideration of how the 
organisation of leading PC firms developed and how particular exchange relationships 
became established in the industry. In more detail, internally, the paradigm includes the 
management of manufacturing, assembly and innovation, the ways of dealing with 
company growth and the coordination of organisational structures. Externally, it 
includes the organisation of exchange relationships with suppliers, distributors and 
customers. In the world-wide PC industry, different competitors have made different 
choices with respect to how these activities should be dealt with. Some have designed 
their product around the IBM industry standard in order to have access to software, 
while others have been using a proprietary operating system. Some are carrying out 
their own'innovation programme, while others are finding sources from outside. Some 
have maintained stable subcontracting relationships with suppliers, while others pursue 
multiple outsourcing. This shows that there may be different ways to carry out the 
activities in the PC industry. But in order to demonstrate their correctness and 
modernity, firms have a tendency to follow the technology paradigm - the dominant 
pattern of activities set by the most successful firms in their particular areas. The nature 
of firrns as social agents, then, is interdependent with the ways in which they are 
embedded in the institutionalised patterns of the technology paradigm, in so far as the 
industry has developed. 
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5.4.1 The Development of Dominant PC firms and Exchange Relationships 
As discussed, a technology paradigm is established by the most powerful and 
successful firms in their particular areas. In the case of PCsl5, there are many firms 
contributing to the paradigmatic formation of the industry, but the most important 
actors are Apple, IBM, Intel and Microsoft. In 1976, Apple developed Apple II PC, 
using proprietary standards both to build their hardware and write their softwarel6. 
Between 1976 to 1981, Apple led the PC industry with its company size and profits 
growing rapidly17. Partly because the PC revolution hit so fast and so unexpectedly, 
partly because Apple did not have the established marketing assets to serve its 
proprietary product strategy, the company did not create a monopolistic position, 
resulting in years of market turbulence and intensive competition (Forester, 1987; 
Freiberger and Swaine, 1984; Larsen and Rogers, 1984). However, the structure of the 
PC industry began a significant change in 1981 when IBM entered this market. 
In line with its overall business policy of gaining and subsequently maintaining a 
dominant market share in every growth segment of the computer industry, IBM 
introduced the IBM personal computer (IBM PC) in 1981, using a 16-bit 
microprocessor 18. Because it wanted to do this quickly, IBM assembled its machines 
15The computer industry, or as it is broadly referred to information technology (IT), eludes 
precise definition. But, the most commonly distinguished segments in the computer are 
hardware systems, peripherals, information services and data communication. This section is a 
focus on microcomputer integrated systems. 
A microcomputer, or as it is sometimes referred to personal computer (PC), is made up of 
many separate items. Among the most important parts of the system are the central processing 
unit (CPU), the memory (random access memory-RAM & read only memory-ROM) and the 
input-output (1/0) ports, which are linked together by means of the system bus (Moss, 1992: 2- 
3,10). In addition to the traditional desktop personal computers, there are two principal 
categories of portable machine: Laptops and Notebooks. As the availability of smaller 
components, improved screens and longer battery-life brings more and more portable 
computers into the market, portable machines are rapidly becoming more sophisticated and 
owerful. Today most portables are as powerful as their desktop cousins. 
6For early description of the development of the PC, see Freiberger and Swaine (1984). 
17For Apple's history, also see Larsen and Rogers (1984: 3-24) and Sculley (1987). 
18For the history and technology of microprocessors or integrated circuits, see Dorfman (1987: 
171-203). 
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from off-the-shelf components made by firms which were also supplying other PC 
firms (Carroll, 1993: 21-3,2642; Chposky and Leonsis, 1989: 21-2). It arranged to 
buy the two most important parts of the machine - the microprocessor and the 
operating-system software - from (respectively) Intell9 and a small Seattle-based 
company, Microsoft20 (Chposky and Leonsis, 1989: 39-53). In addition, IBM made its 
PC easy to copy and encouraged the proliferation of PC clones to gain market 
penetration in its battle with Apple2l. Between 1981 and 1984 IBM captured more 
than a third of the market for microcomputers. By 1984, the IBM PC had become the 
industry's standard. The manufacturers who used to dominate the microcomputer 
market with their own proprietary systems before 1981 (the technological pioneers in 
the microcomputer market, such as Acorn, Apple, Commodore, Tandy etc. ) got into 
serious difficulties after IBM's entry into this segment of the market (Forester, 1987: 
139-42), as the cost of developing and maintaining one's own proprietary systems was 
very high. Of the manufacturers of non-IBM-compatible systems, only Apple managed 
to maintain a significant market presence. Eventually, this company switched to a focus 
strategy based on differentiation with its technologically innovative Apple Macintosh 
range, introduced in 1984 (Sculley, 1987). 
In the early-to-mid 1980s, the structure of open industry standards encouraged 
scores of PC firrns to clone copies of EBM's PC with easy access to component 
suppliers such as Intel and Microsoft. These firms have become two of the biggest 
beneficiaries of the growing PC market. With easy access to components, some of the 
clone firms concentrated on maximising their R&D projects and constantly advanced 
to develop technologically innovative products - for example, Compaq in portable 
19For a further discussion of Intel's history, organisation and strategy, refer to Quinn (1985) 
and Ristelhueber (1993). 
20 For a detailed discussion on Microsoft, see Manes and Andrews (1993). 
21 For detailed discussions of how IBM developed its first PC, see Chposky and Leonsis 
(1988). 
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pCS22. With the rise of clone competitors to penetrate into its market shares and the 
rise of PC networking technology to threaten its minicomputer market (McKenna, 
1989: 33-7), EBM sought to abandon the open architecture design of the EBM PC by 
launching its entirely new Personal System (PS/2) range of PCs in April 1987 (Moss, 
1992: 21). On the hardware side, IBM abandoned the open architecture design and 
replaced the PC AT expansion bus by the Micro Channel Architecture (MCA) 
expansion bus, of which the technical design is protected by patent. On the software 
side, EBM introduced a completely new operating system called OS/2, which is under 
EBM's control and forrns; part of its proprietary System Application Architecture. With 
the launch of the PS/2 range, IBM attempted to use its dominant position, in terms of 
its installed base of microcomputer systems, to replace these open systems with 
systems based on its own proprietary technology over which it had complete control 
(Chposky and Leonsis, 1989: 215-8). 
However, IBM's proprietary strategy based on the PS/2 range PC has proved 
unable to change the don-dnant rule of the PC technology paradigm - that of the open 
systems or standards around the core IBM PUAT technology. The reluctance of both 
users and IBM's competitors to abandon the current IIBM PC/AT standard and commit 
themselves to the MCA has been strengthened due to the challenge from its rivals' 
strategic alliance. In September 1988 a number of manufacturers including Compaq, 
Olivetti, Tandy and Zenith formed a consortium to develop a new expansion bus, the 
Extended Industry Standard Architecture (EISA), which is based on and compatible 
with the PC AT bus (Moss, 1992: 21). After years of competition, not only have the 
existing open standards based on the PC AT bus and MS/PC-DOS survived, but their 
eventual replacements are likely to be based on the EISA, neither of which is under 
]IBM's control. Overall, then, the established dominant rule of open systems or 
2271hroughout most of its history, Compaq has consistently been a step ahead of IBM. For 
example, in 1986, Compaq brought the Despro 386 to market months before IBM introduced 
its first computer with the new Intel chip. But, perhaps, this is because IBM was reluctant to 
advance its PC technology so quickly as this might endanger its minicomputer market. 
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standards (McKenna, 1989: 163-7; Grove, 1990) prevails in the PC technology 
paradigm. This macro rule together with the radical technological advance in 
microprocessors and the integration of PC technology into the area of 
telecommunication imply several subsidiary rules that underlie firms' growth patterns, 
their activities of purchasing, innovation, distribution and the coordination of 
organisational structure. These subsidiary technology rules will now be discussed. 
5.4.2 Technology Paradigm Rules 
Continual Growth (consistent with the Industry Core Technology) 
The first subsidiary rule arising from the macro rule of open systems concerns 
the growth pattern of firms. In order to survive and grow, they need to broaden or 
upgrade their product range under the core technology of IIBM PC AT bus, MS-DOS 
or EISA. This continual growth pattern is based on the prevalence of pen 
=system 
rule 
which will eventually drive out PC firms which create incompatible systems. The 
downfall of Wang Computer, for example, is partly attributed to its proprietary 
strategy which fails to conform to the open systems rule. Typically, the change of 
Apple's proprietary strategy reflects its conformity to this growth pattern. 
Traditionally, in contrast to EBM's leading technological forces with the PC standard 
system, Apple has always deviated from the new computer industry's trajectory by 
differentiating the product range under its Macintosh system. However, the constant 
price-cutting by other PC firms and numerous strategic alliances in the industry 
eventually made Apple's strategy untenable. At the end of 1993, Apple decided to 
license to other computer firms the software that makes its Macintosh PC unique. This 
change reflected Apple's new strategy to broaden the company's markets by 
abandoning the strict proprietary software approach that Apple had adhered to for 
more than a decade (Financial Times, 15 Nov. 1993: 23). Moreover, at the time of 
writing, Apple has joined together with IBM and Motorola to develop a new RISC 
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chip, called the PowerPC which is able to run IBM PC software of all types. To Apple, 
holding an open system was finally proved of significant importance to the survival and 
continual growth of the company. Overall, then, in the search for institutional 
legitimacy, PC firms need to conform to the open systems rule while expanding their 
product range consistent with the core technology of the industry. 
Outsourcing 
Under the influence of open systems, the rule of outsourcing is prevalent in the 
PC technology paradigm. In practice, an open systems rule implies industry-wide 
standards, which allow manufacturers to plug components and subsystems, procured 
from outside, into an unsophisticated system with little mastery of the technologies 
required to produce the components. With access to standardised components and a 
well-defined standard architecture, the open systems rule also enables the companies to 
channel their research and development efforts into maximising hardware performance 
in selected areas. These permit the products of a growing number of computer firms to 
work together, which has opened the door to numerous new firms which now compete 
at every link of the "value chain", from chips, system and software to distribution. The 
high level of market interdependence, together with radical technical development, 
highlight the importance of relationships between specific business partners. Overall, 
then, the rule of outsourcing replaces vertical integration, typical in the old mainframe 
computer industry23. 
-i 
23For the computer industry prior to 1975, particularly of the US, see Soma (1976). For 
mainframe and minicomputer segments after 1965, refer to Dorfman (1987: 43-12 1). For a 
general discussion of computer revolution, see Forester (1987: 17-49). 
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Standardised Design and Cheap Production 
Another important technology rule is standardised design, leading to the need 
for cost reducing in the process of operation. Again, this rule arises from the macro- 
rule of open systems. Once established, the open standards rule offers technological 
networks which can entrench standardised compatibility, and which may "eventually 
'comer the market' of potential adopters, with the other technologies becoming locked 
out" (Arthur, 1989: 116). Consequently, the existing technology becomes extremely 
hard to break out of, even when it is not the best available or abreast of the latest 
technology. As Modis (1993: 165) implies, the notion of technological compatibility 
reflects the differentiation of the technological "species" and impacts the rate of 
substitution. The less differentiated the new technological species, the less resistance it 
will encounter in its diffusion. In the extreme case of microcomputers, firms operating 
in the wider degree of industry open systems are likely to find it difficult to 
differentiate their products without violating the standards. Standardised design is thus 
a typical element of the production strategy. 
The combination of open systems and standardised design rules, in turn, has 
drastically reduced barriers to entry to the industry. The consequence of this has been 
radical price competition and so leads to emerging market opportunities for original 
equipment manufacturers whose advantage is on the cost side. In order to get ac s 
to contracts, these OEM firms have a tendency to pursue low cost strategies an 0 
tend to locate their plants in countries where cheap labour and land are available. 
Rapid Product Change and Strategic Alliances 
In addition to the general rule of open systems, rapid product change also 
shapes the PC technology paradigm. As market competition becomes fiercer in the PC 
industry, joint ventures, cooperative activities and alliances multiply rapidly (McKenna, 
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1989: 151-4). Even firms with a revolutionary product need to promote system 
viability of technical knowledge for other firms to exploit it thereby enjoying a 
"transient monopoly" (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993: 365). But as the technology 
paradigm of PCs is moving towards more uncertainties with radical technical advances, 
firms must also track their direct competitors to avoid being caught off-guard by a 
technological breakthrough. Such market dynamics have undoubtedly brought out to 
the forefront "leaming/adaptation/imitation" capacities (Dosi et a], 1990: 116) which 
are particularly important for PC fmw because of technological discontinuities and 
specialties. 
Relatedly, strategic alliances are a useful way of acquiring leading-edge 
technologies and so increasing firms' technological adaptability. Although the alliances 
are often between firms with complementary products, many are between once-bitter 
rivals. Furthermore, an added complication in most interfirm deals is that few alliances 
are exclusive. Firms usually retain the function to operate independently, or strike 
similar alliances with other firms. In 1993, for example, the two most bitter computer 
rivals of the last three decades, DEC and IBM agreed to work together on a single 
open network management platform (Dataination, 15 Oct. 1993: 59-60). But IBM is 
also, jointly with Apple and Motorola, to develop new microprocessor architecture, 
operating systems and multi-media products. On the other side, Apple, like much of 
the rest of the newly developing PC industry, remains determined to steal business 
from IBM's corporate customers (Financial Time, 16 March 1994: 11). Despite these, 
relationships between challenger companies still tend to emerge constantly. 
Respectfor LP. R. 
Just as every existing product technology appears to be vulnerable, a new rule 
arises from the technological strategy angle that needs to maximise R&D resource 
utilisation. In order to maximise their R&D investment and long sustain their 
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advantage, US firms were extremely casual in enforcing intellectual property rights, 
"an attitude that was reinforced by the confused state of patent and copyright 
protection in computer technology during most of the 1960s and 1970s and by a 
generally hostile antitrust and regulatory environment" (Ferguson and Morris, 1993: 
155). 
While substantially determining the future's innovation rule of the industry, 
I. P. R. battles are truly important in today's PC wars. Because the PC paradigm is 
characterised by multiple technological trajectories and continuing technological 
breakthroughs, innovative forces from time to time nullify oligopolistic power 
stemming from stable entry barriers. The basic technologies of computer - 
microprocessors, memory chips, screens and software - continue to advance quickly24, 
creating new products and altering both the capabilities and pricing of existing 
products in every layer of the industry. These innovations are so widely dispersed that 
predicting which firms will succeed with new technology, or which will suddenly 
spring up as a new competitor, is far more difficult than in most other industries. 
However, once approved, the innovations will bring huge revenues, important to 
secure the company's long-term development, just as the case of Microsoft shows 
(Manes and Andrews, 1993). Therefore, in order to maintain sustainable competitive 
advantage, PC firms are now generally much more aware that licensing practices are a 
key element of a technological strategy. Consequently, the rule of respect for I. P. R. 
becomes strongly institutionalised, indicating one important legitimate process of 
competition for access to technology paradigm resources. 
24For example, according to Moore's Law, the transistor density that is feasible on a microchip 
doubles every 18 months (Grove, 1990: 148-9). 
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Non-integration into Distribution 
In terms of the demand side, the evolution in the market is increasingly 
fragmented with growing competition around distribution channels, logistics and 
marketing expenditure. PCs are now mass-marketed in the same way as soap powder 
or soft drinks, and are sold off the shelves like cans of beans. As the number of systems 
phased-out of the market is very high, consumers are going for more powerful 
systems. As buyers of microcomputers have become better informed, they have come 
to regard the particular brand of hardware as less important than its ability or 
otherwise to run the desired (independently-supplied) applications software. In 
consequence, they have tended to become more price sensitive with respect to 
microcomputer hardware. Because of quick market phase-out, increased financial 
resources and well-established distribution and service channels are essential to fn-ms 
engaging in marketing their own brands. For these own-brand firms, some have 
selectively authorised dealers to sell their products, while others use mass-retailing 
channels and others sell directly to the final customer. Indeed, this choice of 
distribution is probably the most difficult of all, in so far as firms seek to find the most 
efficient way to reach customers. As we can find in the industry, there are a lot of 
effective ways of dealing with marketing and distribution. For example, Dell grew from 
nothing in 1984 to just over $2 billion in sales in 1992 because it invented a new, 
lower-cost way to distribute PCs: mail order sales backed by telephone hot-lines 
offering technical advice (Economist, 27 Feb. 1993: 18). However, partly because of 
the volatile natur et and partly because of the dis-integrated nature of the 
industry, the 
/Iegitimate 
way' of managing distribution tends to focus on "dealers" which 
accounted for-lbout-50 per cent of the whole PC market (Economist, 27 Feb. 1993: 
18). Indeed, the multi-layer structure of the PC industry indicates the non-integration 
into distribution, just as the rule of relationships works against vertical integration in 
the industry. 
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Flexibility and Entrepreneutism 
On the organisation of strategy, the rule certainly is to match the structure with 
the dis-integrated nature of the industry and the uncertainty of technological 
development. Just as IBM and Microsoft did in the early 1990s, the challenge for 
incumbent management is to institute an internal cycle of self-refreshment that matches 
the underlying pace of industrial change. In 1992, IBM restructured the organisation in 
an effort to "breathe some entrepreneurial energy and responsiveness into its business 
units" (Datamation, 15 June 1993: 27). In responding to the market uncertainty, 
Microsoft was very "aggressive in taking legitimate competitive actions" with 
restructuring its organisation to focus more on global marketing edges (Financial 
Times, 16 March 1994: 30). Unlike IBM which has been forced to restructure because 
of falling sales and trading losses, Microsoft remains the world's most profitable 
company. In order to protect their existing businesses and also be able to exploit the 
new market opportunities, both leading computer firms - IBM and Microsoft - have 
restructured their organisations to form SBUs (Strategic Business Units) or individual 
profit-centred units and so to breathe the energy of entrepreneurism. While focusing on 
the management of the immediate technological environment, these independent units 
are likely to respond quickly to the rise of market opportunity. In contrast to Toyota! s 
managerial paradigm where base technologies are centrally managed and assumed to 
be stable over a period of time (Ferguson and Morris, 1993: 171-2), the SBUs 
organisation evolved to accommodate very rapid and unpredictable industrial change at 
any level in the system. With technological information now sifted through divisional 
managers, top management can concentrate on overall strategy. While securing th 
organisation of flexibility and the activity of entrepreneurism for action, the SBUs arel 
the effective way, then, of dealing with the complexity of the PC industry. 
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5.4.3 Technology Paradigm Resources 
Following technology paradigm rules in their actions, firms are legitimate and 
then have access to a bundle of technology paradigm resources. The PC business in 
this sense is ultimately a battle of resources, which is constructed around the 
availability of network externalities, the competition for access to Intel and Microsoft's 
latest products early, Japanese LCD suppliers, US distributors, innovation 
partnerships, business contracts and highly skilled engineering labour. These 
technology paradigm resources will now be discussed. 
Network Externalities 
While discouraging specific differentiation, the open systems rule provides 
firms with accessible resources of "network externalities", created by network 
industries, access to technical knowledge, choice of off-the-shelf components and 
compatibility between products manufactured by different firms (Garud and 
Mumaraswamy, 1993: 352). In contrast to the proprietary nature of the old computer 
industry which denies rivals access to technical knowledge, this open systems rule 
promotes public standards and expertise to which all firms have access. As well as 
encouraging entry into the marketplace, the open systems rule keeps consumers locked 
into industry standards as the size of the industry network increases. Overall, then, 
under the influence of open systems, the PC industry is characterised by standard 
interfaces and multi-system compatibility that provide the resources of network 
externalities to benefit clone makers and industries producing complementary products 
(Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993: 352). 
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Access to Technological Leaders - Intel, Microsoft and Japanese LCD Suppliers - 
and Access to US Distributors 
For most PC firms, some resources of network externalities may be equally 
accessible, but the acquisition of other resources is very competitive. The combination 
between products soon phased-out and the dis-integrated nature of the industry implies 
the importance of access to Intel, Microsoft and US distributors. Access to Intel and 
Microsoft provides firms with the latest technology and products early and so can 
establish firms' first-mover advantage in the market. As indicated above, outsourcing is 
the rule of the industry. In order to get access to suppliers and so extend their products 
into new application areas, firms need to commit themselves into exchange 
relationships which will ensure that they acquire leading-edge products from other 
companies. In the 1980s, for example, Compaq owed much of its extraordinary 
success in the market for assembled PCs to Intel's willingness to provide it with early 
supplies of its latest microprocessor (Economist, 27 Feb. 1993: 23). 
Just as the case of Compaq implies, relationships provide a source of access to 
new technologies and markets. Of the many exchange relationships in the industry, the 
partnership with Intel and Microsoft certainly is a superior one, as both firms dominate 
in their own particular areas and continue to lead the development of PC products. 
This access to Intel and Microsoft is particularly important for small companies, since 
their connections to the paradigm are limited. In addition, as the emergence of 
notebook PCs has achieved a significant place in the industry, the relationships with 
Japanese LCD suppliers will also be critical, as they dominate the LCD market 
(Johnstone, 2 July 1992). 
On the other hand, the connection to US distributors will provide fin-ns with 
both the existing marketing networks and market information which are critical to 
securing the new market opportunities (Economist, 27 Feb. 1993: 18-9; Gilbert and 
125 
Strebel, 1991: 83; McKenna, 1989: 150-60). By authorising dealers to sell their 
products, firms can get access to existing marketing networks in order to reduce 
market risk and protect their existing business. 
Business Contracts and Innovation Partnerships 
Essential to serve customer expectations for less-expensive products, the PC 
technology paradigm provides subcontracting resources available for clone makers. 
The rapid growth of the market together with the need for cost reduction in the 
industry has forced many US PC firms to focus on product research and development, 
in so far as these fmw tend to rely on the external acquisition of products. For 
example, in late 1994, the current largest PC fmn Compaq chose Inventa -a 
Taiwanese PC fmn - to manufacture its notebook PCs (Central Daily News (Intl), 5 
Jan. 1995). In addition to subcontracting resources, the paradigm provides firms with 
access to innovative partnerships. Essential to secure the long-run competitive position 
in the volatile PC industry, partnerships particularly offer firms access to new markets, 
the technological competence of partners and the prospect of monitoring technological 
opportunities (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1990; Powell, 1987: 71). 
Highly Skilled Engineering Labour 
Finally, as the rule of the competing technological trajectories and radical 
product change offers the incentive to encourage potential new competitors, the PC 
technology paradigm makes abundant human resources available. Over the past two 
decades, a vast corps of electronics engineers and programmers has been trained in the 
IT area, especially with experience of open systems. Their job mobility and willingness 
to take risks are legendary. Thus, despite the fact that the industry's overall profitability 
has fallen so sharply, hordes of new competitors continue to enter almost every sub- 
segment of the industry. For example, even in microprocessors - capital intensive and 
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specialised business - Intel now faces competition from a small firm - Cyrix, started by 
two engineers in 1988 (Economist, 27 Feb. 1993: 23). The competition for access to 
the most talented engineers may be very high. But in order to acquire a wide range of 
expertise and the latest technologies, firms have a tendency to recruit their employees 
from Silicon Valley25 where a lot of engineering human resources are available for 
empowering their actions. 
5.4.4 Identification with the Paradigm 
As discussed above, the technology paradigm of PCs is mainly created by, and 
around, the US firms - such as IBM, Compaq, Apple, Intel and Microsoft. Recently, 
Japanese suppliers also play a key role in the area of notebook PCs. It is therefore 
reasonable to expect that most Taiwanese PC firms would be on the fringe of the PC 
technology paradigm and so show a relative distance from the paradigm. However, 
partly through personal connections, partly through business contracts and exchange 
relationships, some Taiwanese firms have demonstrated a relatively high connection to 
the paradigm and so have a tendency to rely on the paradigm to guide and empower 
their actions. 
There are several characters that will reinforce firms' connection to the 
paradigm. Firstly, holding higher degrees (esp. in Engineering) from US universities, 
particularly those in California, will be useful in helping firms get access to the central 
position of the global PC technology - Silicon Valley. In Taiwan where the family 
business predominates, the education background of owner-managers thus plays a key 
role in indicating firms' connection to the paradigm. 
25For a detailed discussion of the Silicon Valley semiconductor industry, see Forester (1987: 
50-80). 
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Secondly, partly through business contracts, partly through outward 
investment, some firms may have developed long-term relationships with their business 
partners, hence increasing their connections to the technology paradigm. For example, 
by focusing on OEM business in particular areas such as notebook PCs, some 
Taiwanese firms - such as Compal. and Clevo - have developed a considerable 
connection with their US industry consumers. 
Finally, relationship with key parts suppliers connects firrns to the PC 
technology paradigm in the strongest sense. As indicated above, alliance or partnership 
is a major rule of the PC game which provides firms with access to new technologies 
and markets. In particular, firms' high connection to key parts suppliers has several 
advantages for the accessibility of technological specialties and market opportunities. 
To illustrate, a slogan such as "Acer is among the first to market Pentium-based PCs in 
the world" (Business Week, 2 Jan. 1995) certainly is influential. Acting as Intel's sales 
representative in Taiwan, Acer has an advantage to market their products faster than 
other Taiwanese firms because of its business connection with Intel. 
In general, of the key parts suppliers, firms' connection either to Intel for CPUs 
or Japanese firms for LCI)s will enable firms to pursue paradigm-oriented strategy. For 
more than two decades, Intel has dominated the global chips business which is still 
growing fast (Ristelhueber, 1993: 58-67; Financial Times, 15 Nov. 1993: 40; 15 April 
1994: 28). As indicated, by acquiring leading chips from Intel, firms can get their own 
products to market faster and so enjoy a first-mover advantage. On the other hand, 
currently, only the Japanese firms - such as Sony, Toshiba and Sharp - have LCD 
technology, and they are not selling it (Johnstone, 2 July 1992). Furthermore, since the 
introduction of notebook PCs in the marketplace, the supply of LCD has always been 
shortening (Electronic Business Asia, March 1993). Having a high connection to the 
Japanese suppliers thus will be useful in helping firms maintain a stable LCD supply 
and so will facilitate their development of long-term commitments to the PC industry. 
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
I have now finished introducing some empirical aspects of the three social 
structures relevant to the evolving Taiwanese PC industry of 1980-1993. It was my 
argument in Chapter 3 that these three structures - policy style, business recipe and 
technology paradigm - represent a distinctive approach to analyse firms' strategic 
agency. Each of these structures embodies a particular body of structural sources of 
power which firms may use to interact meaningfully. Each of the structures gives firms 
a sense of direction that may differentiate their action from one another strategically. 
Operating in such a context, firms can choose their strategies: they can pursue policy 
style-oriented, business recipe-oriented or technology paradigm-oriented strategies. 
But why do they choose different strategies? In answering this question, I shall 
introduce the conceptual category of corporate identities which provides an 
institutional link between structure and agency. But before taking up such issues, I will 
examine the second concept of my theory - industry system - which is collectively 
constituted by the three social structures. 
As I have shown in Chapter 3, the three structures - policy style, business 
recipe and technology paradigm - do not function in a singular position, but are 
interrelated in a certain way. Instead of adopting the static view of institutional 
environments (Jacobson, 1992), 1 emphasise the nature of social tension or conflict in 
my tripartite structural theory of strategy. In my theory, this conflict, while arising 
from the patterning of social structures concerned, will create divergent institutional 
pressures which impinge upon the activities of economic actors who operate within the 
same industry system. 
For example, policy and technology rules of respect for I. P. R. coincide, but 
conflict with the business recipe which has a tendency towards counterfeiting and 
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illegal activity. Equally, the policy style search for own-brand marketing has led to 
conflict with the business recipe tendency towards OEM, so providing a clear choice 
for Taiwanese PC firms. Conflicts between policy and technology rules of inter-firm 
cooperation and business rule of opportunistic exchange relationships likewise produce 
the dilemma, of a firrifs choice of purchasing -a dilernma between supplier loyalty and 
diversification of key parts sources. This consideration of structures patterning and 
social conflicts sets the stage for Chapter 8 in which I integrate the three structures - 
Taiwanese policy style, Taiwanese business recipe and PC technology paradigm - into 
clustering or patterning by examining the evolution of the Taiwanese PC industry 
which is empirically applied to my ideas of industry system analysis. 
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CHAPTER SIX: INDUSTRY SYSTEM 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 51 introduced empirically the three social structures - Taiwanese 
policy style, Taiwanese business recipe and PC technology paradigm. In this chapter I 
shall examine the patterning of the three structures which constitutes the Taiwanese 
PC industry. As discussed in Chapter 3,1 suggest that the patterning of social 
structures indicates the formation of a social system. In this way, I refer to the 
organisation of an industry as a particular type of social system, an industry system 
made up of policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm. All three of these 
structures refer singly to a variety of institutionalised patterns that come together in a 
given social locale to govern and inspire industry activities. In particular, these 
structures as a whole are not effectively integrated, but are more or less conflicting. 
The concept of industry system thus brings to our attention the existence of conflicting 
avenues for action, between which industry firms need to choose. In sum, in this 
chapter, I shall introduce how the system of the Taiwanese PC industry can develop 
internally conflicting avenues, critical to explaining strategic choices and differences 
across my case study firms. 
Beginning in the next section, I will first discuss the emergence of the 
Taiwanese PC industry, and provide the basic data on its major actors, its growth, 
product types and related sectors. Secondly, I will relate the formation of the industry 
to the three structures. In particular, I will examine in detail the implication of this 
Taiwanese PC case; i. e. How do systemic tensions or conflicts develop from the 
industry? and, what should firms do to negotiate the conflicts? It is from this section 
that I shall move from the meso-level of industry system analysis to the micro-level 
units analysis of individual firms. In the third section, I will then provide a brief 
discussion of business organisations in the industry. This discussion sets the scene for 
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the following chapter, in which I shall discuss the third conceptual category of my 
theory - corporate identities - which connect strategic choices with social structures 
and industry system. 
6.2 THE TAIWANESE PC INDUSTRY 
The origin of the PC industry in Taiwan dates back to 1974 when the first 
industry company - Mitac - was established as sales representative for Intel in Taiwan. 
Around that time inventions were made which allowed the use of micro-processors in 
the making of PCs I. However, actual PC system production in the economy is a fairly 
recent activity sternming from the 1980s. During the late 1970s, led by the domestic 
appliance firms Tatung and Sampo, the industry amounted to no more than some 
monitors being produced for export (Schive and Hsueh, 1987: 13 1). The big 
breakthrough came in 1981 when the Apple II clone was developed and production 
began in Taiwan2. In the same year, with the shut-down of TV gambling machines, the 
existing domestic electronic parts firms transferred their facilities to the assembly of the 
Apple II clones. The entry of these local firms made microcomputers the most 
explosively growing manufacturing industry in Taiwan at that time3. In particular, in 
September 1981, the information sector was listed by the state as one of the strategic 
industries. Since then, Taiwan has really developed a prosperous PC industry, which 
lFor other discussions on Taiwan's information industry, see Chang (1990); Chu (1987); 
Economist (9 July 1994: 83-4); Kraar (1994); Madu et al (1991); Schive and Hsueh (1987); 
Wade (1990). 
271he world's first Apple II-compatible was developed in the USA. In Taiwan, the first Apple II 
compatible was developed by private industry but there is no source to trace its origin. 
However, at least we can be sure that it was not developed by state-supported research 
agencies. 
3With the entry of the former TV assembling manufacturers, in just two years, the number of 
PC firms soared from some 10 to about 100 in 1983 (111,1991a: 6). However, this type of 
company is generally unlikely to survive among today's competition in the industry. For 
example, ARC, once the fourth biggest PC manufacturer in Taiwan was closed down in 1992; 
whereas Copam was faced with liquidation in 1993. 
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currently assembles more than one tenth of PC systems world-wide yearly and has a 
very significant place in many peripheral products. Though such vital components as 
chips, HDDs, LCDs and operating systems have to be imported, the design of PCs is 
carried out locally. This is a marked contrast from traditional Taiwanese assembly 
industries such as the television industry, which in its early development relied on both 
Japanese components and design (Schive and Hsueh, 1987). The sustained success of 
the PC industry, together with other IT products, can be demonstrated by the statistics 
on various dimensions, summarised in Table 6.1. As can be seen, Taiwan now 
commands more than 3 per cent of the world information industry. 
The starting point for the development of the PC industry went beyond 
Taiwan's industrialisation model. Unlike its other technology-intensive industries, 
Taiwan actually moved into the microcomputer areas not far behind the U. S. and no 
later than Japan. In the early 1980s, Japan's neglect of PC areas had provided an 
opportunity for Taiwanese firms to catch up with U. S. technological progress. Partly 
for this reason, the information industry has for a long time been identified as a "star" 
in the economy in that it may help deliver Taiwan's industrialisation from the model of 
Japan's development, which Taiwan has traditionally followed. Operating in such an 
industry, some leading IT firms, such as Acer and UMC4, thus may have greater 
opportunities to be viewed as national champions over the other industrial firms. 
The IT industry in Taiwan has been described by many industrial analysts and 
academics as fragmented, dynamic, innovative, highly competitive and quick learning 
(e. g. Kraar, 1994; Schive and Hsueh, 1987). International trade is significant and 
increasingly important to national economies. It enjoyed rapid growth through the 
1980s and has continued to expand by integrating other local sectors, such as 
semiconductor and telecommunications. Discontinuities in technology from time to 
4United Microelectronic Corporation (UMC) is Taiwan's first manufacturer of integrated 
circuits with a 45 per cent equity share held by five private local firms (Wade, 1990: 104). 
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time enabled firms from outside the industry to capture a series of sub-markets. This 
also created constraints on existing firms to achieve dominant market power. Without 
a large home market, the global demand for PC applications was the major inducement 
for the specialisation in the PC industry in Taiwan. In addition, the state provides a 
tightly-regulated exchange system, important to international competition. 
In the industry, there are numerous trade associations which are business or 
geographically based. However, a peak computer association is absent, implying that 
the development of the industry does not follow the classical corporatist model. The 
export-oriented SMEs character of the PC industry makes it difficult to organise the 
large aggregations of industrial interests which thereby explain why the trade 
associations are numerous but no one is sufficiently large to represent the organised 
interests of the industry. Among these, the TCA (Taipei Computer Association) is the 
biggest association with a membership of 5,000 in 1993. In an environment where the 
essence of business is familism and the markets are mostly export-oriented, the 
functions of the trade association are limited to organising exhibitions or acting as an 
intermediary voice between members and government authorities. 
By 1993, the industry remained highly export-oriented, accounting for roughly 
95 per cent of the total production. Own-brand products are low (Figure 6.1), though 
there were some firms like Acer, Mitac and Twinhead gradually building up their 
marketing channels and achieving a very stable market in some countries. Drawing on 
cheap engineering labour, most Taiwanese PC firrris are generally production oriented 
and follow strategies heavily depending on OEM sales for the majority of their 
business. 
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Figure 6.1 PC export value by product type: Own-brand, OEM and DF1 (by percentage) 
Source: IR (1986-93) Information Industry Yearbook. Taipei. 
The home PC market was rarely protected, though some key components such 
as HDD are subject to certain tariffs. Co-operation and joint ventures in the industry 
have proliferated, though they mostly fail to last. Since the late 1980s, backward 
integration has been accelerated by investment in CPU, RAM and LCD technology. 
Overseas production, too, has grown steadily in recent years. 
The vast majority of PC firms are located in northern Taiwan. A concentration 
of competitors, suppliers and universities tends to facilitate open information flow and 
creates efficient and early access to the most cost-effective inputs. The engineering 
transformation in the industry is substantial. The industry has been one of the major 
employers of engineers. It is also typical that PC firms have been led by engineers. In 
comparison with those of the US, Taiwan's engineers are low paid5, draw more bright 
education output from schools, but have less power in the enterprise. In particular, the 
high flow of engineering manpower impels the technical knowledge diffusion very 
quickly and the result is a lot of small PC firms. 
5Taiwan's junior engineers typically earn US$15,000 a year, only about one-third as much as 
their U. S. counterparts (Economic Daily Newspaper, 28 Jan. 1994: 12; Kraar, 8 Aug. 1994). 
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The industry is also an enabling industry. It is true that the PC industry 
corporations are not the only exporting finm that have had international success. A 
considerable part of the other corporations operate as suppliers to the PC industry. 
Monitors, together with PC system itself, are the two major export forces. In 1993,13 
million colour and monochrome monitors accounted for 51 per cent of the global 
market share. Mainboards or motherboards, the highest items of production among all 
Taiwan-made computer components, accounted for roughly 83 per cent of world total 
production, with the top two companies - FIC and Elitegroup - alone boasting over 25 
per cent (TCA, 1993: 312). The specialised. Taiwan input devices include keyboard, 
scanners and mice/trackbalIS6, which supply about (respectively) 49,50 and 80 per 
cent of the world market in 1993. Other products such as add-on cards, tenninal and 
power supplies are likewise highly competitive on a world scale (Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2 Achievement of information products in Taiwan (unit: 1,000 sets) 
Rank 
Products 1990 1991 1992 
1993 
Domestic 
production 
1993 
Global total 
production 
Global 
Market 
Share (1993) 
1 Monitor 8,234 9,810 11,070 13,304 17,485 51% 
2 Microcomputer 2,295 2,653 2,801 3,584 N. A. 7 10% 
3 Mainboard 4,530 4,446 5,963 9,133 12,338 83% 
4 Tenriinal 1,394 1,016 1,560 1,400 1,400 24% 
5 Graphic Card 5,900 6,780 6,230 7,140 N. A. 31% 
6 Power Supply 8,499 9,900 10,500 11,460 211,190 30% 
7 Image Scanner 441 1,385 694 953 953 55% 
8 Network Card N. A. 1,648 2,755 3,810 3,810 27% 
9 Mouse 10,500 14,5 15,117 19,669 22,100 80% 
10 Keyboard 10,370 5,500 
i 
8,850 6,025 18,830 
Source: HI (1990-1993) Yearbookfor Information Industry. Taipei. 
61n the area of miceltrackballs, Logitech is the biggest company in the world. Its customers 
include EBM, DEC, H. P., Apple and SUN Microsystems (Electronic Business Asia, June 
199 1; Johnstone, 9 Aug. 1990). 
7The figures of global productions for microcomputer and graphic card are not available till 
the end of February, 1993. Therefore the market shares for the two products are based on the 
estimation of MIC, III. 
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However, although the PC industry had spurred the development of a wide 
range of related sectors, the CPU, LCD of Notebook, printer and HDD remained four 
missing links among Taiwanese IT hardware products. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, Intel dominates the global supply of CPUs; whereas, though Taiwan had 
overtaken Japan to become the second largest exporter of notebook PCs after the US 
by 1993, its LCD sources remain heavily reliant on the supply from Japan8. The 
domestic printer sector has been dominated by Japan and the US products, with Japan 
accounting for about 78 per cent of imports and the US 15 per cent in 1992. The local 
HDD industry, too, has failed to flourish9, with 70 per cent of domestic demand being 
imported from Singapore. In addition to hardware industries, Taiwanese software 
companies have acquired only a limited share of the market in the Chinese application 
packages and game software, leaving the system software to be dominated by the US 
firms such as Microsoft and Lotus. The list below surnmarises this overview of the 
Taiwanese PC industry. 
Table 6.3 The general character of the Taiwanese PC industry 
" Listed as a strategic industry in the 1980s; 
" Fragmented, dynamic, innovative, highly competitive and quick learning; 
" Export-oriented; mostly concentrating on northern Taiwan; 
" Mostly focus on OEM, but some own-brand products exist; 
" The engineering professional dominates; 
" Around a lot of related industries, 
some succeed - e. g. monitors, motherboard and input devices 
some fail; some key parts of PCs - e. g. CPU, LCD and HDD - rely on foreign suppliers 
8Taiwan's reliance on foreign components has long been a contentious trade issue with Japan. 
For example, Taiwan's US$7.7 billion trade deficit with Japan was heavily weighted with 
electronic goods (Brown, 199 1). 
91n 1991 when the research started, there were four major firms of HDDs. But by 1993 only 
one still survived, and it had dipped into losses, too. 
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To conclude, the Taiwanese PC computer industry is very much diversified and 
complicated. For example, it is generally considered one of the success stories of the 
world computer business (e. g. Kraar, 8 Aug. 1994), but this success is limited to the 
areas of monitors, motherboards, PC platforms, input devices and so on. Firms' choice 
of strategy is pluralistic, as some fin-ris pursue more the own-brand strategy while 
others focus on subcontracting activities. In the next section, the implications of this 
will be further discussed through a conceptual description of the "industry system" in 
which the patterning of policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm takes 
place. 
6.3 THE ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRY SYSTEM 
6.3.1 The Pattering of Social Structures 
In order to examine the significance of social conflicts in structuring firm 
behaviour, I suggest that there is an industry system whose institutional sources are 
policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm, all interconnected and each 
capable of generating different social rules and resources for guiding and empowering 
firms' behaviour. According to Giddens (1984), a social system refers to the clustering 
or patterning of social structures. Conforming to his ideas of social system, I suggest 
that the emergence of an industry represents a type of social formation. This formation 
leads to the construction of a social system which is produced by the intersection of the 
structures of policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm. Each of the 
structures is critical to explaining the formation of an industry. Relatedly, all three of 
these structures refer individually to a variety of institutionalised patterns that come 
together in a given social locale to drive economic activities in a particular industry. 
Overall, then, the organisation of the industry can be seen as an industry system in 
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which social relations are reproduced and reinterpreted through the patterning of 
structures. 
In practice, the formation of a local industry is non-nally triggered by one of the 
social agents - the state, local firms or industry operators - relevant to the three social 
structures. In 1974, the set-up of Mitac, for example, originated the development of 
the Taiwanese information industry. Once begun, the evolution of an industry is set in 
motion and competitors are attracted, social structures become significant, and 
patterning between the structures constantly takes place. The formation of an industry 
system is thus a never-ending process, not a static, once-and-for-all integration. Each 
industry system is unique, with its own evolutionary path. But this path can be better 
understood if we examine particular industries in particular countries. 
The Taiwanese PC industry, for example, grew initially out of the island's 
consumer electronics industry which was long dependent on the pool of SMEs 
prevailing in the Taiwanese business recipe (cf. Wade, 1990: 103-8). Relatedly, ever 
since it was selected as one of the strategic industries in 1980, the industry has 
benefited from the national policy style in which "the state was the contrapuntal partner 
to the market system, helping to insure that resources went into industries important 
for future growth... including ... new export sectors such as electronics" (Wade, 1990: 
110)10. On top of these influences from the national context, the Taiwanese PC 
industry is also continuously shaped by the world-wide technological forces of the 
microcomputer industry as a whole. 
At its core, the evolution of an industry is structurally-connected. Each of the 
structures is mutually connected because the effect of one is often contingent on the 
state of others. The nature of Taiwanese PC firms, for example, would not have led to 
1017or a fuller discussion of the role of the state in the Taiwanese PC industry, see Appendix 4 
- Statutory bodies: ITRI and HI. 
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competitive advantage in PC assembly if the KMT state had not shut down all TV 
game machines in 1981. The abundant bank loans and government subsidies were not 
translated into assets for Taiwan's PC industry until the state chose the industry as one 
of the strategic industries. Taiwan's highly fragmented and diversified modes of market 
organisation did not constrain the industry's potential for advancement and upgrading 
because they are well-fitted to the open systems and quick technological diffusion rules 
of microcomputers. The PC price wars of the past few years, which established 
enduring demand for ever more economical models, have helped make the Taiwan 
production mode indispensable for PC firms. In order to compete in a price as well as 
quality sensitive market, these PC giants see Taiwan as the place to contract for major 
components at cut-rate prices. Thus, the process of creating competitive advantage is 
one in which co-evolving activities between policy style, business recipe and 
technology paradigm are important to industry evolution. Furthermore, each of these 
/X_d 
three structures works through contingency and inter-dependence, not in isolation with 
one another. 
The industry system in this sense is open because the patterning of the 
structures constantly leads us to different system outcomes. As in the case of PCs, for 
example, the same PC technology paradigm can be interpreted differently in different 
local industry systems according to its interaction with other present social structures 
of policy style and business recipe. The comparison between Taiwan and Korea can 
illustrate this point. In 1985, XT-compatible PC production was a mature industry and 
the Koreans went into mass production, leading Taiwan in terms of units and profits. 
In 1986, the market quickly switched to AT products which definitively overthrew the 
Koreans' strategies of mass production efficiency. The Koreans' PCs were left out. 
Since then Taiwan took over by virtue of the mutual reinforcement between KNIT's 
vast corps of technocrats and Taiwanese family-owned business entrepreneurs whose 
networks are a source of flexible production and technical learning. Apparently, in an 
environment where uncertainty is prevalent, success seems to depend "not on right 
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choice but flexibility in moving from one right choice to another quickly enough" 11. 
As Pollar (1992: 50) implies, technological change alone will not define an industrial 
revolution, but the present one certainly brought other social values which may well 
turn out to be as profound as those of the first one. For the Korean PC industry, 
clearly the existing Chaebol organisations, typical of its business recipe, failed to 
accord with the rules of open systems and radical product change, typical of the PC 
technology paradigm. While world-wide technology paradigm can allow shifts in 
competitive advantage in an industry, the intersection of national policy style and 
business recipe plays an important role in determining which nation can exploit it. 
Additionally, it is worthy noting that the systemic patterning of the PC industry 
is not all determining, as this patterning may result in internally contested logics. These 
logics may conflict with one another, thus inducing institutional pressures which firms 
have to manage. There are three obvious examples to illustrate the existence of 
conflicting logics in the Taiwanese PC industry system. First, the choice of innovation 
represents a fairly standard case that exhibits critically conflicting institutional ties 
facing Taiwanese PC firms. As is noted in the previous chapter, the respect for I. P. R. 
is a dominant rule in the PC technology paradigm. But conformity to this rule of the 
game certainly conflicts sharply with part of Taiwanese business recipe: the industry 
has been long regarded as one of the worst offenders of intellectual-property rights 
because of weak legal protection, erratic enforcement, and a high level of skill on the 
part of pirates (Clifford, 8 Oct. 1992; Gwynne, Jan/Feb 1993). Therefore, in the system 
of the Taiwanese PC industry, conflicts arising from IRR both in Taiwanese business 
recipe and PC technology paradigm at least serve to distance the one from the other. 
Secondly, the state policy rule of own-brand marketing conflicts with business 
rule of OEMs, so resulting in an important strategic choice facing Taiwanese PC firms, 
just as Figure 6.1 shows (see page 135). Accordingly, some firms pursue more the 
II Interview with T. C. Tu, director for MIC, III (Kraar, 8 Aug. 1994: 5 1). 
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own-brand strategy, while others focus on OEM activities. By adopting an own-brand 
strategy, firms are legitimate in the nation state, and so can get access to a bundle of 
policy style resources. However, the own-brand strategy is discouraged by the business 
recipe which is only supportive of OEMs. Consequently, own-brand firms deny 
themselves access to business recipe resources. 
Thirdly, the policy and technology rules of technology venture/strategic alliance 
coincide, but conflict with the business recipe, so providing a clear choice. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the Taiwanese business recipe provides rules that 
indicate an opportunistic relationship and short-term commitments between specific 
business partners. Tensions between policy style, business recipe and technology 
paradigm thus provide a dilemma for firms in purchasing strategy -a dilemma between 
diversification of component sources and supplier loyalty. In the case of CPUs, for 
example, some Taiwanese firms (e. g. Twinhead) have diversified their CPU sources, 
while others (e. g. Acer and Mitac) depend upon long-term contracts with Intel 
(Brown, Sep. 1991: 77-8; Ristelhueber, Sep. 1993: 58). The implication of these 
conflicts for strategic choices will be further discussed in the next section. 
6.3.2 Connecting Macro/Meso and Micro Processes 
By integrating the social structures into patterning, I suggest a new concept of 
industry system which is collectively made up of policy style, business recipe and 
technology paradigm. The concept of industry system highlights the significance of 
conflict in explaining firm behaviour. This internal systemic conflict, of course, creates 
institutional pressures which impinge upon the activities of economic actors who 
operate within the same system. This perspective of systemic conflict thus provides an 
opportunity for examining whatfinns do in response to institutional pressures. Now 
because of the reference to action, we move from social structures through industry 
system to the analysis of individual firrns themselves. 
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In turning from macro- or meso-levels to n-&ro-level analysis, it is worthwhile 
emphasising that society is not all "smart", while organisations are not quite "dumb" 
(cf. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 78). As Giddens (1984) asserts, society is the 
product of the human activity it makes possible. As social actors, human beings are 
"highly learned in respect of knowledge" which they possess, and apply, in the 
production and reproduction of social life (Giddens, 1984: 22). It logically follows, 
from the fundamental insights, that all social agents retain an assumed capacity to 
negotiate conflicts in the ongoing course of social events. 
This point is reinforced by analysing the structural resources that enable firms 
to deploy a range of causal behaviour. As noted in the previous chapter, firms have 
access to a plurality of social rules of conduct and right over resources available for 
action. It is this plurality that frees firms from environmental determination and 
"provides the range of options that permits genuine choice" (Whittington, 1989: 88). 
In particular, firms' capacity to choose between alternatives is constituted structurally 
in relation to other agents, as the social resources they have available are ultimately a 
matter of competition. Consequently, in order to receive legitimation, firms are 
expected to compete with one another and hence have access to an acknowledged 
claim on social resources (Bauman, 1990: 118-9; Scott, 1991: 169-70). From this 
perspective, firms in the tripartite structural formation of an industry "are seen as part 
of a set of intertwined relationships with other entities" within the industry system 
(Shearman and Burrell, 1987: 328). This research, therefore, stresses the significance 
of individual firins in understanding the nature of modem market economies. 
It is obvious that much theory and research seeking to explain the economic 
performance of nation states fails to take account of individual firms. Naturally, one 
tends to look upon industries as the basic unit of analysis for international competition 
(e. g. Porter, 1990: 34). If the ways that industries create and sustain competitive 
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advantage in the markets provide the necessary foundation for understanding the 
nature of international competition in the process, then analysis at the firm level should 
not go by default. However, it is my view that the prevailing characterisation of macro 
(nation states) or meso (industries) approaches to market economies are too restrictive 
and that this restriction has obscured certain conditions essential for an adequate 
account of competitiveness. Indeed, industries within societies are not quite real. From 
the perspective of individual industries, they are made up of different mixes of finTis 
whose diversity "is an essential aspect of the processes that create economic progress" 
(Nelson, 1991: 72). In other words, industrial success is based on the behaviour of 
firms. 
In modem economies, firms within the same industry do differ from one 
another. Economists have studied the functioning of industry, but at once tended to 
play down firm differences. Sociologists have studied the functioning of organisation, 
but only a few have matched the firm's unique identities to the immediate society that 
determine its economic outcomes. While recognising the significance of this neglect, 
this thesis argues that individual firms are at the heart of our inquiry about how 
"different kinds of business organisations and economic rationalities develop and 
become effective in different institutional contexts" (Whitley, 1992a: 1). Certainly, the 
details of firms' individual behaviour cannot be studied at the industrial level. As 
Whittington (1993,1994) has recently argued, the linkage between the firm and its 
attendant society is essential to explaining firm behaviour. As we shall see later in my 
case firm studies, the structural sources of power are unique to each company. The 
uniqueness is a product of the firrifs identities which provide institutional links to its 
immediate social structures of policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm. 
The identities, while offering a linkage between structure and agency, give the fmn not 
only resources empowering its action but also institutional links related to rules that 
govern or constrain its action. It is through this linkage that we examine how firins, 
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with access to a variety of social rules and resources, can make a difference to their 
strategic choices. 
6.4 BUSINESS ORGANISATIONS 
As I repeatedly stress in the thesis, firms within the same industry are different 
from one another. They are socially structured with different links to their immediate 
social structures including policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm. 
These differences constitute their peculiar identities that will cause firms to make 
strategies differently. While the industry system is made up with a mix of economic 
actors, we may observe a certain similarity and difference with reference to their social 
positions in the industry. 
In my case study here, the Taiwanese PC industry comprises a lot of firms. 
Actually, its business organisations are diversified and highly fragmented. The industry 
has over 5,00012 hardware manufacturers, largely small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, producing PCs and components mostly on an OEM basis. Within this 
industry, there are about 250 firms manufacturing microcomputer integrated systems 
and the top 20 Taiwanese manufacturers have a combined market share of 56 percent 
(Chem, 1991)13. However, it is possible to observe some elements of similarity (cf. 
Schive and Hsueh, 1987: 135-7; Chem, 1991: 4-5). 
To begin with their links to Taiwanese policy style, some firms are PLCs 
(publicly listed companies), and, therefore, able to draw upon the financial resources of 
the stockmarket to empower their actions. These firms include Tatung, Acer, Mitac, 
12This figure refers to the members of Taipei Computer Association, the biggest association of 
the computer industry. See TCA (1993: 4). 
13By 1993, there were 182 desktop PC vendors who were members of TCA (TCA, 1993: 268- 
74). 
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FIC, Compal and so on. Just as the PLCs have, some PC firms have demonstrated a 
relatively high connection to the policy style because of its shareholders including the 
state or the KMT business group. Twinhead, for example, is owned by a set of 
diversified shareholders that include venture capitalists, state-operated banks and a 
KMT-owned firm. 
Considering now their links to Taiwanese business recipe, most of the firms 
operating in the industry share a common position as Chinese family businesses. 
However, the industry also comprises some firins which are set up by large 
multinational firms through direct foreign investment. For example, in 1987 AST of the 
US set up Taiwan AST in the HSIP to produce PCs which mostly are shipped to its 
US-based home company (111,199 1 a: 66). In 1993, DEC, the second largest computer 
company in the world, also invested in a subsidiary in Taiwan to assemble PCs. 
Some firms - such as Tatung, Sampo, FIC, Mitac and Compal - are related to 
business groups, while others - such as ASI, Clevo and AUVA - are owned by single 
forms of family business. Tatung, for example, with more than 70 years in the home 
appliance business, started its PC business in 1980 with sales of its own brand products 
and later began to focus on OEM orders. Mitac was created in 1974 partly as the result 
of Matthew Miau's desire to have his own firm outside of his parents' chemical and 
financial empire - the Lien-hua conglomerate. Other examples are FIC whose founder 
(Dr. Ming-jen Chien) is the son-in-law of the chairman of the Formosa group; the 
newly formed Sampo Technology which used to be a branch of Sampo Home 
Appliance Company; and Compal which was created by the Cal-Comp business group, 
one of the longest lived indigenous conglomerates in the economy. 
With respect to single forms of family business, ASI, for example, was founded 
by Paul Liu who used to be an English teacher and managed his own travel agency. 
AUVA was basically the result of a merger through a marriage of Chris Yang - its 
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president - and Annie Tsao - its chairman. Originating from brick manufacturing, Clevo 
is owned by the Hsu family. As discussed in the previous chapter, in comparison with 
the single forms of family business, the business-group firms - such as Tatung, Sampo, 
Mitac, FIC and Compal - demonstrate a relatively high level of business relations and 
so have the advantages of exploiting business recipe resources on their behalf. 
Finally, partly through business contracts and personal relationships, partly 
through cross-equity holding, some finns have developed long-term relationships with 
leading US PC firms or Japanese LCD suppliers, hence increasing their connections to 
the technology paradigm. For example, Mitac and Acer, the two largest PC firms, in 
particular have special relationships with Intel with subsidiaries of both acting as Intel 
distributors. In particular, Mitac's chairman - Matthew Miau - is a close friend of Intel's 
president and CEO - Andy Grove. One of AUVA! s substantial shareholders is a US PC 
firm. Compal's parent company - Cal-Comp - has a good relationship with Japanese 
suppliers for reasons of its long operating history in the society. 
As discussed above, although these firms all operate in the system of the 
Taiwanese PC industry, they differ markedly in terms of their links to the three social 
structures. As I mainly argued in this thesis,, ýfims'-strategic ch dependent on its D= 
social identities. As a result, because of th diff "Ilerent social identitie, some firms (e. g. 
Acer and Twinhead) have pursued more the own--blund-f le others (e. g. FIC, 
Clevo and Compal) have focused on OEM contracts. Because of their different 
identities, some (e. g. Acer and Mitac) have maintained a stable subcontracting 
relationship with Intel, while others (e. g. FIC, ASI and AUVA) have diversified their 
CPU sources. Because of their different identities, some (e. g. FIC and ASI) have 
started their overseas production in China, while others (e. g. Twinhead) have simply 
operated their factories in Taiwan. Because of their different identities, some (e. g. ASI 
and AUVA) have pursued opportunistic diversification strategies, while others (e. g. 
Acer and Elitegroup) have pursued integration growth strategies. More or less, every 
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individual firm provides strategic differences within the industry system where they 
compete and co-operate. From here, a more detailed description of corporate identities 
of my nine case study firms will be examined in the next chapter. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
I have so far introduced two concepts of my theory - social structure and 
industry system. The industry system is understood as a social formation with social 
structures - policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm - patterning in a 
certain way. In this chapter I reviewed the system of the Taiwanese PC industry in 
these terms. 
Overall, I began this chapter by introducing the general character of the 
industry. The industry is dominated by engineering professionals. It is fragmented, but 
dynamic, competitive and quick learning. Export-oriented, the industry comprises a lot 
of small and medium firms. Most of these firms focus on OEM, but some own-brand 
products exist. Though considered successful, the industry relies heavily on foreign 
supplies of CPU, HDD, operating systems and so on. By examining the patterning 
modes of the three social structures, I have argued that the industry system may exhibit 
internally conflicting logics which will impinge social pressures on firms' action. In 
order to negotiate the systemic conflict, firms have to choose to conform to certain 
social structures with rules of conduct and right to resources available. Here, choice is 
possible, because in the industry system there is more than one social structure 
providing social rules and resources for guiding and empowering firm behaviour. To 
summarise, in this chapter I argue that neither macro (nation states) nor meso 
(industries) approaches give a full appreciation of an equally significant analytical 
dimension - that of the "individual firm" itself. This sets the scene for the next chapter 
in which I shall explore the corporate identities that help explain firms' strategic 
choices. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CORPORATE IDENTITIES 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 61 introduced a concept of industry system by examining the 
organisation of the Taiwanese PC industry. On the basis of my tripartite structural 
theory of strategy, I argue that the development of the industry illustrates the 
patterning of three social structures - policy style, business recipe and technology 
paradigm - introduced in Chapter 5. The patterning of the three structures highlights 
the significance of systemic conflicts in explaining firms' behaviour. Given the 
particular structural links that underlie their actions, firms will respond differently to 
the system in order to negotiate the conflicts. In particular, the structural links 
construct firms' social identities, to which a range of social rules and resources is 
attached in a network of social relations and forces, critical to strategic choices. In 
order to examine how fin-ns, took divergent actions, I shall therefore now examine the 
third concept of my theory - corporate identifies, linking strategic choices with industry 
system and social structures. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, nine Taiwanese PC firms are chosen for study (see 
Table 7.1). In this chapter, I shall establish the broad similarity and differences of their 
social identities in the industry system. In Chapter 5,1 have identified some significant 
criteria for examining firms' structural links that constitute their particular identities 
(see Table 5.2, page 77). With respect to policy style, these criteria include (1) 
connection to the KMT chairman, (2) education of owner-managers, (3) connection to 
the KMT business group, (4) stock-exchange listing and (5) ethnicity. With respect to 
business recipe, they include (1) purely familial management, (2) business-groups firms 
and single form of family business and (3) personal relations and education of owner- 
managers. With respect to technology paradigm, they include (1) US degrees, (2) 
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Table 7.1 The case PC companies 
Company; Key personnel Ownership status Start-up mode Main products 
Start date 
Acer Stan Shih PLC; Local entrepreneur; Highly 
(9/1976) Shih's family own 9% Electronic trading business integrated 
Mitac Matthew Miau PLC; related to Lien-hua business Integrated 
(1974; Miau's family group (mainlander); 
1982) controlled Intel sales representative 
FIC Ming-jen Chien PLC; related to Formosa business Motherboards 
(1980) Chien's family own group 
more than 50% 
ASI Paul Liu (before mid- Family owned Local entrepreneur; Desktop PCs; 
(5/1983) 1993) Travel agency; electronic Motherboards; 
trading business 
Clevo Kent Hsu Family owned and Local entrepreneur; Notebook PCs 
(10/1983) controlled From brick business 
Twinhead Stanley Chiang; Joint venture with Local entrepreneur; Notebook PCs 
(2/1984) Charles Chen (before venture capital, bank, a Electronic trading firm 
1992) KMT subsidiary and 
young professionals; 
Chiang own 9% 
Compal Rock Hsu; PLC; a subsidiary of Cal-Comp Notebook PCs 
(6/1984) Ray Chen family controlled business group 
AUVA Chris Yang; Fan-dly owned 25% Local entrepreneur; Loosely 
(1985) Annie Tsao A merger of two firms integrated 
Elitegroup Thomas Chen; Joint ventures with 7 Local entrepreneur; Motherboards 
(1987) Dr Frank Huang (after Acer's former Split from Acer 
1 1993) emPloyees I I 
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contracting or investment linkages and (3) long-standing component supply. Bearin 
these points in mind, I will now discuss social identities of my case PC firms. 
In each case, I will begin by briefly introducing the company history, their 
product range, company sites and ownership status. I will then continue to explore 
their top management, owners and their positions in political, business and 
technological networks. All these elements contributed to constructing their individual 
identities, during the period 1987-1993. As can been seen in Table 7.1, by 1987, all my 
case firms were in existence. Therefore, my analysis of corporate identities from 1987 
to 1993 can provide a comparative basis. In the light of these identities, I shall describe 
the various strategic choices that my case firms made in the next chapter. First, 
however, I want to preview my discussion with a table that sununarises my 
comparative analysis of social identities for the nine case firms (see Table 7.2). 
Throughout this chapter, my aim will be to make sense of this table so that I can 
integrate it subsequently into the analysis of strategic choices. In addition to the 
individual discussion of each case, Table 7.2 as a whole will be further examined after I 
finish introducing the nine case firms. 
Table 7.2 Corporate identities: firms' structural links with social structures (1987-93) 
Policy style Business recipe Technology paradigm 
Acer Extremely high Medium Medium-high 
Mitac Medium-high High High 
FIC I Low-medium Extremely high Medium-high 
ASI Low LOW LOW 
Clevo Low Medium Medium 
Twinhead high Medium Medium 
Compal Low-medium High Medium 
AUVA Low-medium Medium Low-medium 
1 Elitegroup Low (high after 1993) Medium Medium 
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In all the following case studies (chapters nine to eleven), all quotations are 
verbatim tape recorded statements with the anonymity of the speaker preserved, except 
that where statements are quoted from published material a source will be mentioned. 
The particular status of a speaker is usually specified only when it is important to 
distinguish between successive quotations; or when the speaker's position is significant 
to the interpretation of the quotation. 
7.2 CASE 1: ACER 
In 1976 Acer, formerly known as Multitechl, was set up by Stan Shih and four 
others, with an initial capital of NT$1 million2. Like the other case firms Twinhead and 
AUVA, it started out as a components trading company and gradually expanded into 
systems development. With a few years of working experience as small local parts 
suppliers, Shih and his partners began selling ICs, "delivering them personally by 
motorbike at a time when Taiwan had no PC market and was just beginning to sell 
notorious pirated Apple clones, 3. By the middle of 1980s, the company had become 
the largest PC firm in Taiwan and one of the major suppliers in the world. It began 
making monitors in 1983, keyboards in 1985, ASICs in 1986 and motherboards in 
1993. By 1993, the Acer group had developed to be a large diversified holding 
company with business spread through some 14 subsidiaries, each fragmented into 
separate business units and financially independent. These regional and strategic 
business units include a peripheral subsidiary, a high-technology venture capital 
company, a publishing company, a value-added network services company and so on. 
IThe name of Acer was created in 1988 when an unrelated US firm named Multitech disputed 
the Taiwanese firnYs right to market products with the name in the US. 
2 There are two books outlining the history of Acer, both written in Chinese; See Wang (1988) 
and Shih (1989). 1 also draw on Asian Finance (1988), Clifford (1993), Dubashi (199 1), 
Economist (1992), Engardio (1993), Johnstone (1993), Moore (1988), Roy (1989), Shao 
ý 1987), Welt (1987) and Whiting (1993). 
Quoted from an interview with an industrial analyst, June, 1993. 
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Allied to these, the company is also involved in trading business, with Acer Sertek 
acting as Taiwanese distributors for some major US IT firms' software and engineering 
equipment. In addition to owning two main plants in Taiwan, one for PC systems and 
the other for peripherals, the company has extended its overseas production to include 
activities in Malaysia, Holland and the US. The Malaysian plant in Penang produces 
peripherals such as colour monitors and keyboards, while the factories in Holland and 
the US assemble PCs with major parts shipped from Taiwan. By the middle of 1993, it 
had 52 offices in 16 countries with a network of more than 100 distributors and 10,000 
dealers operating in 70 countries. Overall, then, partly because of it, long o rating p 
history in the industry and partly because of its subsidiary acting as In(eLs-s es agent 
. 
in Taiwan, the company possessed a relatively high connection to the PC technology 
paradigm. -40. 
In its early history, the company secured a significant financial source from a 
local construction business group which has remained a major shareholder of Acer. 
Certainly, this financial linkage partly reinforced its connection to the business recipe. 
In 1988, it became the first publicly floated PC firm and so considerably connected 
'7 
itself with part of the policy style. But since going public, its profits declined sharply 
(Economist, I Feb. 1992: 78), suffering heavy losses in 1991 and 1992. Its Eurobond, 
which was launched in 1991 with a total value of $45 million, was once floated under 
its face value in the London market. In 1992, in order to solve its huge deficit, the 
company raised about NT$500 million by selling land and shares in its affiliates. 
However, by 1993, the enormous revenues from its DRAM joint venture with TI and 
the expanding of OEM business had turned Acer again into profit. By the end of 
February, 1994, its stock prices trebled from its December low of NT$15 (Clifford, 4 
March 1993). 
Holding a master degree in Electrical Engineering (E. E. ) from the highly 
reputed Chiaotung University, Stan Shih, the CEO of Acer group, and his wife Carolyn 
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Yeh, are among Acees original founders and together with other family members hold 
nearly 9 per cent of the company's stock. Surprisingly, in a recent disclosure of high- 
level government officials' assets, the President of Taiwan, R. O. C., Dr. Lee holds 
520,000 shares of Acer's stocks (PC Week Taiwan, 18 Oct. 1993: 4). Obviously, it is 
impossible for the President to buy these shares from the open market after his 
inauguration; thus, Dr. Lee has been for a long time one of the major share-holders of 
Acer, before it became a PLC. 
As is well-known in the industry, the company's strategy over the years cannot 
be understood without appreciating Stan Shih's entrepreneurial style, and his strong 
personal commitment to, and patriotic enthusiasm for, the development of the industry. 
The "rags-to-riches" story of Stan Shih, home-grown Taiwanese and the son of a 
hawker, and his expanding PC empire, parallel the story of Taiwan's information 
industry. As a native business elite, he has benefited from the rise of "Taiwanisation" 
of the KMT party-state. Partly as a result, Stan Shih is the first, and until now the only, 
business person to be invited by the President of the Republic (Dr. Lee Teng-hui) to 
make a speech to government officials in the Presidential office. He acted as the first 
chairman for the Taipei Computer Association (TCA) from 1984 to 1989, and on 
several occasions was awarded the title of the Model of Young Professional 
Entrepreneur. Moreover, in 1987, he was appointed as the sole industry representative 
of the board of directors of ITRI. Over the years, Stan Shih of Acer has been the best 
known industrial spokesman of IT in Taiwan. In general, largely because of its 
connection with the President Dr. Lee and partly because of its connection with the 
stockmarket, ITRI and other state institutions, Acer's connection to the policy style 
was considerably higher than the other eight case firms. 
Accordingly, as we shall see in the next chapter, the creation of Acer's empire 
depends largely upon policy style resources to inspire Stan Shih's rash decision to enact 
its global strategy. Because the company is Taiwan's leading PC firm, it benefits much 
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from a political system which has dreamt of creating a Taiwanese IBM in order to help 
compensate for its political isolation while underpinning its effort towards international 
recognition. Like ICL of Britain, Nixdorf and Siemens of Gen-nany and Olivetti of Italy 
(Hendry, 1989; McClellan, 1984), Acer enjoys a policy-driven competitive advantage 
over its domestic rivals. 
7.3 CASE 2: MITAC 
One of the oldest players in the Taiwanese information industry, the Mitac 
Group began in 1974 with Mitac Inc., acting as Intel's sales representative in Taiwan4. 
In 1982, in order to grasp the booming PC market opportunity following the radical 
competition between Apple and IBM, Mitac International Corporation, the case firm, 
was founded as the manufacturing arm of the Mitac group. It had enjoyed rapid 
growth and high profits throughout the 1980s and was publicly quoted in 1990. Its 
manufacturing activities were built at its main HSIP factory as well as UK and US 
subsidiaries. PC system business was roughly split between own-brand and OEM 
equally. Unlike its rival Acer which proceeded with a series of hostile take-overs 
during the late 1980s, Mitac did not over-expand its activities through overseas 
investment. But starting in 1989 when the PC industry faced declining profitability and 
increasing hostility, diversification and acquisition activities at Mitac were intensified. 
Apart from being a system integrator and distributor for international IT firms in 
Taiwan, the parent Mitac group has steadily developed. Its business activities now 
span defence electronics, communications, terminals and distribution channels. In 
1992, it was ranked No. 91 in Datamation's top 100 IS companies. However, although 
it had made marked rapid growth through this series of integration and diversification 
initiatives, Mitac's performance declined sharply. By 1992, it had fallen into huge 
4Much of the material to follow comes from my interviews with Mitac's managers and the 
company's annual reports. 
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losses, thought to be half of its capital. At the end of 1993, top management was 
restructured. Francis Tsai, the executive vice president, took over C. S. Ho's 
presidential work. Head office was also purged but the boards were retained. 
In essence, top management at Mitac was highly professional. Although C. S. 
Ho, a former H. P. engineer, is excluded from the principal executive job, he still acts as 
the chairman of Taipei Computer Association and was given the post of the "vice 
chairman" of Mitac. Matthew Miau, the chairman, who joined Mitac Inc. by virtue of 
Intel's connection, is the most important strategic decision-maker. Unlike other case 
firms' entrepreneurs, Matthew Miau was educated overseas from early childhood. 
Miau's intense interest in computing dates back to the early 1970s, when he worked in 
California for the newly formed Intel Corporation. After graduating from the 
University of California, at Berkeley, he designed chips for a time at Intel. Miau is still 
a close friend of Intel's president Andy Grove. Partly as a result, Mitac was much like a 
"foreign PC firm", demonstrating a relatively higher connection to the technology 
paradigm than its domestic rivals. 
In comparison with Acer, Mitac also showed a relatively higher connection to 
the business recipe because of its identity as a business-group firm. Its chairman - 
Matthew Miau - is the son of Yuh-shiou Miau, one of the leaders of the "Sun-tung (a 
province in the North-east of Mainland China) business gang"5, and is taking charge of 
his family's various business interests. Notably, within my case study firms, Mitac is the 
sole firm which is controlled by a mainlander entrepreneur. Given this ethnic identity, it 
is not surprising that the Mitac group has diversified its activities to include business in 
defence electronics outside the immediate PC industry which has attracted many 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs. In Taiwan, defence has always been privileged preserve for 
mainlanders. In turn, however, the mainlander ethnicity also imposes certain 
51n a survey of one local business magazine (Excellent, Aug. 1993) Yuh-shiou Miau was 
ranked as the 39th richest person in Taiwan. 
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constraints upon Mitac in the competition for political advantage over its rival Acer, 
whose political agency is partly built by the rise of "Taiwanisation" of the KMT party- 
state. So Mitac may enjoy a competitive advantage over Acer in the access to business 
recipe resources, but may be at a competitive disadvantage in the access to policy style 
resources. However, in considering its connection with the policy style, Mitac's identity 
as a PLC, its mainlander ethnicity and business connections with the defence industry 
still considerably associate this company with the policy style. 
In contrast to Acer's Stan Shih who "spent every moment building the only 
thing he knows", Matthew Miau created Mitac in "moonlighting stretches between 
shifts working for the family's chemical and financial empire". As one industry observer 
acknowledged, "at company management, Miau was more like a delegator because he 
had other business to tend, leaning Mitac on (former) president C. S. Ho and other 
corporate officers to get things done and report to him". Indeed, although Mitac's 
shares are mostly controlled by the owning Miau. families, partly through the control of 
the obligations of kinship and partly through imposing subsidiary shareholding, they 
are inclined to delegate decision-making to managers who have developed long-term 
personal ties to Miau. 
However, with regard to Mitac, corporate strategies were obviously influenced 
by Miau's personal interests and his responsibilities for effectively mobilising family 
resources. This emphasis on the protection of family interests constrained opportunistic 
take-overs of different kinds of industrial activities, such as those pursued by Acer. 
Concern to protect family interests also led the company to maintain tight control over 
its financial management. Unlike that of Acer, Mitac's managerial philosophy was thus 
one of cautiously safeguarding company survival instead of reckless pursuit of growth. 
However, this emphasis on business recipe-driven strategy constantly led the company 
to face systemic tensions, as its connections to policy style and technology paradigm 
are also high. As we shall see in the following chapter, Mitac's choices of strategy 
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mostly came from searching for balance between policy style, business recipe and 
technology paradigm. 
7.4 CASE 3: FIC (FIRST INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER) 
In 1980, FIC was originally set up as the U. S. Prime minicomputer sales 
representative in Taiwan6. In 1983, under the brand of LEO the PC division was 
created primarily for the local market, which currently accounts for roughly 90 per 
cent of total company revenue. Apart from motherboards, PC systems and add-on 
cards, it also operates in factory automation, semiconductor development, banking 
information service and minicomputers distribution. It was publicly floated in 1991 
with its stock price persistently higher than its rival electronic firms. Performance was 
constant. It started overseas production in mainland China in 199 1, but its PC business 
was nevertheless built at its Hsien-tien and two Lin-kuo factories which were on land 
supplied by Nan-ya, a subsidiary of the Formosa group. Situating its headquarters in 
the building of the Formosa empire and two major factories in the Nan-ya plant, FIC is 
certainly likely to apply Formosa! s reputation for competing in the domestic market. 
The main characteristic of FIC is, of course, its emphasis on strong owner 
control and its close relationship with Formosa's business group, the largest 
manufacturing conglomerate of the economy. Dr. Ming-jen Chien (PhD at Berkeley), 
founder and chairman, is the son-in-law of Y. C. Wang, the billionaire founder and 
chairman of Formosa. Prior to the creation of FIC, Dr. Chien used to be an engineer in 
Bell laboratories and a professor at Wayne State University in the US. Though 
Formosa's support of FIC was inevitable, the creation of FIC was the result of Dr. 
Chien's personal desire for independence from the managerial hierarchy within the 
Formosa conglomerate. Unlike other case firms, power at FIC was extremely 
6The profile of FIC is based on the company's annual reports and my interviews. 
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centralised with only three members on the board; apart from Dr. Chien, his wife, 
Charlene Wang (Master in Statistics at Berkeley) acted as the president, the husband of 
Charlene Wang's younger sister - Y. C. Ou (MBA at Berkeley) - being the senior vice 
president. Company shares were mostly owned by the three owner-managers whose 
connections to Formosa mainly directed the company's growth. In general, largely 
through the education background and working experience of the owner-managers and 
partly through its long agentive relationship with Prime Minicomputer, FIC 
demonstrated a considerable connection to the technology paradigm. On the other 
hand, in considering its connection to Taiwanese policy style, FIC stood considerably 1ý7 apart from the style, with this connection slightly reinforced by its identity as a PLC. 
Consistently with Formosaýs style, FIC was basically production-oriented, 
emphasising volume expansion. Pursuit of cost leadership was facilitated by 
membership of the Formosa group whose manufacturing management and equipment 
prevailed over the organisation. In a capital market which did not favour small firms 
and relied heavily on tangible asset debts, being the "son-in-law of Y. C. Wang" was 
definitely an asset. Unlike Acer's Stan Shih who depends on "self-advertisement and 
state idealism" to underpin his action, Dr. Chien has an "assured charisma" to impress 
on banks, shareholders and exchange partners his inspirational vision. In addition, 
while competing in the industry, FIC has the advantage of building itself a relatively 
favourable niche by getting access to its family resources of Formosa's business group. 
Originally founded as a minicomputer agent company, for example, FIC had at least 
one large loyal customer in the Formosa group and additional business opportunities 
through Formosa! s relationships with other business partners. This also explains why 
FIC has the biggest domestic market ratio of its product markets among the case firms, 
though its main business of OEM-based motherboards is mostly export-oriented. 
Overall, then, just as Acer commanded access to policy style resources anO 
Mitac commanded access to technology paradigm resources, FIC showed a relatively " 
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higher connection to the business recipe than the other eight case firms. Actually, Acer, 
Mitac and FIC were understood to be "the big three" in the Taiwanese PC industry. As 
we shall see in the next chapter, FIC depended more on the rules of business recipe to 
drive its action, as its owner-managers had the advantage of access to more business 
recipe resources. 
7.5 CASE 4: ASI (Aquarius System Inc. ) 
ASI was founded by the brothers, Paul and Tony Liu, in 1983, with an initial 
capital of NT$2 million7. Before its foundation, Paul Liu was an English teacher and 
ran a travel agency for years. In 1983, at the age of thirty-five, Paul and his younger 
brother Tony created ASI with its early operation mainly an exporting agency in PC 
areas. As overseas business grew constantly, the company began to assemble PCs in 
1986, and manufactured mainboards and VGA cards in 1991. Its main PC 
manufacturing plant was established in Kuan-yin, Taoyuang County. In terms of 
business management, the two brothers were assigned divided responsibilities, with 
Paul more involved in the sales, administration and accounts while Tony (whose 
education background was in chemistry) concentrated on technology, design and 
factories. Among IT firms, ASI had the distinction of being the sole Taiwanese firm so 
far to have formed joint ventures with companies in both Germany and Russia. In 
Germany, ASI held fourth place in the share of the market. In Russia, it claimed that it 
was once the largest PC brand. Its propensity to venture overseas had been reinforced 
by the state's political bias in favour of internationalisation. However, from 1990, the 
company's performance declined. Its technology venture into Russia had become 
dilapidated. The most important business unit in Germany was facing declining 
profitability. The main board had also changed in its mode of operation. With a new 
717or ASI's history, I draw on my interviews, the company's annual reports and the reports by 
Wu (1992). 
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chief executive from outside, a corporate turnaround at ASI had quickly to be 
instigated. 
In the industry, ASI was an outsider. Without either a conspicuous engineering 
background or conglomerate financial support, the company had poor connections to 
all of the policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm, ASI's strategy was 
greatly influenced by its founder - Paul Liu - whose cosmopolitan and opportunistic 
character provided the basis of the company's action. Indeed, according to one of my 
interviewees, Paul Liu was described as "very speculative .... European-oriented... (with 
respect to computer technology) a layman". As we would expect, the company's 
idiosyncratic marketing orientation in the European market derived from the 
professional expertise of Paul Liu with his language education background and his 
experiences as travelling and trading agents. 
Lacking access to strong structural sources of power, ASI certainly found it 
difficult to compete in the industry. Consequently, in 1992, Paul Liu invited the former 
vice president of Elitegroup - Jack Huang (a graduate of Taiwan Institute of 
Technology) - to act as the president in order to start its sub-contract motherboards 
business. Furthermore, in 1993, the company merged with CAF, a rival PC firm owned 
by a local business group. Its merger with CAF brought in the new chairman Dr. 
Huang and since 1994, Paul Liu has been awarded the title of "honourable chairman" 
with the managerial team not much changed. At the time of writing, it is by no means 
clear that the merger with CAF has raised the value of ASI. But there are signs that 
strategic development of this company is being steadily re-shaped by its reinforced 
connection to the business recipe. As we shall see in the next chapter, the company's 
strategy has shifted the focus from the former owner's personality and professional 
association with the European market to the business recipe at large. 
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7.6 CASE 5: CLEVO (NTC) 
Founded in 1983, NTC originally specialised in keyboards8. It expanded into 
manufacturing PC systems in 1987, and diversified into monitor production by 
establishing a subsidiary in 1992. Like Acer, the company changed its English name 
from NTC, which had been registered globally by another firm, to Clevo in reflection 
of its pursuit of intemationalisation. About 85 per cent of its keyboards and notebooks 
were sold to overseas OEM customers, with notebooks accounting for roughly 90 per 
cent of total turnover. Allied to these, it also has the flexibility to supply a wide range 
of other peripherals such as case and power-supply. The company divides its keyboard 
business between two facilities, in Taiwan and Malaysia, whereas notebooks are built 
mainly at its main Wu-guo plant, in northern Taiwan. In general, by focusing mainly on 
notebook PC subcontracting business, Clevo has developed a relatively stable 
relationship with its exchange partners (e. g. IBM, ATARI and DTK), hence partly 
reinforcing its connection to the technology paradigm. 
Although both are categorised as single-unit family businesses, Clevo differs 
substantially from ASI in many dimensions. Unlike ASI, Clevo is managed by an 
engineering team, with its founder and chain-nan - Kent Hsu - notably specialising in 
R&D. After graduating from Taipei Institute of Technology (TIT), Kent Hsu created 
Clevo as the result of his interest in electronics and in association with his family's 
traditional brick manufacturing, which had faced the conflicts between declining 
demand, environmental protection and labour shortage. The company shares are 
mostly controlled by Hsu's family. For a long time, Kent Hsu was the sole key person 
but, since 1988 he has invited the former vice president of Tatung - J. P. Chen - to 
work as the principal executive. This certainly reinforces Clevo's connection to the 
business recipe, as Tatung is the biggest consumer electronics company in Taiwan. 
8Much of the material in this section is based on my interviews and the company's annual 
reports. 
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Additionally, Kent Hsu is also the chairman of Chicony -a typical business recipe 
company, though it competes with Clevo neck and neck on the OEM notebook 
market. The management of Clevo stemmed mostly from the engineering training from 
TIT, the best technology institute in Taiwan. Situated in downtown Taipei and very 
close to the largest grey electronic market of the island, TIT is known as the "cradle of 
local electronic engineers". 
Unlike Acer with its strong reliance on policy style over the creation of 
strategic resources, Clevo demonstrated a relatively low connection to the state. In 
turn, the combination of strong family control and local engineering professionals 
connected the company more with the logic of business recipe, as its strategy was 
more oriented toward the protection of family business. Overall, then, as we shall see 
in the next chapter, the company has pursued strategies that largely exclude the 
influence of policy style. 
7.7 CASE 6: TWINHEAD 
Established in 1984, Twinhead was created by local professional engineers 
from Philips9. Its main founders - Stanley Chiang and Charles Chen - were classmates 
at the prestigious Graduate School of Electrical Engineering of Taiwan National 
University. Before setting up Twinhead, Mr. Chen was the developer of a 
microprocessor-based teaching kit which he sold to Acer. Built at the founder's home, 
its early products were mainly innovative but low-cost ASIC chips and add-on cards. It 
integrated desktop PC assembly in 1987, portable PCs in 1989, and since 1991, 
committed its main resources to the notebook area. Apart from producing ASIC chips, 
add-on cards and PC systems, it also runs an R&D centre for workstations at the 
HSIP, and distributes Sun Microsystems' workstations and Hewlett-Packard's 
9For Twinhead's history, I draw on the company's annual reports and my personal interviews. 
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peripherals. Important OEM partners include NCR and Unisys whose business 
relationships with Twinhead date back to 1989. Overall, then, partly through its 
relations with both Sun and Hewlett-Packard and partly through its connections with 
other exchange partners, the company retains a considerable connection to the 
technology paradigm. 
Twinhead differs from the majority of Taiwan's PC companies by having its 
manufacturing facilities situated in the southern port city of Kaohsiung, though its main 
office and R&D facilities are located in Hsin-tien, suburban Taipei. Indeed, spin-offs of 
organisational geography have a tendency to locate near the original company, because 
entrepreneurs not only live there but have established relationships. For this reason, the 
founder of Twinhead - Stanley Chiang - located his firm in the area of Kaohsiung 
where he was born and where he worked for a long time. 
From its foundation until 1993, Stanley Chiang and Charles Chen were the key 
personnel of the company. In the industry, Charles Chen is well-known as having taken 
the highest rank in the university entrance examination of his time. In this, though both 
are known as specialists in notebook PC technology, Twinhead provides a sharp 
contrast to Clevo, with the former driven by the graduates of Taiwan University and 
the latter led by the TIT professionals. In Taiwan, Taiwan University is the best 
university and TIT is the best technology institute. Variation in education background 
certainly made a difference to competition for access to policy style resources. On this 
point, Twinhead was viewed as more legitimate than Clevo and, as a result, Twinhead 
was more likely to secure the support of the state. In addition, the education 
background of Twinhead's owner-managers was certainly an advantage in winning the 
support of local business elites, hence increasing its connection to the business recipe. 
However, in early 1993, because of a US debt which turned the company's huge 
earnings into losses, Mr. Chen left Twinhead and founded a rival notebook PC firm in 
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a venture with Philips. Since then, Stanley took over Charles' managerial job and has 
been the chairman-curn-president of the company. 
In addition to its founders being the major shareholders, the company is also 
partly owned by a set of diversified external shareholders that include venture 
capitalists, state-operated banks and a subsidiary of the KMT business group. These 
external shareholders accounted for at least 40 per cent of the company's total shares. 
Obviously, this social identity as partly state-owned connects the company to the 
7 
policy style in a very strong sense. Partly as a result, strategic development at 
Twinhead has been very like that of Acer. As we shall see in the following chapter, 
Twinhead's relatively high connection to the policy style helps explain its peculiar 
strategies. 
7.8 CASE 7: COMPAL 
Compal was established in 1984 with a capital of NT$50 millionlO. It is a 
subsidiary of Cal-Comp, one of the longest lived indigenous conglomerates. The 
business group was the creation of Chao-yin Hsu, jointly with some Taoyuan 
bourgeois" and six young graduates of the Electrical Engineering Department of 
Taiwan University. By 1993, the Cal-Comp group had grown to be a diversified 
holding company though its main business is so far mostly related to electronics. It has 
also diversified into other areas of investment, venture capital, international trade, 
automation and industrial materials. In 1984, Cal-Comp founded Compal to work 
mainly in manufacturing and sales of computer peripherals. Given the imperfect legal 
environment, the separation of Compal from the conglomerate "was simply a strategic 
1OMuch of the material to follow in this section is based on Compal's annual reports and my 
interviews with the company's managers. I 11bey include doctors, scholars and merchants, most of whom had lived through the Japanese 
colonialist period. 
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response to tax incentive" 12. Both Cal-Comp and Compal are publicly floated on the 
Exchange, with many of their assets and resources mutually shared. Compal, the case 
study firm, was originally built as a 14" specialised colour monitor producer and, in 
1990, moved forward integration of notebook system manufacturing. All their 
products are based on export-oriented OEM contracts. 
Like Mitac which loosely separated the ownership and control, Compal was 
managed by a professional team, though the main board had the final say over strategic 
investment decisions that determined Compal's future and was the final arbiter of 
personnel policy. This professional team was led by Ray Chen - its president. Ray Chen 
is a graduate in Electrical Engineering of National Chengkung University. Before 
joining Compal, he had worked at Cal-Comp for a long time and so had developed 
long-term relationships with the Hsu family. Another key person was the chairman's 
oldest son Rock Hsu who was on the board of directors. Chao-yin Hsu, the honorary 
chairman of Cal-Comp and chairman of Compal, was educated during the period of 
Japanese colonialism. Company shares were mostly controlled by the Hsu family, 
partly through interlocking subsidiary shareholding and partly through reliance on 
kinship relations for obligatory control. It maintained stable subcontracting relations 
with suppliers and industrial customers, many of which were Japanese firms. In 
particular, its LCD sources depended heavily on the long-term development of Cal- 
Comp in electronics, during which Cal-Comp's managers have grown together, with 
many of the Japanese executives of the suppliers, since the days when they were all in 
lower positions for their organisations. In addition, since the group founders were 
equipped with colonial Japanese education, the company still retained a profoundly 
Japanese managerial style, summarised as having a paternalist leadership but stressing 
"lifetime" employment patterns. These Japanese connections, especially privileged 
access to leading LCD suppliers, reinforced Compal's connections to the technology 
paradigm, compensating for its lack of American links. 
12Quoted from an interview with Compal's senior manager. 
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In sum, partly because of Cal-Comp's relationships with Japanese suppliers and 
partly because of Cal-Comp's long operating history in the industry, Compal has 
developed a considerable connection to the PC technology paradigm, particularly that 
related to Japanese CPU suppliers. However, despite its identify as a PLC that partly 
associated the company with the policy style, the company retained a largely aloof 
posture in terms of its relationships with the state. Like Mitac and FIC, the company is 
a business-group firm and so shows a relatively high connection to the Taiwanese 
business recipe. Indeed, the social identities of Compal are quite similar to those of 
FIC, and these similarities have led both firms to pursue quite similar strategies. In the 
next chapter, these strategies will be discussed and systematically compared in detail. 
7.9 CASE 8: AUVA (AUTOCOMPUTER) 
AUVA was a privately owned firm, profoundly coloured by family 
managementl3. It was basically the result of a merger, through a marriage of Chris 
Yang and Annie Tsao. In 1985, Tsao's family set up AUVA as a production and sales 
electronic company in motherboards and add-on cards. It merged with Yang-tech in 
1988 after Annie Tsao married Chris Yang. Originally among the five founders of 
Datatech, a rival PC firm, Chris Yang created Yang-tech in 1981 as a sales agency of 
IC parts and, in 1982, expanded its business to include production and sales of 
motherboards and add-on cards. Related to these, in 1989, the main board brought in a 
US computer firm (with 34.7 per cent shareholding) to reinforce its financial 
structure14. Motherboards and desktop PC systems, built at its Thailand plant, and 
notebook PC at its new Chung-li factory, were the mainstay of AUVA's business, 
DFor AUVA's history, I draw on the company's annual reports and my interviews. 
14 According to AUVA's annual report of 1992, this US computer firm is named as "Ming- 
jen". However, it is nearly impossible for the researcher to trace any information regarding this 
investment event, because the company was very reluctant to talk about it. 
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accounting for more than 90 per cent of total turnover. Its subsidiary in Thailand was 
among the leading computer companies of the country15 and factored a substantial 
amount of PC manufacturing equipment. 
After the merger in 1988, the company was "very much a Taiwanese family 
business", with Tsao's parents and sister closely involved. Ambitious and with frugal 
lifestyles, the Tsao family excluded their operational managers from policy making and 
financial responsibilities. The president Chris Yang and his wife Annie Tsao, the 
chairman, were among AUVA's key personnel and jointly with other family members 
hold nearly 25% of the company's shares. Chris Yang is a graduate of Taiwan Institute 
of Technology, and Annie Tsao is a graduate of Taipei Institute of Business. Thus both 
the owner-managers did not have eminent education backgrounds that could associate 
the company closely with the policy style, business recipe or technology paradigm. 
However, in the industry, Chris Yang was active in industrial public affairs and was 
rather "sensitive in mastering every business opportunity" 16. From 1989 to 1992, he 
acted as the chairman of Taipei Hsien (County) Computer Association, and from 1993, 
the chairman of China Computer Development Association. 
Without a strong engineering professional team, the company developed no 
more than a quite loose link to the PC technology paradigm. Comparatively, partly 
through investment links with a US computer firm and partly through sub-contracting 
qconnections, 
AUVA did, however, possess a relatively higher structural link with the 
-paradigm than ASI. Like most of my case firms, as a typical single form of family 
business, AUVA's considerable connection to the business recipe was mainly 
dependent upon its long-established business networks in the industry. However, its 
connection to the policy style was much more complicated. Despite Chris Yang's (the 
15AUVA claimed that its factory in Thailand was the largest, though the exact statistic is not 
available. 
16Quoted from one of my interviewees. 
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president) enthusiastic participation in the industry, it was very difficult for AUVA to 
compete with its domestic rivals such as Acer or Twinhead for access to political 
resources for reasons of his lack of prominent education background. As we shall see 
in the next chapter, the desire of the owner-manager to secure the support of the state 
constantly drove AUVA! s choice of strategy and so distracted AUVA's strategic 
./ alternatives from the demands of the business recipe and technology paradigm. 
Finally, it is worth noting that AUVA only survived for less than a decade. In 
early March 1994 when my fieldwork was just ended, the company announced 
liquidation with a debt of more than NT$600 millionl7. Price competition and rapid 
roduct change within the PC technology paradigm probablyýdmv"ut this traditional 
Chinese family business, which was neither publicly floated on the Exchange nor 
financially connected to any business group (Central Daily News (Intl), 3 March 1994: 
8) 
7.10 CASE 9: ELITEGROUP 
With an initial capital of NT$5 million, Elitegroup was established in 1987, 
during a peak in the growth of Taiwan's information technology18. Most of its 
founders (five out of seven) came from the R&D department of Acer. It began as a 
mainboard manufacturer and, currently, jointly with its rival FIC, is the world's biggest 
independent maker of printed circuit boards or motherboards. In 1993, it began 
overseas production in Mainland China. Some book-sized PCs are assembled on 
limited OEM orders. Unlike other case PC firms, Elitegroup does not have its own 
17AUVA claimed that its business in Thailand will continue despite the liquidation of its parent 
company. 
18The profile of Elitegroup is based on my interviews and the company's annual reports. 
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production line for desktop/notebook PC. Eventually, it set up a subsidiary to integrate 
forward into PC system manufacturing under the brand name of the company. 
Despite its belated entry into the PC industry, discontinuities in supply for chips 
gave an opportunity for Elitegroup to gain a position. As early as the Autumn of 1989, 
the company placed largely long-term CPU orders and obtained support from the 
headquarters of its monopoly supplier - Intel - to become a major account. This 
decision proved to be "a hen that lays golden eggs". During the unprecedented 
shortage of CPUs in 1990, the company obtained 386 CPUs at official prices while the 
grey market price tripled. A medium company like Elitegroup receiving 13,000 CPUs 
monthly would enjoy an annual advantage of NT$ 500 million over their competitors 
(Brown, Sep. 1993). 
With access to a stable supply of chips, the company tended to focus on 
innovative mainboard technologies which rely on bringing advanced CPU into mass 
production. For example, it was one of the first manufacturers in Taiwan to 
incorporate VLSI technology and ASICs standards into the design of mainboards. 
Notably, the company can turn out a prototype motherboard within two or three 
weeks, about half the time that a US computer firm requires to do the job (Kraar, 8 
Aug. 1994: 55). Aiming at keeping up to date with new product information, it 
operates an R&D centre in America! s "Silicon Valley", and set up an E-mail system for 
the headquarters and the subsidiaries. Partly because of its fame as an innovator, at the 
end of 1993, the company became the strategic ally of DEC by manufacturing Digital's 
new Alpha microprocessor on its boards (Clifford, 16 Dec. 1993: 44). Overall, partly 
through its subcontracting relationships with Intel and other business partners, and 
partly through its overseas subsidiaries, the company connected itself considerably to 
the technology paradigm. 
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The company was managed by a professional young team which had grown 
together with the company. The main board was made up of these major managers 
with Thomas Chen as the key man holding shares of about 6 per cent. From its 
foundation to June 1993, Thomas Chen was the chairman and the principal executive 
of the company. Like Kent Hsu of Clevo, Thomas Chen is a graduate of Taipei 
Institute of Technology, implying that the education background of the owner-manager 
was not positive in associating Elitegroup with the structures of policy style, business 
recipe and technology paradigm. Its connection to business recipe was largely built 
through its friendly relationships with Acer. 
Since 1993, Dr. Frank Huang (a native), joined Elitegroup as the chairman, 
after an alliance between the company and a scanner maker, Lee-jek. Dr. Huang was 
the vice chairman and once the president of Lee-jek, and his educational background 
included two doctoral degrees: one in Medicine and the other Physics. Also, Dr. 
Huang is a member of "Seven-Hearts Club", an informal association providing an 
alternative source of access to the KMT party-state (Economic Daily Newspaper, I 
June 1993: 11). Perhaps in order to strengthen its efforts to become a PLC, Elitegroup 
invited Dr. Huang to chair the board, with his company share holding less than I per 
cent. But with access to more policy style resources, the company is also forced to 
follow more the policy style rules. Its connection to the policy style in this sense has 
been substantially increased since 1993. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
Elitegroup's recent strategy of integration into related PC peripherals (Central Daily 
News, (Intl), 2 Dec. 1994: 8) was explained by its increased connection to the policy 
style. 
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7.11 THE COMPARISON OF CORPORATE IDENTITIES 
The last nine sections introduced the nine PC companies that make up my case 
studies. Although the companies all operated in the same system of the Taiwanese PC 
industry, they differed markedly in terms of the social relationships that construct their 
particular identities in the system. Certainly the relationships between individual firms 
and social structures - policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm - are too 
complex to be fully conceived in simple terms. But each relationship as a phenomenon 
of interest to social scientific research deserves more systematic thinking. 
In my theory, firrns' links to the three structures constitute their identities, 
providing them with both access to structural sources of power essential to strategic 
choice, and certain rules about how to exercise their choices. In general, this 
consideration raises three concerns. First, the more diverse the sources of their power 
firms have, the wider is their range of choice. Secondly, Insofar as firms are socially 
stru wcv 
structured ith differe rees of social relationship, their choice of strategy is likely 
mt [etures to conýform to e socinstrru uressoniaxhieiýcthey depend most. Thirdly, insofar as 
they vary in the strength and intensity of their relationships to the social structures, 
, .... ... ..... "I'll . .... ......... firms will. exi::: týii: i`ý" a"i"a'nt strategic ch stry system. Taken together, the 
three points suggest that the degree to which firms are capable of exploiting their 
social relationships is critical to explaining corporate strategic choices and 
differences. It is, then, important to compare the extent to which firms demonstrate 
different degrees of social relationship with the three social structures. These 
differences were surnmarised in Table 7.2 (see page 15 1), introduced in the beginning 
of this chapter. This table has been discussed through my analysis of each case firm 
individually, and will be now more systematically compared. 
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Corporate Identities with regard to Policy Style 
In a sense, it is reasonable to argue that most PC firms, while greatly export- 
oriented, are less likely to recognise the benefits of political advantages than those (e. g. 
auto and cement firms) which are more geared towards competition in the domestic 
market. But in order to take advantage of a highly growing stockmarket, firms are 
likely to go public, hence increasing the degree to which they are shaped by the policy 
style. Among the nine case studies, Acer, Mitac, FIC and Compal are publicly listed 
companies. As discussed in Chapter 5, the stockmarket favoured business-group firms 
and national champions, working against most SMEs. Among the four PLCs, Mitac, 
FIC and Compal are all related to business conglomerates, while Acer secures the 
support of political power. Indeed, Acer's connection to the policy style was extremely 
high. In addition to its high links to President Lee Teng-hui and the stockmarket, Acer 
benefited from a style of public policy which favoured native business elites and 
industrial leaders. Just as Singh et al (1986: 173) point out, older organisations, like 
Acer and Mitac, are more likely to be viewed as legitimate in nation states, hence 
increasing their access to policy style resources. As a PLC, Mitac's high connection to 
the policy style was additionally built on its exclusive Mainlander's ethnicity which still, 
to some extent, was supportive of political advantages. For example, Mitac's identity 
as a mainlander firm facilitated its political advantage in the traditionally sensitive area 
of defence electronics. But in competition with that of Acer and Twinhead, this 
ethnicity generally limited Mitac's ability to gain a higher degree of political advantage 
than the former two firms, whose access to the advantage was partly built by the rise 
of Taiwanisation of the KMT party-state. Owned by a set of diversified shareholders 
including venture capitalists, large banks and a KMT-owned firm, Twinhead was more 
like Acer as a native business star which needed to fulfill a greater degree of 
conformity to policy style-oriented strategies than the other seven firms. 
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The other six firms - FIC, ASI, Clevo, Compal, AUVA and Elitegroup - stood 
considerably apart from the policy style. However, AUVA was very aggressive in 
pursuing its political connections. But this connection was largely confined to the 
fringe of the policy style which was only supportive of large firms or national 
champions. Like AUVA whose access to political advantage was considered at a low 
to medium level, FIC and Compal, too, did not stand very far from the policy style 
because of their identities as PLCs. Typical were ASI, Clevo and Elitegroup which all 
showed a relatively low connection to the policy style. But Elitegroup's connection to 
the style was reinforced after 1993 when the company invited Dr. Frank Huang, to 
chair the company in order to fulfill its dream of "going public". To summarise, Acer's 
connection to policy style was considered as extremely high; 7Winheads was high; 
Mitac's was medium to high; FIC, Compal and AUVA's were about low to medium; 
ASI and Clevo's were low; and Elitegroup was low before 1993 and high after 1993. 
Corporate Identities with regard to Business Recipe 
Turning now to consider their connections to the business recipe, on average, 
those PC firms growing initially out of the local electronics industry showed a 
relatively higher connection to the business recipe than their links to policy style. 
However, in comparison with single-unit family firms, subsidiaries of business groups 
have the advantage of maintaining effective collaboration to coordinate operational and 
marketing activities and facilitate technical interchange across group businesses. This 
ability to use the flexible network of supportive group members was a critical resource 
in the Taiwanese business recipe. Among the nine firms, Mitac, FIC and Compal are all 
related to business groups, though they differ in the strength and intensity of their 
relations. Highest was FIC, which was set up as a subsidiary of Formosa, Taiwan's 
largest manufacturer. As we would expect, the local business recipe served FIC well 
and helped ensure that its competitive advantage of manufacturing was sustainable. 
Where FIC possessed the highest access to advantage in the business recipe, another 
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two subsidiaries of business groups - Mitac and Compal - are considered also to 
demonstrate a high connection to the recipe. Mitac is a subsidiary of "Sun-tung gang" 
group, one of the successful mainlander conglomerates in Taiwan. Compal is a 
subsidiary of Cal-Comp, one of the longest lived native manufacturers. Both firms' 
strengths were partly derived from their parent companies' long business traditions 
which dated back to before the emergence of IT industry. In an environment where 
personal ties and relations are important, this tradition was a source of social networks 
providing both firms with learning, adaptability, co-operation and market 
opportunities. 
Another five family firms - Acer, Clevo, Twinhead, AUVA and Elitegroup - 
showed a moderate connection to business recipe with their owner-managers 
considerably depending on local business networks to empower their actions. While its 
owner's cosmopolitanism mattered a great deal to its strategy, ASI was more like an 
outsider, showing a relative detachment from the Taiwanese business recipe. To 
summarise, FICs connection to business recipe was considered as extremely high; 
I Mitac and CompaPs were high; Acer, Clevo, Twinhead, AUVA and Elitegroup's were 
about medium; and ASrs was low. 
Corporate Identities with regard to Technology Paradigm 
Finally, I want to discuss firms' connections to the technology paradigm. 
Because the paradigm of microcomputers is mainly created by US firms and partly 
around Japanese CPU suppliers, it is reasonable to expect that Taiwanese PC firms 
would hardly demonstrate high paradigm connection equivalent to those of Acer with 
the policy style and FIC with the business recipe. None the less, we may argue that 
Mitac had a high connection to PC technology paradigm, which was partly created and 
transformed by Intel who dominated the world's CPU market. After graduating from 
the University of California, at Berkeley, Mitac's chairman - Matthew Miau - worked 
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for a time at the then newly formed Intel. Even today, Miau still holds a good personal 
relationship with Intel's founder - Andy Grove. Acer's long operating history in the 
industry has also established its medium to high connection to the paradigm. It is 
considered medium to high because of the company's business links to several US IT 
firms and the character of its top management. The business links reinforced its 
connection to the paradigm, but in contrast to Mitac, Acer' top management was a 
purely native engineering team which put it slightly apart from the US dominated 
paradigm. Like Acer, FIC was considered as showing a medium to high connection to 
the paradigm. But in contrast to that of Acer, this connection was largely reinforced by 
the education backgrounds of FICs owner-mangers, which include a PhD of Berkeley, 
a MBA of Berkeley and a statistics master of Berkeley. 
The other four fmm - Clevo, Compal, Twinhead and Elitegroup - were 
considered to have only a moderate access to the technology paradigm, as the extent 
to which they associated themselves with the paradigm seems less than FIC (which was 
managed by Berkeley's graduates) and Acer (which was linked to considerable 
investment overseas). Correspondingly, Clevo, Compal and Twinhead were notebook 
specialists, while Elitegroup was a motherboard specialist. All the four firms had 
considerable connections to industrial consumers and components suppliers, though 
the connections were mostly confined to their own particular areas. Comparatively, 
neither specialising in particular product areas nor committing themselves to particular 
OEM partners, ASI and AUVA were on the fringe of the PC technology paradigm. 
Unlike other entrepreneurs who had a technological background, ASI and AUVA 
shared a common position as "opportunistic marketers". But lowest would be ASI 
which was mainly European market-oriented. In comparison with ASI, AUVA was 
considered to have a low to medium connection to technology paradigm because of its 
relatively long operating in electronic business. To summarise, Mitac's connection to 
technology paradigm was considered as high; Acer and FICs were medium to high; 
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Clevo, Compal, Twinhead and Elitegroup's were about medium; A UVA's was low to 
medium; and, finally, ASFs was low. 
I have now finish introducing Table 7.2. Overall, the degree to which firms 
relate to policy style is clearly greater in Acer, Twinhead and Mitac than in the other 
five firms. Equally, the greater levels of connections to local market organisations in 
FIC, Mitac and Compal compared to the other six PC firms should reflect in the 
greater degree of connection to business recipe in the former firms. Finally, 
dependence on the technology paradigm is obviously lower in ASI and AUVA than in 
the other seven firms here. 
- ---l 
Again, a glance at Table 7.2 (page 15 1) will confinn that finns within the same 
industry system differ from one another. These differences are based on their different 
links to a plurality of social rules and resources that construct their particular social 
identities. The identities establish firms' social positions that cause them to make 
strategic choices differently. To summarise, throughout the thesis, it is my argument 
that these identities will serve as an institutional link between structure and agency 
and that this link connecting macrolmeso and micro processes will accord 
corporate identities with strategic choices. In the next chapter, the strategic choice of 
the nine case PC firrns will be examined and systematically compared in detail. 
7.12 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I introduced my nine case PC finns; by establishing the broad 
similarities and differences of their social identities or positions in relation to the 
industry system in which the structures of policy style, business recipe and technology 
paradigm interact. In examining firms' individual identities, I have been drawn into a 
wider discussion of company histories, their product range, company sites, top- 
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management traits, key owner-managers and political, business and technological 
networks. As already discussed in the thesis, firms within the same industry system 
differ from one another. They are socially constructed with different forms of structural 
links to their attendant social context. These differences in the nine case study firms' 
identities are summarised in Table 7.2. According to my theory, it is in the light of 
these differences that I shall show how firms made their strategic choices differently 
from one another. This is the task of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8: STRATEGIC CHOICES 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
I began this thesis by contrasting the divergent strategies of two PC companies. 
This contrast served to introduce the central issue of the thesis: why do firms pursue 
different strategies? and how are they able to sustain them? As I have argued so far, a 
firm's uniqueness is an essential aspect of strategic analysis. This uniqueness is a 
product of the fmn's structural relationships. The unique set of relationships gives the 
firm not only resources empowering its action but also structural links to social rules 
that govern or constrain its action. Comparatively, the uniqueness constitutes the 
corporate identities that account for the strategic divergences of the firms. In addition, 
identities, while providing an institutional link between structure and agency, serve as 
the driving force for the growth of the firm whose powers of choice derive from the 
structures of society. These elements make up the main dimensions of my tripartite 
structural theory of strategy. In this research, I apply this theory empirically to the nine 
PC firms introduced in the preceding chapter. 
In this chapter, I shall both examine how the social identities of the nine case 
study firms made a difference to their strategic choices and elucidate the social forces 
behind them. For this account, I shall adopt a thematic approach - around various 
strategic issues - which will cover the cross-case analysis and results I. The outcome of 
this analytical method is a mixture of narrative and themes, of history and theory (cf. 
Starkey and McKinlay, 1993). 1 will particularly focus on five major strategic issues: 
OEM vs. own-brand, purchasing, innovation, interriationalisation and diversification. 
According to Whittington (1993: 79-110), the growth strategies of innovation, 
intemationalisation and diversification have proved useful in illuminating firms' 
behaviour from a sociological point of view. The other two strategies - OEM vs. own- 
IFor different approaches to the composition of multi-case studies, see Yin (1984: 133-5). 
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brand and purchasing - are generated from the cases themselves. In a similar position, 
Porter (1990: 680) indicates that one important strategic choice facing Taiwanese 
firms is whether to pursue a strategy of being an OEM supplier to foreign firms or to 
seek to create internationally known brand names. In addition, as I have discussed in 
Chapter 5, the PC technology paradigm is built around the macro rule of open systems 
which indicates network source, choice of off-the-shelf components and compatibility 
between products manufactured by different firms. This rule highlights the role of 
purchasing in illustrating PC firms' behaviour. In relation to the five strategic 
discriminators, the chapter will finish by examining several key issues on which the nine 
case firms took very divergent strategies. 
8.2 OEM vs. OWN-BRAND 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the Taiwanese PC industry has a tendency to 
specialise in OEM. To a large extent, the OEM business is consistent with the 
Taiwanese business recipe that promotes volume expansion, cost leadership and 
contract manufacturing, at the expense of marketing and original design. However, the 
Taiwanese policy style and the PC technology paradigm are less clear. The KMT state 
is keen to encourage own-brand strategies to underpin its efforts towards international 
recognition. The technology paradigm, on the other hand, is ambivalent, offering an 
established niche to subcontractors at the same time as placing a premium on the ability 
to market under the company's own name. Thus business recipe, policy style and 
technology paradigm offer conflicting avenues, between which each Taiwanese player 
has to choose individually. As this section will show, Taiwanese PC firms tended to 
resolve the dilemma between OEM and own-brand according to their particular 
identities in relation to the three structures (see Table 8.1). 
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Table 8.1 Choice of OEM or Own-brand with respect to corporate identities 
% of own-brand Policy style Business recipe Technology paradigm 
Acer High (50-70) Extremel high Medium Medium-high 
Mitac High (50-60) Medium-high High High 
FIC Low (10) Low-medium Extremely high Medium-hiRh 
ASI Medium-high 
(30-70) 
Low Low LOW 
Clevo Nil LOW Medium Medium 
Twinhead High (50) high Medium Medium 
Compal Nil Low-medium High Medium 
AUVA Medium (30-40) Low-medium Medium Low-rnediurn 
Elitegroup Low (5) Low (high after 
1993) 
Medium Medium 
In general, Taiwanese PC firms have tended to pursue more the OEM route. 
OEM strategies draw on the production-oriented strengths of the Taiwanese PC 
industry system. Compal, for example, is an OEM-based notebook company. Under 
the OEM arrangement, productivity considerations always have the priority for 
Compal. Compal's managers identified strongly with this objective: "We are not like 
Acer which clairns itself as the star of the island. We've run our business on an 
industrial customer-led basis .... Profits are the only visible things that we can show to 
our shareholders. " Equally, Clevo is much like Compal, being an OEM-based notebook 
manufacturer which asserts its production orientation: "Since we began, we never 
thought to promote our brand to be world well-known. It's not our specialisation. It is 
only in production at this stage that we can compete with other international 
rivals ... OEM is the area where we can successfully make profits. " Compal and Clevo 
have pursued product strategies that are consistent with "OEM culture" in Taiwan's PC 
industry system. Indeed, this is what we would expect, given the combination of low 
connections to the policy style and considerable connections to the business recipe. 
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Another family firm - FIC - is OEM-oriented as well. As discussed in the 
preceding chapter, the company depends on the Formosa group's established capability 
to underpin its strategy. In Taiwan, Formosa is the biggest manufacturing firm whose 
reputation certainly plays a key role in the process of creating competitive advantage. 
Originally founded as a minicomputer agent company, FIC had at least one loyal 
customer in the Formosa group and a huge potential market through Formosa! s 
relationship with other enterprises, banks, government institutions and so on. While 
subsequently competing in the international market, FIC has succeeded in building 
itself a relatively favourable niche by getting access to the resources of the Formosa 
business group. Accordingly, FIC's efforts concentrate wholly on production efficiency 
rather than global marketing. The efforts are consistent with its strong connection to 
the business recipe. 
Elitegroup is also an OEM-oriented firm. As one of the world's major makers 
of motherboards, the company created a new venture to integrate forwards into PC 
system manufacturing in order to focus on subcontracting activities. In sum, all these 
OEM firrns have much in common. They are tightly controlled by the owning family 
(FIC, Compal and Clevo) or business partners (Elitegroup). They are heavily driven by 
profit considerations. Top managements at these firms are dominated by engineering 
professionals. In particular, they are considerably independent of the state and tend to 
depend upon the business recipe to guide their actions. 
However, there are still quite a number of manufacturers starting out as OEM 
manufacturers and slowly advancing into marketing their own brand products. These 
firms often have close links with the Taiwanese policy style (see Table 8.1). 7winhead, 
for instance, makes OEM PCs, enough of them to invest in its own brand-name 
systems which enjoy higher margins. Its vice president Dr. Lee called this the "50-50" 
strategy, which implies an equal product-mix of OEM and own-brand aiming to 
support each other. Though highly dominated by engineering professionals, the 
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company differed from the above firms by substantially developing positions in own- 
brand market places. Because the company is partly state-owned, it bears the 
responsibility of creating a global strategy in order to promote the image of Taiwan- 
made products. Thus, Twinhead's high links to the policy style help explain its strategic 
choice. 
AUVA's once own-brand strategy was associated with the background of its 
decision-makers and, in particular, its structural links with the state. Without an 
engineering background but active in industrial public affairs, Chris Yang - AUVA! s 
president - was keen to reinforce the company's political links to the state while 
constantly holding its own-brand policy. Its choice of own-brand strategy was thus 
reinforced by the president's relations with local trading agents and its connection with 
Taiwanese policy style. 
The most notable case of own-brand efforts came from Acer. Ever since the 
information industry became feasible, Acer has been the symbol for a Taiwanese 
export-oriented company which is determined to achieve world-wide sales. It is the 
first computer company to successfully establish a brand name - Multitech, before 
switching to Acer in 1988. The changing of the company name represented one of the 
company's endeavours to pursue a global strategy whereby Acer managed to 
compensate for the conflict between the language barrier and own-brand behaviour by 
getting access to the resources of a state-backed national champion: "The major 
purpose for the change was to come up with a smoother sounding name that can 
advance our efforts to effective globalisation. Multitech was awkward to pronounce 
and had caused legal disputes with some other firms of identical name. We spent 
$35,000 to come up with the new name and the accompanying logos for our 
company. " The Taiwanese government played a very supportive role in this event 
(Wang, 1988: 216-25). For a long time, the KNIT-controlled mass communication 
continued to report Multitech's efforts at creating a new name. Almost every person in 
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Taiwan believed that this company was on the way to becoming Taiwan's first 
significant multinational company. A few months later, Acer became Taiwan's first 
publicly floated IT firm. 
Among other divergent directions in its strategic development, Acer's product 
strategy is a new type of Taiwanese penetration of Western markets. The aggressive 
pursuit of domestic acclaim established a national base for expansion overseas. This 
internationalisation came out with Stan Shih's ambition so long as the entrepreneurial 
process was necessary to satisfy external expectation. Armed with patriotic enthusiasm 
and entrepreneurial inspiration, Acer has been making every endeavour to enhance the 
global image of its products so that "people won't regard them as something of inferior 
quality due to the stigma of 'made in Taiwan', but rather as products of internationally 
recognised stature". For Acer, the whole plan also expressed the luxury of patriotic 
adhesion to government objectives. In addition, Stan Shih's own commitment to 
internationalisation was reinforced by the nature and character of being the first 
publicly listed PC company and being the top employer of the human resource 
market. 2. In the case of Acer, access to the policy style resources, such as the 
stockmarket, the HSIP, social prestige and publicly free advertisement, certainly has 
proved important in explaining its global strategies. J 
Mitac represents a more ambivalent case. The company and Acer shared a 
common position as "industrial leaders and PLCs" whose structural links to the policy 
style were the great driving force behind their own-brand strategy. In addition, Mitac's 
long connection with Intel places a premium on its ability to pursue own-brand 
strategy. On the other hand, Mitac's identity as a subsidiary of the Lien-hua business 
group propelled its search for OEM business which was more consistent with business 
21n a survey of a local magazine, in 1989, university graduates ranked Acer as the most 
sought-after employer of the society (Acer's annual company report, 1990). 
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recipe. As a result, throughout Mitac's history, it emphasised the balance of OEM and 
own-brand products. 
Finally, in contrast to the motivation of Twinhead, Acer and Mitac, ASrs 
product direction of own-brand concentration was to be highly reinforced by the 
centralisation of ownership structure and, in particular, the background of the owner as 
a relative outsider to the Taiwanese business recipe. From the early 1980s when one of 
ASI's major clients in New Zealand announced liquidation because of its violation of 
IBM's I. P. R., Paul Liu had decided not to explore other markets abroad without using 
the "ASI" brand. By its divergence in the industry, ASI's idiosyncrasy of marketing 
orientation in pursuit of the European market owed much to the professional expertise 
of Paul Liu with his language education background and his experiences as travelling 
and trading agents. The considerable distance between ASI from both the business 
recipe and the technology paradigm reflected the unwillingness of the owner to focus 
on an OEM business mostly related to the U. S. market. However, its choice of own- 
brand strategy was not because of its connection to the state's search for international 
respectability. In fact, this connection was quite low. It was the owner's personality, 
professional association with the European market, and particularly the company's 
great distance from the business recipe that made a difference to its choice. 
To conclude, social relations with the policy style clearly contribute to the 
firms' tendency towards own-brand strategy while ASI's exception was based on its 
owner's cosmopolitanism and relative detachment from the Taiwanese business recipe. 
8.3 PURCHASING BEHAVIOUR 
Purchasing behaviour offers an important choice for Taiwanese PC firms. 
Although the industry currently produces 60 per cent (by value) of a computer system 
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independently, the 40 per cent of imported items tend to include some of the most 
important parts, especially LCDs, HDDs and CPUs. CPUs, for example, mostly 
depend on the supply of Intel. More recently, AMD, Cyrix, Motorola and IBM started 
to supply CPUs, but they are largely confined to making replicas of Intel's 
microprocessors (Ristelhueber, 1993: 58-67). In general, the PC technology paradigm 
encourages fmns to build close relationships with Intel which still dominates the CPU 
market. The Taiwanese policy style supports firms' long-term commitments to 
international partners. However, the Taiwanese business recipe provides rules that 
indicate a more opportunistic relationship and short-term commitments between 
specific business partners. In other words, the recipe is only supportive of using 
multiple suppliers. Tensions between policy style, business recipe and technology 
paradigm thus produce a dilemma from firms in purchasing strategy -a dilemma 
between diversification of CPU sources and supplier loyalty (cf. Brown, Sep. 1991: 
77-8). As this section will show, Taiwanese PC firms made their choice in good part 
according to their particular identities related to the three structures (see Table 8.2). 
Table 8.2 Choice of purchasing: diversification of sources vs. supplier loyalty 
Purchasing Policy style Business recipe Technology paradigm 
Acer Loyalty Extremely high Medium Medium-high 
Mitac Loyalty Medium-high High High 
FIC Mix Low-medium Extremely high Medium-hiRh 
ASI Diversification Low Low Low 
Clevo, Diversification Low Medium Medium 
Twinhead Diversification high Medium Medium 
Compal Diversification Low-medium High Medium 
AUVA Diversification Low-medium Medium Low-medium 
Elitegroup Contracting Low (high after 
1993) 
Medium Medium 
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To resolve the systemic tensions, typical strategies such as those of ASI, Clevo, 
Twinhead, Compal and A UVA tended to diversify their CPU sources. They asserted 
their emphasis on the cost side. As one manager at AUVA contended "why diversify? 
It is very simple. As we all know, don't put all one's eggs in one basket ... Cost is very 
important. But we would continue to do business with Intel. " Largely lacking ready 
access to Intel and relatively independent of the state, these five firms conformed to the 
business recipe and adopted the choice of diversification of CPU sources. On the other 
hand, why did the other four firms differ? Did the environment tolerate their deviancy 
from the business recipe? 
Acer and Mitac had special relationships with Intel, both having subsidiaries 
acting as Intel distributors. The high level of their connections to Intel, along with their 
high links to the state, had led both firms to conform to the technology paradigm rule 
of "supplier loyalty". Split from Acer and still run by Acees former managers, 
Elitegroup, too, depended upon long-term contracts with Intel. The contracts were 
largely reinforced by Elitegroup's connection with Acer. However, FIC's choice of 
purchasing was more complicated. 
To FIC, the strategy of how to resolve the purchasing tension came from 
searching for balance between policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm. 
When the researcher interviewed a middle manager about this issue, she refused to 
answer. In a later interview with one director for the PC business, he explained that, 
"of course, cost consideration is important. That is why we have business with AMD 
or even other CPU suppliers. But we don't say it. We are a very big company .... We 
have to keep face for Intel. " As discussed in the preceding chapter, the degree of 
dependence upon the business recipe was clearly greater in FIC than in the other eight 
firms. While conflicting with the technology paradigm (note that FIC was managed by 
three Berkeley graduates and so showed a relatively high connection to the paradigm), 
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this strong dependence in turn limited the willingness of the owner to conform to 
diversified purchasing. In addition, as a PLC with its stock price persistently higher 
than Acer and Mitac, FIC also had a tendency to conform to the policy style. FIC, 
Intel's fifth-biggest customer buying about US$500 million in Intel products in 1992 
(Clifford, 16 Dec. 93: 45), thus provides an extra angle on purchasing strategy. As well 
as playing by the business recipe rule to diversify its CPU sources, FIC also showed 
obeisance to the policy style and the technology paradigm in keeping silent about its 
choice. 
8.4 INNOVATION 
Managing innovation is an important feature of the PC technology paradigm. 
This feature is built around the rules of open systems and rapid product change that 
encourage firms to pursue R&D alliances and I. P. R. (Intellectual Property Right) 
protection. The Taiwanese policy style, too, promotes technology venture, inter-firm 
cooperation and licensing practices. However, the Taiwanese business recipe 
discourages inter-firm cooperation and has a tendency towards counterfeiti g and 
illegal activity. Thus, technology paradigm, policy style and business recipe provide 
two strategic dilemmas that Taiwanese PC firms faced. One is whether to take part in 
inter-firin cooperation or not, the other is whether to conform to the rule of respect for 
I. P. R. or not. As this section will show, Taiwanese PC fin-ns tended to resolve the 
dilemmas according to their social identities related to the three structures. 
8.4.1 Choice of Inter-Firm R&D Cooperation 
As discussed in Chapter 5, one important rule of the PC technology paradigm 
is strategic alliance or inter-firm cooperation. This cooperation can afford a firm access 
to new technologies or new markets, economies of scale in joint research and sharing 
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of risk. The Taiwanese state also promotes industrial cooperation, and, on many 
occasions, sets up strategic consortia with local companies. In the case of PCs, the 
cooperation between the state and local finns includes the projects of POXT, MAT, 
386/AT, 486/AT and the recent notebook development consortium which is also the 
biggest one. In order to provide a comparative basis, I shall take the example of the 
notebook development consortium which was organised in 1990. At that time, all nry 
case firms had come into existence. 
Table 8.3 Choice of notebook strategic consortium 
Alliance Policy style Business recipe Technology paradigm 
Acer Yes Extremely high Medium Medium-high 
Mitac Yes Medium-high High High 
FIC No Low-medium Extremely high Medium-high 
ASI No LOW Low LOW 
Clevo No LOW Medium Medium 
Twinhead No high Medium Medium 
Compal No Low-medium High Medium 
ALTVA No Low-medium Medium Low-medium 
Elitegroup No 
1 
Low (high after 
1993 1 
Medium 
1 
Medium 
As Table 8.3 shows, only Acer and Mitac joined the consortium. Both firms 
were very much related to the policy style. As one manager of Acer indicated: "If we 
don't join, who will?.. Actually, most of these firms (who joined the consortium) are 
very small.. Big firms like FIC, Compal and Twinhead don't join. But we are the 
industry leader. We have to give a lead. " One industrial observer further indicated: 
"Acer has to join, because Stan Shih is the previous chairman of Taipei Computer 
Association (TCA). Mitac also has to join this consortium ... (because) C. S. Ho (then 
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Mitac's president) is the incumbent chairman of TCA ...... Overall, the relatively high 
connection with the policy style drove Acer and Mitac to join the notebook 
development consortium. However, tensions between policy style and business recipe 
put a strain on both firms'commitment to the consortium. Both were believed to carry 
on their own notebook R&D projects, even though these projects overlapped with the 
industrial consortium one. 
However, high connection to the policy style did not drive Twinhead to join 
the consortium. Twinhead's choice was facilitated by its strong R&D team led by its 
then president - Charles Chen. In the industry, Charles Chen is well-known as having 
the highest ranking in the university entrance of his timCTfiiýýrehis R&D team 
reinforced Twinhead's connection to the business recipe that discourages strategic 
alliance. As one manager of Twinhead identified with its choice: "In the industry we 
are the best. To join the consortium did not help us. In contrast, it just led to sharing 
our technology with our rivals. " The relatively high connection to the business recipe, 
too, also encouraged Clevo and Compal to commit resources on their own notebook 
R&D project. FIC's great dependence on business recipe also discouraged its search 
for strategic alliance. 
The mutual reinforcement between low policy style orientation and medium 
business recipe orientation also pulled Elitegroup out of the consortium. ASI did not 
join the consortium, because of its relative distance from the policy style and 
technology paradigm. However, AUVA was an exception. As I have described, 
AUVA! s owner cum president - Chris Yang - was very active in industrial public 
affairs. In 1990 when CCL and TEAMA organised this consortium, Chris Yang acted 
as the chairman of Taipei Hsien (county) Computer Association. Both the association 
and TEAMA "did not like each other" and this certainly constrained the willingness of 
the owner-manager to join the consortium. Eventually, AUVA began its notebook 
production with access to two former employees from an OEM notebook firm which 
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was split from Compal. Accordingly, AUVA's choice not to join the consortium was 
facilitated by its connection to the Taiwanese business recipe which promotes the rule 
of opportunistic external acquisition of expertise. 
8.4.2 I. P. R. Protection: the Free Rider or Leader 
Table 8.4 Firms' tendency towards I. P. R. violations 
I. P. R. Policy style Business recipe Technology paradigm 
Acer Earlier: more or 
less 
Recently: no 
(claiming I. P. R. 
advantage) 
Extremely high Medium Medium-high 
Mitac Negative Medium-high High High 
FIC Negative Low-medium Extremely high Medium-high 
ASI More or less Low Low Low 
Clevo More or less Low Medium Medium 
Twinhead More or less high Medium Medium 
Compal More or less Low-medium High Medium 
AUVA More or less Low-medium Medium Low-medium 
Elitegroup 
1 
Missing 
1 
Low (high after 
1993) 
Medium Medium 
1 
Within the industry system, most Taiwanese PC firms pursued a free-rider 
strategy consistent with the business recipe. In so doing, they used the technique of 
reverse engineering to advance their products. However, reverse engineering is hardly 
a cheap way to acquire expensive know-how. The PC technology paradigm 
discourages firms' choice of counterfeiting or free-riding as reverse engineering 
inevitably violates intellectual property rights (IPR). The state's emphasis upon 
international relations also negated this kind of R&D strategy. Since Taiwan has been 
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willing to show more responsibility to the global economy in an effort to join the U. N., 
the state has created many pressures on firms' counterfeiting and other illegal practices, 
typical of the business recipe3. 
Just as Table 8.4 shows, most of my case firms, such as Acer, ASI, Clevo, 
Twinhead, Compal and AUVA had had experiences of being charged with I. P. R. 
violations. Only Mitac, FIC and Elitegroup were free from I. P. R. accusation. The 
owners of both Mitac and FIC were educated in the U. S. and this education 
background provided a sharp contrast to the industry which was dominated by the 
native university graduates. The relatively high connection to technology paradigm 
thus has driven Mitac and FIC to conform to the avenue of the technology paradigm, 
at the expense of their links to business recipe. 
Elitegroup was an exception. There are two reasons for this exception. First, 
there were significant profits in their early years that led them carefully to protect their 
position in the industry. Secondly, Elitegroup was the world's leading motherboard 
firm whose connection to Intel drove the company into the search for motherboard 
market leadership through what it calls "wave and tank tactics". As a senior manager 
of Elitegroup explained: "Since the investment in motherboards is not huge - say - 
about NT$1 million, therefore we let the R&D people do whatever they want to 
do .... maybe the products are numerous ... but let only one succeed and that will be 
enough .... Continuing to develop new products is a weapon for marketing people, like 
tanks to move forward ... Tank strategies are to combine R&D and marketing people to 
conquer the market .... Afterwards we'll see what happens and decide what to 
invent 
3After the breakdown of trade talks between US and Taiwan in early March 1993, principally 
over increased protection for I. P. R., Taiwan was told to pass legislation acceptable to the US 
under the threat of the possibility of 100% tariffs on electronic exports under retaliatory 
measures pennitted by the US Omnibus Trade Act of 1988. It is generally believed that 
Taiwan, which is vulnerable because of its diplomatic isolation and its pending application to 
join the GATT, is being made into an example for Washington's world-wide war against I. P. R. 
theft (Baum, 8 April 1993). 
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next. " Therefore, Elitegroup did not pursue a free-rider strategy. Instead, they "throw 
spaghetti at the wall and see what sticks" (Peters, 1994: 18). The innovation strategy 
for Elitegroup is therefore a combination of the evolutionary process of market 
selection and self-reinforcing sets of organisational resources. 
Finally, I want to focus on the implication of Acer's case which is still more 
interesting. In Acer's earlier history, the company more or less committed itself to 
some counterfeiting activity. For example, Apple brought the company to court when 
it marketed its Apple-compatibles in the US during 1983 and into 1984. But the judge 
found no infringement of copyright. Gradually, the innovation strategy at Acer has 
changed from the free-rider to leading or fast following directions. This change of 
strategy is less about satisfying market exchange partners than securing a dominant 
position as industrial leader. In more detail, this strategic change, while approved by 
the technology paradigm, may be more consistent with Acer's identity as national 
champion, but tensions between the structures brought pressures on Acer's action. 
Between 1987 and 1989, for example, the pursuit of a leading innovation 
strategy led Acer to face problems in committing far too many resources to the micro- 
channel architecture of technological advancement. As Stan Shih put it: 
"When IBM introduced the PS/2, everyone wondered if he should follow. At that time, 
Acer had the resources so it decided to commit - it couldn't afford to miss the 
opportunity. But because IBM feared the clone market, MCA was only semi-open, not 
really open. IBM's strategy was to protect its corporate accounts. However, the PC 
became popular because it was based on an open standard. With MCA, there weren't 
the clones to make it popular and we had to switch back to AT and EISA. For Acer, it 
is not in a position to introduce a standard. You need size or a niche to do that ... (in 
1989) Acer almost conunitted (itself) to SPARC but it learned from its mistake with 
Micro-channel. However, if [MCA] happened again, I might make the same decision to 
invest if I had the resources. If you just wait and see, you may end up losing out in the 
end, '. 4 
41nterview with Stan Shih (Electronic Business, May 1991: 44). 
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In general, while against the business recipe, innovation strategy at Acer is 
governed by fast-follow motives attempting to secure the inherent advantage of 
emergent PC knowledge as soon as possible. However, the relative distance from the 
technology paradigm restricted Acer's ability to achieve this advantage. Moreover, 
while the intersections of policy style and business recipe have a tendency to deny 
monopolistic advantages, technical superiority may not actually help improve Acer's 
competitive position. For example, despite its relatively high connection to the policy 
style, we see how difficult structural change in enabling patent protection can be in 
practice (see "Acer's dilemma in sustaining I. P. R. "). Accordingly, Acees high structural 
links to the policy style may provide the company with vital social resources important 
to its own-brand strategy, and yet the links, while providing structural sources of 
power for innovation, were denied by the business recipe which still connected Acer in 
a considerable sense and so constrain its action. In short, Acer's unique identity as a 
national champion drove its search for I. P. R. strategy, but the recipe did not support 
this deviancy and its relative detachment from the technology paradigm denied it any 
substantial first-mover advantage. 
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ACERS DILEMMA IN SUSTAINING I. P. R. 
Tired of playing the I. P. R. defendant to industry dominators, Acer went on the 
attack and became the plaintiff in a case regarding its "chipUp" technology. Announced 
in 1991 and granted a patent by Taiwan National Bureau of Standards in January 1992, 
the technology basically provides an upgrade path for PCs by simply changing the 
CPU. Acer claims ChipUp is the most convenient and econom ical way to upgrade a 
PC, since it eliminates the need to replace the machine itself or even the motherboard. 
And since many PCs are shipped from Taiwan without CPUs (easily inserted at the 
destination market), ChipUp technology enables Acer warehouses to reduce inventory 
while increasing flexibility. Starting in December 1992, the company sent certified 
letters to dozens of manufacturers, including many of Taiwan's top 30 computer 
marketers, warning them to stop production of upgradeable motherboards or pay a 
royalty on every unit shipped. 
The move infuriated the heads of many of the companies involved, who then 
formed an unspoken "anti-Acer alliance" and launched a noisy debate in the local 
media. They scoffed at the US$1 million dollar "prior use fee" (which was later 
changed to US$38,000) and the royalty structure proposed by Acer. They argued that 
CPU upgradability is a feature provided by Intel and other CPU manufacturers and is 
not a unique technology invented by Acer, regardless of whether or not Acer held the 
patent rights in Taiwan. After mediation by several government institutes and a two 
month "cooling off' period, Acer proposed lower royalty fees as a compromise to its 
local competitors, until Acer could attain the ChipUp patent rights in a third country, 
presumably the United States. In a result, none of the accused stepped forward to pay 
and the case appeared headed to court. 
After the realisation that IT firms all over Taiwan were turning against the Acer 
group in disgust, Stan Shih made the decision to drop the royalty demands until US 
patent rights are secured. Local pundits saw this as a last ditch effort to "save face" in 
an embarrassing public relations flop that had little chance of succeeding in the first 
place. Industry experts generally dismiss Acer's chances of gaining the ChipUp patent 
rights in the US. 
Source: Tuck (May 1993) (Partly quoted) 
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8.5 INTERNATIONALISATION 
In past years, the interactions of business recipe and policy style created an 
environment which offered Taiwanese PC firms cheap labour and land to gain a cost 
advantage over international competition. Recently, the environment has changed. 
Large-scale currency appreciation, rising wages and land prices have decreased this 
advantage. In order to remain cost-competitive, Taiwanese PC firms can choose to 
import foreign labour or move abroad where less-expensive labour is still available. 
However, the Taiwanese policy style discourages the importation of foreign workers, 
with only a limited quota per year allowed. The style also discourages firms from 
investing in mainland China for obvious reasons. However, investment in China is 
encouraged by the Taiwanese business recipe, which has traditionally put forward 
cheap labour as part of a cost strategy. This cost strategy is additionally consistent with 
the technology paradigm rule of cheap production. 
On the other hand, the paradigm indicates the rule of flexibility and 
entrepreneurism that encourages big international firms (such as Acer and Mitac) to 
form SBUs in order to respond quickly and to exploit local market opportunities. In 
turn, the recipe discourages commitment to particular markets and partners, but the 
policy style supports firms' searches for intemationalisation. 
Accordingly, tensions between policy style, business recipe and technology 
paradigm provide conflicting routes for firms' choice of internationalization. As this 
section will show, my case firms made their choice according to their individual 
identities related to the three structures. 
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8.5.1 Choice of Importing Foreign Labour 
Table 8.5 Choice of importing foreign labour 
Importing choice style Business recipe Technology paradigm 
Acer No Extremely high Medium Medium-high 
Mitac No Medium-high High High 
FIC Yes Low-medium Extremely high Medium-high 
ASI No Low Low Low 
Clevo No Low Medium Medium 
Twinhead No high Medium Medium 
Compal Yes Low-medium High Medium 
AUVA No Low-medium Medium Low-medium 
Elitegroup No 
1 
Low (high after 
1993) 
Medium Medium 
In order to decrease labour costs, Taiwanese PC firms can import foreign 
workers. Among my case firms, however, only FIC and Compal chose to import 
foreign labour (see Table 8.5). Both finns are subsidiaries of business groups which 
have long operated in Taiwan's environment and are greatly business reciPe-oriented. 
This recipe orientation, together with the relative distance from the policy style, drove 
both of the firms' search for importing foreign workers. However, with regard to being 
recipe-driven, Mitac is an exception. Though closely related to business groups, Mitac 
was reluctant to import foreign workers. Not only did Mitac's relatively high 
connection to the policy style constrain its freedom to import foreign labour, but 
tensions between ethnic identities made a difference too. Unlike Formosa and Cal- 
Comp - the parent companies of FIC and Compal (respectively), Mitac's parent 
company - Lien-hua business group - was controlled by a mainlander entrepreneur who 
preferred to isolate its economic activities from other foreign ethnic groupings. This 
was because foreign workers might "raise the sensitivity of ethnic conflicts". Thus, 
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Mitac's strong links to the recipe did not drive the company into the search for 
importation of foreign labour. However, as in FIC and Compal's cases, the relatively 
high connection to the business recipe gave their choice a sense of direction. Similarly, 
the other five finns did not respond to this direction because of their relatively low 
connection to the business recipe. In addition, as in Acer's case, its high connection to 
the policy style further constrained any tendency towards following the business recipe 
in this particular aspect. 
8.5.2 Choice of Investment in South-eastern Countries and China 
Table 8.6 Choice of investment in south-eastern countries and China 
Choice Policy style Business recipe Technology paradigm 
Acer Malaysia Extremely high Medium Medium-high 
Mitac China (1993) Medium-high High High 
FIC China (1991) Low-medium Extremely high Medium-high 
ASI China (1993) LOW Low LOW 
Clevo Malaysia Low Medium Medium 
Twinhead No high Medium Medium 
Compal 71ailand Low-medium High Medium 
AUVA Thailand Low-medium Medium Low-medium 
Elitegroup China (1993) Low (high after 
1993) 
Medium Medium 
Rather than importing foreign workers, most PC firms turned their attention to 
the neighbouring Pacific Rim countries where less-expensive labour and land are still 
available5. Acer began overseas monitor and keyboard production in Malaysia and was 
later followed by Clevo's keyboards; Compal's monitors and AUVA! s motherboards 
5 An added bonus for manufacturers who ship directly from Southeast Asia is that the products 
are often available with GSP (Generalised System of Preference) Form A, which means that 
they are exempt from import duties ranging from 3.9% in the U. S., 3.9 in Canada, 4.9% in the 
EC, and 8.9% in Eastern Europe. This is very significant if the product value is high. 
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and desktops in Thailand; and more recently, FIC, ASI and Elitegroup's motherboards 
and Mitac's monitors in China6. However, rather than going abroad to set up a new 
factory, Twinhead is simply managing its manufacturing operations at home (see Table 
8.6). So why did Twinhead diverge from the other eight case PC firms? 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the recipe rule of strong fan-dly control has led to a 
company which does not usually function in hierarchies and has a tendency to pursue 
an opportunistic market strategy. Consequently, the diversified capital structure of 
Twinhead conflicted with this recipe rule and this conflict constrained action that 
would conform to the business recipe search for overseas' cheap natural resources. On 
the other hand, the considerable connection with the business recipe drove another two 
notebook firms - Clevo and Compal to invest in Malaysia and Thailand (respectively). 
For the firms searching for cheap labour, China should be the best choice, 
consistent with both the business recipe and the technology paradigm7. However, this 
choice was not approved by the state until 1993. For example, the mutual 
reinforcement between state and business relations drove A UVA to invest in Thailand, 
instead of investing in China. However, the relative distance from the policy style and 
the strong connection to the business recipe explain FIC's first move in China in 1991. 
However, as a PLC, FIC denied that it had any facilities, or even plans for starting 
manufacturing in China. But the later evidence showed that it was organising a 
manufacturing programme in China regardless of government regulation8. In general, 
while heavily business-recipe-driven, FIC was very likely to invest in China where its 
parent company - Formosa - was planning the world's largest petrol-chemical plant in 
Fujian, China. However, its connection to the policy style more or less constrained its 
6For a general discussion on the PC production shift from Taiwan, see Uimonen (May 1993). 
7For example, the current largest PC firm - Compaq - operates three factories in the world; 
One in the US, one in Scotland, and the other in Guangdong, China. 
81nterviewed with academics. Ibis information was also confirmed by China! s governmental 
officers (Central Daily News (Intl), 18 Dec. 1994: 8). 
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investment. Eventually, facing the tensions between policy style and business recipe, 
FIC did go to China but denied that it had done so. This behaviour, in a sense, is just 
like its policy on CPU diversification. 
Instead of "going first", Acer and Mitac, while much more related to the policy 
style than FIC, were only planning their investment in China in 1991. But Mitac went 
to China in 1993 when the state had just lifted its ban on investment in China. The 
strong connection to the policy style certainly put a constraint on Acer's tendency 
towards investment in China. In turn, the relatively high connection to the business 
recipe, together with Mitac's identity as a mainlander business, drove the firm quickly 
to enter the China market. The relative distance from the policy style also facilitated 
ASTs investment in China in 1993 when the firm had started its motherboard 
manufacturing. Like FIC and ASI - as motherboard firrns which were more likely to 
face more pressures from the cost side - Efitegroup also embarked upon a recent 
investment programme in China though it was described as "rather late to enter into 
China" As one manager of Elitegroup indicated: "You see, FIC had been in China for 
two years.. ASI had been there for one year,.. Our movement to China is a little bit too 
late.. But we still have to go. " 
A number of reasons contribute to explaining Elitegroup's belated access to 
China! s cheap resources. Firstly, there was the personal enthusiasm of Elitegroup 
leaders, who were willing to upgrade their own local industries. Elitegroup started 
their business with modem manufacturing equipment which thereby constrained their 
investment in China. Secondly, there were the significant profits in their early years 
that led them to neglect other considerations in order to achieve cost advantage. 
Finally, and most importantly, the desire to obey floatation regulations was deeply 
grounded in the strategic investment decisions of the company, which had long dreamt 
of "going public". In order to become a PLC, the company invited Dr. Frank Huang, 
who had good relationships with the KMT state, to chair the company. As a result, the 
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intention to develop strong connection to the state constrained Elitegroup's choice of 
Cbina investment. 
8.5.3 Production Activities in Europe and the US 
Table 8.7 Production activities in Europe and the US 
Choice Policy style Business recipe Technology paradigm 
Acer Holland, US Extremely high Medium Medium-high 
Mitac UK, US Medium-high High High 
FIC No Low-medium Extremely high Medium-high 
ASI No LOW Low Low 
Clevo No LOW Medium Medium 
Twinhead No high Medium Medium 
Compal No Low-medium High Medium 
AUVA No Low-medium Medium Low-medium 
Elitegroup No Low (high after 
1993) 
Medium Medium 
In addition to policy style and business recipe account on firms' international 
conduct in China and Pacific Rim countries, the restructuring of the PC technology 
paradigm has increasingly defined the value of internationalisation. Acer and Mitac, 
with their strong connection to the technology paradigm, are particularly influenced by 
the paradigm which indicates the rule of flexibility and entrepreneurism to run 
international business (see Table 8.7). In more detail, the rapid decrease in the price of 
components and radical technical innovation have driven Acer and Mitac to take 
advantage by bringing their final assembly closer to the market. Both had 
manufacturing activities in Europe and the U. S. and they depended upon the 
technology paradigm to drive their international operation. The other considerably 
paradigm-connected fkm FIC, in turn, did not operate production activities in Europe 
7 
and the US for reasons of its extremely high connection to the recipe that constrained 
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its search for intemationalisation. In particular, a glance at Table 8.5 will confirm that 
the rationale of internationalisation for both Acer and Mitac is partly associated with 
the English language9. As we would expect, in terms of investing in Europe, 
Taiwanese firms prefer to invest in the UK or Holland where English is much more 
popular than in the rest of European countries. 
In 1990 when the company dipped into the first losses of its history, Acer 
decided to break down its large organisations into more fleet-footed, "market 
responsive business units". As Stan Shih explained: "the strategy is that, while 
restructuring may hurt in the short-term, the smaller companies will be better prepared 
to seize opportunities quickly". In addition, the company had recently expanded its 
assembly operations in Holland, and had made Eindhoven the base for its European 
operation. 
Mitac, with about 40 per cent of its sales in Europe, had lately started the 
company's new European plant in Telford, England 10. The former president of Mitac - 
C. S. Ho - indicated the "Modulised Manufacturing System" overseas had its 
advantages of "decreasing the risks of cost variations,... enjoying low importing tariffs, 
and ... increasing shipping efficiency" (Economic Daily Newspaper, 28 Jan. 1994: 12). 
In a sense, both corporations had fragmented into numerous independent 
companies that addressed specific markets. And both firms were moving 
manufacturing out of Taiwan and closer to particular geographic regions in order to 
increase local market penetration. While Mitac planned a headquarters in each regional 
90n this point, see page 86. 
IOThe European Community's "local content" regulations certainly give incentives to local 
assembly. Import duties differ vastly for imports of components that are locally assembled 
compared to importing a complete system. Import tariffs for a motherboard are significantly 
lower if they come without the CPU, which is easily bought and attached locally anyway. This 
is the main reason behind the myriad of European firms who nowadays assemble their own 
system, and have thereby basically shut out the smaller Taiwanese PC firms, although Taiwan 
remains the main supplier of motherboards and add-on cards for these companies as well. 
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market, Acer licensed assembly operations from South America to Europe, Africa and 
Australia, with the eventual goal of recruiting third-party investment to localise 
ownership. Both strategies reduced delivery time from months to days. One manager 
at Acer asserted, ".. Our policy is to 'localise' these overseas operations by finding 
native people in the host countries to head operations. " In the international operation 
where the prevailing local contexts are unaccustomed to companies, the matching of 
strategy and structure in exploiting the technology opportunities of their locales is 
more obviously understood. The vice president for international manufacturing of 
Mitac identified further with this technological distinction: ". ffor example), Hard disk 
drives prices drop every three months, CPUs the same.. If Mitac can build a machine 
out of the latest-priced components, it sells at an advantage; if it's stuck with that 
machine past the next price drop, it's cooked". Overall, then, while conforming to the 
rule of flexibility and entrepreneurism, Acer and Mitac's organisational restructurings 
were the socialised outcomes of the PC technology paradigm, though this rule partly 
conflicted with the Taiwanese business recipe. 
To conclude, Acer and Mitac's choice of internationalisation was technology 
paradigm-driven and this choice was consistent with the policy style search for 
international recognition. In other words, their relatively strong relations to the 
technology paradigm and policy style steered their activities while overriding the 
importance of business recipe. Indeed, a strategy of immediate market sensitivity 
requires mastering a flexible organisation structure to enable a quick shift from one 
technology to another in order to follow in the direction of "multitech innovations" 
(Dror, 1993). An international business that focuses on technology management thus 
has to be diversified down to a local division or lower. It may be less efficient for 
routine operations, but it will be more effective in exploiting global resources of 
technology paradigm and thereby tuned to the competitive advantage of the company. 
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8.6 DIVERSIFICATION, INTEGRATION AND ACQUISITION 
Table 8.8 Choice of diversification 
Choice Policy style Business recipe Technology paradigm 
Acer Integration Extremely high Medium Medium-high 
Mitac Integration Medium-high High High 
FIC I Integration Low-medium Extremely high Medium-hijzh 
ASI Merge Low Low Low 
Clevo Focus Low Medium Medium 
Twinhead Focus High Medium Medium 
Compal Focus Low-medium High Medium 
ALTVA Opportunistic 
diversification 
Low-medium Medium Low-medium 
Elitegroup Focus & 
Integration into 
peripherals 
Low (high after 
1993) 
Medium Medium 
In the system of the Taiwanese PC industry, choice of diversification offers a 
sharp conflict between business recipe, technology paradigm and policy style. The 
Taiwanese business recipe encourages opportunistic unrelated diversification and 
discourages vertical integration and acquisitive growth strategies. However, the PC 
technology paradigm indicates the rule of continual growth which, in tum, promotes 
broadening, deepening and upgrading product range around the core technology. The 
Taiwanese policy style is a little ambivalent. The state offers tax incentives to favour 
new firms, on the one hand, and increasingly promotes the development of native 
conglomerates as the means of both justifying the Taiwanese controlled regime and 
pursuing international respectability, on the other. Thus, diversification strategy 
exposes systen-k conflicts between the three social structures. As this section will 
show, the nine case finns, tend again to resolve the conflicts according to their social 
identities related to the three structures (see Table 8.8). 
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In a casual conversation with Dr. Frank Huang 11, Elitegroup's new chairman, I 
asked him how PC firms can survive in today's environment. He stated: "There are 
only two strategies - focus or integration. For example Clevo, Twinhead and Compal 
focus on notebook segments. They can survive in their own niches ... The big three - 
Acer, Mitac and FIC - can continue their activities, of course. " But how about middle 
firms like ASI and AUVA? "They have to really think about that .... ASI just merged 
with CAF - (a subsidiary of Yung-fen-yu business group) ... It will find its own way ... In 
order to compete in today's environment, AUVA has to seek the support of 
conglomerates or it will be in danger. " Two and a half months after the interview, 
AUVA announced liquidation. A few months after this liquidation, ASI integrated into 
notebook PC manufacturing. 
The comparison of ASI and AUVA is interesting. Before 1993, ASI was much 
more like an outsider in PC industry which is dominated by engineering professionals. 
The relative detachment from the policy style, business recipe and technology 
paradigm constrained the firnfs tendency towards integration or product innovation. 
However, starting in 1990, the company's identity began to change. The company 
diversified into motherboard production after the arrival of president Jack Huang, the 
former vice president of Elitegroup. In 1993, ASI sought to merge with CAF to create 
a much larger firm in competition with the future advantages of mass volume and of 
the cluster effects of technology paradigm rules. ASI's merging with CAF has brought 
a change to its prior identity, substituting an outsider with relatively high connections 
to the business recipe and technology paradigm. This merger may endanger the 
founder's control, but at least it contributes to ASI's survival for reasons of its 
increased access to structural sources of power. 
I IThis conversation was taken place at the TCA on 21 January 1994. At that time, Dr. Huang 
was invited by the TCA to address a speech. 
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Before ASI's merging with CAF, AUVA was somewhat similar to ASI. Both 
companies lacked conglomerate financial support and a significant professional 
background. But comparatively, AUVA was more likely to diversify into unrelated or 
related markets than ASI because the former had a relatively high connection to 
business recipe and technology paradigm. The conflict between business recipe and 
technology paradigm, however, has brought pressures to AUVA, partly resulting in 
AUVA's collapse. 
In 1993, despite severe shedding of the Taoyuan site, and even slashing 
margins in its traditional business, AUVA's leaders were driving their company into a 
major investment in the workstation systems and notebook range. Technology 
paradigm-driven, this investment was greatly reinforced by its external shareholder -a 
US computer firm which invested in AUVA in 1989. As a singular kind of family 
business, AUVA also invested heavily in the property market, conforming to the recipe 
rule of opportunistic diversification. However, this action certainly formed a 
constraining influence over its debt operation from financial institutions. Eventually, 
the owners of AUVA "destroyed the company with its diversified investment in the 
volatile property market" (Central Daily News (Intl), 3 March 1994: 8). 
In contrast to AUVA pursuing opportunistic diversification, Twinhead, Clevo 
and Compal pursued a focus strategy building around the core of notebook 
technology. This strategy was consistent with a technology paradigm which promotes 
either a focus or integration strategy. Twinhead, for example, is a notebook 
specialising firm. Its high connection to the policy style constrained its tendency 
towards opportunistic diversification which is business recipe-driven. However, 
Twinhead is not a PLC. In turn, its well-known R&D team provided the company with 
a moderate connection to technology paradigm. As a result, the mutual reinforcement 
between state and technology relations contributed to its focus strategy. In addition, 
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these relations, together with its newly established R&D centre in the US, enabled 
Twinhead to enter the workstation systems market. 
Just as happened with Twinhead, the connection with the technology paradigm 
also partly contributed to Clevo's focus strategy. The company originally specialised in 
keyboards. It expanded into manufacturing notebook PCs with its R&D executive and 
technical team mainly coming from Acer. Though concentrating on notebook areas, 
Clevo still pursued some sort of diversification. This diversification was reinforced by 
its relatively high dependence on business recipe and technology paradigm. Largely 
lacking access to the policy style, Clevo did not pursue integration or an acquisition 
growth strategy. Originating from brick manufacturing, the company invested mainly 
in the areas of PC peripherals, such as keyboard, monitor, case and power supply. All 
these products did not need heavy investments. In addition, as a TIT graduate, Kent 
Hsu has developed a close relationship with the operation of Taiwan's grey electronic 
market which provides a source of technological diffusion and supplier networks. 
Like Clevo, as an OEM notebook firm, Compal also pursued a focus strategy. 
However, its relatively high connection to the business recipe did not contribute to its 
opportunistic diversification behaviour. The diversification was pursued by its parent 
company - Cal-Comp which, for example, set up Compal better to exploit the scope 
economies of physical assets in related electronic manufacturing areas. In addition, 
Cal-Comp's investment in PC areas was reinforced by the group's long-term 
relationships with Japanese suppliers who dominated the world's LCD market. In an 
environment where rapid product change is a rule, mutual obligations between 
suppliers and customers may turn out to be an advantage. To take an example, in 
October 1990, shortly after Compaq shipped its first 386-based notebook system, 
Compal also managed to demonstrate its first notebook model in a US exhibition. At 
that time, LCD supply was shortening. But, through its parent company's long term 
relationship with Japan's suppliers, Compal was able to bring the notebook prototype 
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into mass-production, though it still took considerably longer. In a sense, its relatively 
high connection to the technology paradigm drove Cal-Comp's search for PC 
manufacturing. But its low reliance on the policy style restricted the willingness of the 
group to create a much larger firm under the name of Cal-Comp. Instead, the groups 
created another company - Compal - as a strategic response to tax incentives. When 
pursuing a focus strategy, all these firms - 7Winhead, Clevo and Compal - had much 
in common. By mobilising immediate resources to reinforce their positions, they 
followed the technology paradigm search for integration into similar kinds of economic 
activities. 
In addition, the creation of Compal leads us to consider the logic of the policy 
style, as well as of the technology paradigm which help explain the diversification 
strategy. Before 1992, Elitegroup was most conservative, keeping out of PC systems 
while solidly defending their core motherboard business and expanding the works. The 
relatively low level of its connection to technology operators constrained the course of 
diversification action. But the company's identity changed substantially after 1993 
when it invited Dr. Frank Huang, a member of the KMT's informal sub-association, to 
act as the chairman with his company shareholding less than I per cent. Since then, 
Elitegroup has intensively diversified into PC peripherals and, particularly, 
semiconductors (Central Daily News (Intl), 2 Dec. 1994: 8). This choice of 
integration growth strategy was clearly facilitated by its strong connection to the policy 
style. 
So far I have discussed a variety of diversifications which were policy style, 
business recipe or technology paradigm oriented. I have also touched on some 
examples of the modes of systemic conflict that disrupted firms' conformity to the three 
structures. Finally, I want to discuss the cases of the big three - FIC, Mitac and Acer. 
Among my case firms, FIC has the strongest connection to the business recipe. Mitac 
has the strongest connection to the technology paradigm, and Acer is much more 
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related to the policy style than are the other 8 firms. However, the relatively high level 
of recipe connection did not facilitate FICS opportunistic diversification which was 
substantially constrained by its considerable links with the technology paradigm. In 
comparison, the relatively high connection to the technology paradigm did not drive 
Mitac's strategy towards reckless pursuit of integration or acquisitive growth, such as 
that pursued by Acer. This pursuit was constrained by Mitac's strong connection to 
business recipe which discouraged the strategy of growth by integration. Both FIC and 
Mitac are PLCs and subsidiaries of business groups, and their owners were once 
educated in the US. The high connection to the business recipe and technology 
paradigm, together with their relative distance from the policy style (when compared 
with Acer) led both firms to pursue carefully integration or acquisitive growth 
strategies. On the other hand, the relatively high level of dependence upon Taiwanese 
policy style led Acer to face the problems of committing too many resources to the 
pursuit of growth. 
After being floated on the stock market in 1988, Acer had expanded with a 
series of increasingly rash acquisitions. In 1990, through a government incentive 
programme, Acer managed to acquire an interest-free loan of US$20 million to partly 
fund its acquisition of Altos. In general, although Acer's choice of diversification may 
be a result of the company's conformity to the state search for national champion, the 
logic of policy style may not always be the initial motivation for its investment. 
During 1988-1990, the series of acquisitions coincided with the emergence, for 
the first time, of professional management at Acer and the inability of top management 
to absorb and manage its growing capital structure. In 1988, Acer's initial public 
offering empowered the company with the necessary resources to reinforce its 
overseas acquisition strategy, at least three acquisitions and one heavy investment 
following forthwith. In 1989, "in a move to further strengthen Acer's position in the 
computer market", Stan Shih invited a former senior manager from IIBM, Dr. Leonard 
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Liu to join Acer with Dr. Liu acting as president of Acer and chairman and CEO of 
Acer Americal2. This invitation certainly increased Acees connection to the 
technology paradigm. On the suggestion of Dr. Liu, Acer took over Altos, a San-Jose- 
based manufacturer of multi-user system, at a cost of US$94 million. Acer's acquisition 
of Altos has been the largest overseas deal of any Taiwan PC firm, with a senior 
manager at FIC stating that "with the money, you can buy a PLC in Taiwan". To 
summarise, not only did Acer's high connection to the policy style encourage its 
tendency towards acquisition, but its association with Dr. Liu temporarily resulted in 
its reinforcing connection with the technology paradigm which subsequently drove 
Acer into the search for a growth strategy by integration. 
8.7 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the research reported in this thesis is to build and test a 
framework of ideas, by reference to which I explain why firms pursue different 
strategies. Basically, I argue that strategy-making is channelled through social 
structures that offer a variety of social rules and resources for guiding and empowering 
firm behaviour. After a long theoretical and empirical journey, I now want to look at 
some of the implications of the above analysis in so far as it informs our thinking about 
how PC firms made their strategic choices in their immediate industry system. 
A glance again at Figure 1.1 (page 14) will be useful in helping us go through 
this whole journey very quickly. In Chapter II argued the relative failure of economics 
to explain strategy because of the socially-embedded nature of economic action. This 
kind of argument calls for the use of sociology to analyse firms'behaviour in order to 
help reconcile society with agency. Because society embodies a wide range of social 
rules and resources, firms are able to draw upon a multiplicity of structural sources to 
1213r. Liu resigned in 1991 as a result of huge losses of Acer America. 
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guide and empower their strategic agency. In Chapter 31 suggested three sets of 
structural sources, namely policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm. The 
structures as a whole are not effectively integrated, but are more or less conflicting. In 
order to examine the significance of social conflicts in structuring firm behaviour, I 
suggest that there is an industry system which represents a type of social forination 
produced by the intersection of policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm. 
Though influenced by the same industry system, firms retain an assumed capacity to 
compete and cooperate in the system. Recalling Giddens (1984), society is the product 
of the human activity it makes possible. In this sense, firms, as social actors, can draw 
upon plural rules and resources in the production, reproduction and development of 
their industry. 
While recognising the significance of this agentive potential, this thesis further 
argued that firms are socially constructed with diverse forms of systemic links to the 
three structures - policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm. Together, the 
links constitute firms' identities which not only provide the institutional link between 
structure and agency, but also serve as the driving force for the growth of the firm. Put 
simply, because identities are different, firms adopt different strategies. It is from these 
points that I argue "firms within the same industry and country can act differently from 
one another, and are able to sustain their divergent strategies". 
Again, this thesis emphasises that strategy involves choices which mobilise a 
variety of social structures and thereby contribute to the possibility of their "doing 
otherwise". The empirical work presented in chapters 5 (social structures), 6 (industry 
system), 7 (corporate identities) and 8 (strategic choices) provides some support for 
this set of ideas. As we saw in my case studies, Acer benefited from a policy style 
which had often favoured de facto industrial leaders. So with values drawn from 
patriotic demands for a national champion to reinforce its global vision, Acer has 
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pursued strategies of own-brand, leading innovation and integration/acquisitive 
growth. All these strategies were largely policy style-driven. 
While related to various business groups, Mitac, FIC and Compal's advantages 
depended heavily on the business recipe. Because of their relatively high link with the 
recipe, they have put emphasis on OEM production and avoided acquisitive growth 
strategies. In addition, strong connection with the technology paradigm has driven 
Mitac and FIC to avoid I. P. R. violations, typical of the business recipe. In turn, ASI's 
relatively greater distance from the policy style and technology paradigm drove its 
strategy for opportunistic diversification and, sometimes, counterfeiting activity. 
The relatively close connection with the policy style drove Twinhead to 
commit itself to own-brand strategy and avoid opportunistic diversification. In contrast 
to Twinhead, the low level of policy style connection and the relatively high level of its 
dependence on the business recipe drove Clevo and Compal towards an OEM strategy 
and investment in south-eastem countries. Tensions between the technology paradigm 
search for focus and the business recipe tendency towards opportunistic diversification 
considerably distracted AUVA's strategic conformity. By inviting Dr. Frank Huang to 
chair the company, Elitegroup increased its connection with the policy style. This high 
connection facilitated its strategy towards integration into related PC peripherals, but 
this connection also put pressures on its tendency towards investment in China which 
was consistent with business recipe. 
All in all, throughout the interaction of my theory of ideas and nine PC firms' 
behaviour, it is evident that 'Ylirms are socially structured with different identities and 
therefore they will respond differently to their immediate economic and social 
environments". While providing an institutional link between agency and structure, the 
firmýs identities are a product of the firms structural relationships that are related to 
institutional rules and resource for guiding and empowering the firm's behaviour. As 
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discussed in chapters 1,2 and 3, it is this combination of structure and agency that 
serves as a more robust link between society and strategy than economists and 
institutionalists, provide. The implications of the empirical results in this general 
framework are further discussed in the next and final chapter. 
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CHAPTER NINE: THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The last four chapters addressed how the four conceptual categories - social 
structures, industry system, corporate identities and strategic choices - can be 
integrated into a framework capable of explaining why firms within the same industry 
and country pursue different strategies. After this empirical interlude, I shall in this 
final chapter return to the theoretical ground-work and consider some of my theory's 
implications. 
In Chapter II provided an overall appreciation of a sociological approach to 
strategy while arguing the significance of social structures in explaining firm behaviour. 
In Chapter 21 reviewed different forms of knowledge - including middle-range 
theorising, paradigmatic analysis, structurationist sociology and corporatism of 
political sociology - critical to explaining the evolving Taiwanese PC industry of 1980- 
93. In Chapter 31 suggested a tripartite structural scheme of corporate strategy in 
order to take into account three social structures, namely, policy style, business recipe 
and technology paradigm. The patterning of the three social structures constitutes an 
industry system which may exhibit intemally conflicting logics. Given the particular 
structural links that underlie their actions, firms will respond differently to the industry 
system in order to negotiate the conflict. In particular, the structural links construct 
firms' social identities, to which a range of social rules and resources is attached in a 
network of social forces and relations, critical to strategic choices. These elements 
make up the main dimensions of my conceptual framework -a tripartite structural 
theory of strategy, which has proved useful in explaining corporate strategic 
differences across nine Taiwanese PC firms. 
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In this final chapter, I discuss the application and generality of this framework 
and summarise its main arguments. In detail, informed by the framework, the following 
two sections will provide the strategic implications for, respectively, managerial action 
and governmental industrial policy. That done, I shall discuss the generality of my 
theory of strategy, and conclude this thesis by summarising this theory's implications 
for our concepts about how firms operate in our society. 
9.2 MANAGERIAL CONSEQUENCES 
Firms, not nations or industries, are on the front line of international 
competition. Firms are thus the central concern of the field of Management and 
Business Studies which is emerging as an important area of social study that reflects 
the richness and complexity of the modem capitalist world. Clearly, this field is a wide 
one. But within the area, strategy, or strategic management, is probably central to 
understand the nature of business competition. Pascale (1990: 54) labels it the king of 
business disciplines because it "causes us to question the fundamental premises on 
which all else rests". Despite this, strategy is considered as a "contested and 
imperfectable practice" (Whittington, 1993,1; cf. Chaffee, 1985; Crow, 1989; Knights 
and Morgan, 1990,1991; Shaw, 1990; Shrivastava, 1986). Recently, rather than 
assuming the general applicability of US management theories, strategy scholars are 
beginning to challenge the basic assumptions of management orthodoxy so that 
"universal, regiocentric, intercultural and cultural-specific theories and research (can 
be) clearly demarcated" (Boyacigiller and Adler, 1991: 262; cf. Whitley, 1992a: 1; 
Whittington, 1993). It is from this position that I argued in chapters 1,2 and 3, 
suggesting that the subject of strategy has suffered from the neglect of obvious roots in 
sociology and in philosophy. My job in this thesis then is to deal with this challenge. 
Overall, it is in this thesis that I was not only to establish an alternative strategy 
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framework for understanding what was already known, but also to collect new 
information (based on the emerging industry of microcomputers) to verify my theory. 
Throughout the thesis, I have presented a series of theoretical considerations 
and empirical evidence that address how society matters for managerial practice. True, 
certain social actors like firms, as economic members of society, operate in a diversity 
of social structures. This involves a set of propositions about economic actors: they are 
deeply embedded in the structures of society by which to justify and empower their 
actions. Such advocacy of a sociological approach to strategy arms managers with 
"sardonic self-awareness" (Whittington, 1993: 136), providing that strategic decisions 
depend not only on economic merit but also on social confon-nity. This stress on social 
conformity does not imply a deterministic position, because the diverse and 
contradictory nature of social structures provide firms; with a range of social rules and 
resources that permit strategic choice and difference. In this respect, my tripartite 
scheme of corporate strategy suggests three sets of social structures - policy style, 
business recipe and technology paradigm, each capable of generating different patterns 
of strategy. In short, where social structures are diverse, firms are able to use the broad 
environment to gain their agency. 
For instance, accepting the pervasiveness of political power in market 
economies, global firms in Taiwan, like Kennexl in tennis racket manufacturing and 
Acer in microcomputer, define themselves as national champions to secure the support 
of the state. In 1988, the state helped Kennex solve its financial crisis. As we have seen 
in the previous four chapters, global strategies such as those of Acer, need not rely just 
on capitalist resources and technological rationalities; they may draw on state subsidy 
and support. As we would expect, both Kennex and Acer are among the five firms (the 
other three firms are Giant in bicycles, Sanyang in motorcycles and Proton in TVs) 
I Kennex is the number one tennis racket manufacturer in Taiwan. It also owned a PC 
subsidiary firm - Arche, holding a significant place in the French market. 
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featured in an aggressive advertisement promotion begun in 1993 by the state 
(Pennells, 1994) (see Appendix 6). Another case of Taiwanese micro-corporatism in 
the early 1990s is the promotion by the state of native-owned Eva Airline (a subsidiary 
of Evergreen), denying a monopolistic position to mainlander-operated China Airline. 
In particular, all the three firms - Kennex, Acer and Eva Airline - have at least two 
things in common. They are native, and are able to grasp the political tensions between 
the mainlander and Taiwanese (during 1987-1993) as an opportunity to achieve their 
political advantage. 
Bearing this point of sociological sensitivity in mind, a truly dynamic advantage 
is based on effectively mobilising plural resources within society to create competitive 
advantage rather than simply accepting advantage as "industry given". For practising 
managers to compete effectively in the industry, they should therefore sensitize 
themselves to the institutional sources of their social identities, play reflexively the 
rules of game and open up to the resources of policy style, business recipe and 
technology paradigm. 
9.3 THE CONSEQUENCES FOR STRATEGIC INDUSTRY POLICY 
An important aspect of my tripartite framework of strategy analysis is the range 
of policy style available to government and political leaders. If governments are able to 
manage industrial development, the question is how, that is, by what strategies they go 
about doing it. A typical strategy to meet this challenge is to "pick winners" (cf. Porter, 
1990: 673-5; Wade, 1990: 334-7). In so doing, governments can single out either 
individual firms or particular industries for support and development (cf. Cawson, 
1986: 106-25; Williamson, 1989: 144-67). 
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However, in considering the prospect of state direct support of individual firms, 
many researchers do not support this way. For example, following a major study of the 
development of corporate life cycles, Mintzberg (1984: 221) proposes a healthy 
industry structure "to be one that sustains a steady level of replacement of old, spent 
organizations by young, energetic ones". Instead of assisting large firms, government 
policy in this way should be aimed at killing them off and encouraging the "younger, 
smaller, less constrained and more vibrant ones" (Mintzberg, 1984: 222; cf. Hendry, 
1989: 179). This observation is consistent with Porter's (1990) argument that, in the 
commercial competition between nations, success is correlated with pressure, and 
especially with that provided by highly visible and local competitors, rather than 
protection. 
However, since the late 1980s, the increased desire of the Taiwanese state to 
pursue international reputation has driven its search for national champions. Politically, 
such a micro-corporatist policy strategy may be necessary in terms of its traditional 
political isolation. But considered from another point of view, these national 
champions may barely sustain international success, largely because growth in 
organisational structure contradicts the fragmented Taiwanese business recipe. As we 
can see, the once-renowned tennis-rackets firm. Kennex has gone through a series of 
financial crises. Similarly, since Acer's internationalisation, its profits have declined 
sharply, suffering heavy losses in 1991 and 1992. 
If niicro-corporatist favouring of particular firms faces strict limitations, then a 
meso-corporatist policy strategy may be pursued by policy makers. This stress on a 
more sectoral focus leads governments to choose a particular industry in which any 
f= has the opportunity to prosper. The issue, then, is how to choose. As we go 
through the empirical data of the thesis, it seems that nations are most likely to succeed 
in industries where the interaction of structures is most favourable. Two examples can 
illustrate this point. First, as discussed in Chapter 6, benefiting from a favourable 
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patterning of social structures, Taiwan's PC industry demonstrates more competitive 
advantage than Korea! s PC industry. Secondly, within the national context, Taiwan's 
HDD industry has been far less successful than its PC industry. The small business 
organisations, typical of the Taiwanese business recipe, critically contradicts the 
dominant HDD technology paradigm which is mainly around a limited number of large 
firms with relatively constant technology in the field of the combination of electronics 
and metals (Yih, 1992: 10-1: Chou, 1991: 15). Within Taiwan's education system, this 
field has been traditionally neglected by the state. 
Comparatively, Taiwanese PC assemblers may have not been leading 
technological innovators themselves. But their small size in organisations (business 
recipe) and pools of engineering professionals (policy style) has interacted 
synergistically with the dynamic impetus of technological discontinuities, typical of the 
PC technology paradigm. Therefore, to a considerable extent, the mutual enforcement 
of the business recipe and policy style enables these PC firms to adapt quickly to new 
technologies pioneered elsewhere. As a result, although the HDD and PC industries 
share strong boundaries with nation states, each of them develops their own structural 
patterning. In so doing, the Taiwanese PC industry utilises and modifies existing policy 
style and business recipe better than the HDD industry. In this way, hypothetically, I 
suggest that the more effectively the three structures integrate, the more successful the 
industry would be. 
Recently, the Taiwanese state has chosen aerospace as a strategic industry for 
promotion (Liu. 1993: 52-3). My theory does not support this policy choice. The 
aerospace industry is characterised by large, capital intensive and professionally 
managed firms, something uncharacteristic of Taiwan. Instead, the state should choose 
an industry that is more likely to fit the highly diversified industry organisation, typical 
of the Taiwanese business recipe. Additionally, the state should exclude an industry 
whose technology paradigm is mainly around national champions. This is because 
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Taiwan's political isolation does not support its search for inter-firm cooperation at the 
state level. In a sense, perhaps Taiwan's industry policy makers should continue to 
identify the highly growing information technology sector as an important priority. 
9.4 CONCLUSION ABOUT FIRMS AND SOCIETY 
9.4.1 Generalisability 
In order to develop a more robust organisational science, Boyacigiller and 
Adler (1991) suggest that scholars need to clearly examine the generality of their 
theories. In this respect, research which relies on case study design may be more 
vulnerable to the charge of limited generality than that of statistical surveys. But, still, 
case-study-design research is likely to discover relations and properties which are 
general or widely applied, although exactly how widely is only determined through 
empirical study. 
In order to examine strategic differences across nine Taiwanese PC firms, I 
develop a tripartite structural theory of strategy. 'Ibis theory mainly concerns three 
social structures - policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm, which 
constitute my case firms' immediate society. Although these are not the only ways in 
which society is structured, I have demonstrated these three structures are particularly 
important in explaining the strategic choices of my case study firms. 
In considering the cultural and geographical domain of the theory, the 
distinction of policy style and business recipe is generally applicable to nation states 
which are semi-autonomous in the business community. After 1997, for example, 
Hong Kong will certainly develop a new type of policy style whose interaction with 
Chinese family business recipe is central to understanding the development of this 
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area! s firm behaviour. In addition, the significance of policy style in structuring firm 
behaviour is less clear in countries such as the UK and the US which generally see 
political influence as equal for every individual firm. In this sense, firms are less likely 
to identify with state policy in order to access resources (in comparison with firm 
operating in a corporatist political structure such as Taiwan's case during 1987-1993). 
In considering the sectoral domain of the theory, it appears to me that, in 
service industries, such as banking, securities, insurance and travelling, the technology 
paradigm is less important in structuring firm behaviour than in manufacturing 
industries. In Taiwan's case, for example, these service industries are mainly 
domestically-oriented. This led them to be less likely to sense the significance of a 
world-wide technology paradigm than export-oriented ones, such as PCs and textiles. 
In turn, largely because they are domestically-oriented, most of Taiwan's service 
industries are likely to recognise the benefits of political advantage and the importance 
of local business networks. 
Although the significance of the three social structures in explaining finn 
behaviour is not equal in every industry system, the sociological appreciation of 
strategy is fundamentally crucial. This stress on a sociological strategy view is 
important, because it suggests that firms have access to a plurality of social structural 
rules and resources. Strategic choice is thus possible, because this plural account of 
social structures frees firms from any unique determination. Additionally, strategic 
difference is viable, as the plural account of social structures widens the focus beyond 
institutionalists'concern for isomorphism. 
9.4.2 Concluding Summary 
Throughout the thesis, I develop a middle-range theory of strategy applied 
empirically to the Taiwanese PC industry from which nine case firms were drawn. The 
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basic methodology used for this research is that of structurationist sociology and 
comparative case studies. The main issue of the thesis is to explain why firms pursue 
different strategies and how they are able to sustain them. 
The theoretical work presented in chapters 1,2,3 and 4 establishes a 
conceptual framework -a tripartite structural theory of strategy - in order to take 
account three social structures - policy style, business recipe and technology 
paradigm. The patterning of the structures constitutes an industry system which 
highlights the significance of systemic conflicts in structuring firm behaviour. In order 
to negotiate the conflicts, firms; have to choose to confonn to certain social structural 
rules and resources. Here, choice is possible, because in the industry system there is 
more than one social structure providing social rules and resources for guiding and 
empowering firm behaviour. 
While recognising the possibility of choice, the thesis continues to argue that 
this agentive potential of doing otherwise is different for each company. The difference 
is a product of corporate identities which establish firms' structural links with their 
attendant industry system and so provide them with both access to specific social 
resources essential to strategic choice, and certain particular rules about how to 
exercise their choices. Consequently, the concept of corporate identities provides an 
institutional linkage between structure and agency and it is through this linkage that we 
examine how firms can make a difference to their strategic choices. To summarise, the 
thesis has argued that social structures, industry system, corporate identities and 
strategic choices need to be integrated in a complex framework in order to understand 
the formation of firms' divergent strategies within society. 
In addition to the theoretical work, the empirical work presented in chapters 5, 
6,7 and 8 provides some tentative support for this set of patterns. In Chapter 5,1 
introduce some aspects of the three social structures which are particularly important 
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to the evolving Taiwanese PC industry of 1980-93. The structures include the 
Taiwanese policy style, the Taiwanese business recipe and the PC technology 
paradigm. The patterning of the three structures constitutes the system of Taiwan's PC 
industry discussed in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7,1 establish the broad similarity and 
differences of corporate identities of my nine case PC firms and these identities are 
subsequently used for examining the different strategic choices discussed in Chapter 8. 
Finally, this study of structures, system, identities and choices suggests a number of 
conclusions for the analysis of corporate strategies which can be summarised as 6 
separate points: 
1. The failure of economics to explain strategy is rooted in a neglect of agency which 
concerns occasions at which firms could have acted differently in their immediate 
society. The Structurationist social theory of Anthony Giddens can provide an 
affirmation of firms' strategic agency by which the relationships between firm and 
society can be better illuminated. 
2. Appreciation of social structures, or social institutions, is critical to explaining fmn 
behaviour. The structures comprise a plurality of social rules related to strategy 
content and social resources associated with structural bases of power. This 
perspective on firm-society relationships implies the rule-following and resource- 
empowered nature of corporate strategy. 
3. Current organisational sociologists may have studied the dynamics of social 
structures, but they have tended to play down fmn differences and so imply a 
deterministic position. Within the area of strategic management, firm difference 
matters. In order to assert firm difference, we have to appreciate the diverse and 
contradictory nature of social structures by which to justify strategic agency. 
4. Strategy implies choice by its very nature. Within an industry, it is observable that in 
fact many viable strategic paths are taken and no single one is necessarily superior 
to the firm itself. Strategic choice is possible, as social conformity permits 
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organisations to have access to a variety of forms of legitimacy, allowing the 
acquisition of diverse resources capable of sustaining action. 
5. The three social structures - policy style, business recipe and technology paradigm - 
have proved important in explaining firm behaviour in Taiwan's PC industry. All 
three of the structures are interconnected, and each generates different social rules 
and resources. 
6. Strategy implies difference, as corporate identities establish firms' social positions 
that will cause them to make strategic choices differently from one another within 
their attendant industry system. Corporate identities, while providing an 
institutional link between structure and agency, serve as the driving force for the 
growth of the firm whose ability to choose derives from the structures of the 
society. 
To conclude, appreciation of the diverse and contradictory nature of social 
structures is critical to explaining corporate strategic difference. 
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Appendix 1: Introductory Letters to Case Firms and Interviewees 
1. 
15 MARCH, 1993 
MR STAN SHIH 
PRESIDENT, ACER SERTEK INC. 
NO. 135, SEC. 2, CHIEN KUO N. RD., 
TAIPEI, TAIWAN, R. O. C. 
Dear Mr Shih 
This is to introduce Mr Shih-Chang Hung who is currently a PhD student in Marketing 
and Strategic Management Group of the Warwick Business School of the University of 
Warwick. Mr Hung is doing his doctoral thesis on the strategic development of 
Taiwanese companies in the microcomputer industry. Further information is enclosed. 
Taking you as one of the Taiwan's leading PC firms, we are very interested in learning 
about your company's experience in this industry. Your contribution is most important 
both for understanding Acees performance and on account of your personal reputation 
in the microcomputer industry. We would be very grateful, therefore, if you could 
assist when the researcher starts his field-work (May - July) in Taiwan. This will 
involve three or four interviews of about 30 minutes each with nominated managers 
and a visit to your factory. All data will be treated confidentially. 
As the supervisor of this research, I wish to express my appreciation for any assistance 
you may be able to give. 
Again, thank you very much. 
Yours sincerely 
Dr Richard Whittington 
Senior Lecturer in Marketing 
and Strategic Management 
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li. 
RESEARCH DESCRIMON: 
Title: PC Company Strategies in Society: State, Business and Technology 
The thesis is examining the development of the Taiwanese personal computer business 
in its social context. It focuses on how business culture, political intervention and 
technological resources interact to create successful business strategies in the personal 
computer industry. Typical Taiwanese firm strategies of production, marketing, 
distribution, financial and human resource management will be compared with other 
international firm strategies. 
The research will be carried out by a series of comparative case studies. The 
development of strategies will be analysed historically and comparatively. Data will be 
drawn from interviews, company tours and documentary sources. All data will be 
treated confidentially. 
The outcomes of the research will be three-fold. First, the research will help managers 
analyse the social context of their business, the better to take advantage of local 
conditions and understand those of competitors. Second, the research will produce 
recommendations for government policy to aid the development of the personal 
computer industry. Finally, it will contribute to the emerging academic understanding 
of the relationship between strategy and society. 
All participants will receive a brief summary of the final research findings. 
About the Researchers: 
The researcher, Shih-Chang Hung, completed his B. B. A. and M. B. A. degrees in 
Taiwan and is currently a doctoral student at Warwick Business School of the 
University of Warwick, starting in September, 1991. 
Dr. Richard Whittington, the supervisor of this research, is currently a Senior Lecturer 
in Strategic Management teaching on MBA, executive and doctoral programmes. He 
has published articles on strategy, marketing and small firms, and is also the author of 
Corporate Strategies in Recession and Recovery and What is Strategy - and Does it 
Matter? 
Warwick Business School is ranked as one of the top two research business schools in 
the U. K.. It is closely involved with industry not only through its research, but also 
through an extensive programme of post-graduate and post-experience courses. 
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Appendix 2: Original Data Sources: Interviews, Company Tours, and Attendance to 
Conferences and Speeches by Industrial Observers and CEOs of Case 
Finns 
1. Field Interviews and Personal Contacts to Case Firms and the Industry 
(Alphabetically ordered by names) 
Chang, Amy, Special Assistant, TCA. 7/5/93: 11: 45-11: 55 (N 
Chang, Li, Manager, TCA. 7/5/93: 10: 30-11: 45 (Y). 
Chao, Eddy, Director of Marketing Dept, Twinhead. 23n193: 14: 10-15: 15 (Y). 
Chen, E. C., Former Quality Manager, Everrex (USA); Senior Buyer at International 
Procurement Office, Philips, Taiwan. 25/2/94: 18: 00-19: 30 (N). 
Chen, David, Director for Finance Dept., Twinhead. 3n193: 15: 45-16: 00 (Y). 
Chen, Wee-son, Director for Manufacturing, Clevo. 22/6/93: 14: 00-15: 50 (Y). 
Chiang, Stanley, Chainnan & President, Twinhead. 28M93: 17: 00-18: 15 (Y). 
Chien, Bob, Manager for Finance Dept., Twinhead, 3n193: 16: 00-16: 35 (Y). 
Chin, John T. H., Senior Staff of President's Office, Twinhead, 6/5/93: 15: 00-16: 10 
(N); 13n193: 14: 10-15: 10 (Y). 
Du, Enoch, General Secretary, TCA, 2/9/92: 09: 30-10: 30 (N); 5/5/93: 11: 00-11: 50 
(Y). 
Gau, J. M., Director, FIC. 20/1/94: 16: 10-17: 00 (Y). 
Ger, Jy-gang, Section Chief, IDB, MOEA. 27/5/93: 9: 00-10: 00 (Y). 
Ho, Nancy, Manager for Marketing, FIC. 18/1/94: 11: 15-12: 00 (Y). 
Huang, Jonny, Journalist, Economic Daily News. 10/1/94: 18: 30-19: 20 (Y). 
Huang, Thomas, Project manager, MIC, III; Former Product Marketing Manager, 
Acer. 26/1/94: 2: 50-3: 30 (Y). 
Lai, Alex, Supervisor for Production and Planning Dept., A UVA. 28/1/94: 1: 50-2: 30 
(Y). 
Lee, Arnold, C. M., Analyst of Security Investment Dept., Cathay Life Insurance Co., 
Ltd.. 31/12: 16: 00-17: 00 (Y). 
IN means the interview is not tape recorded whereas Y means yes. 
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Lee, Daniel, Senior Vice President, Inventa. 10/6/93: 13: 20-14: 00 (Y). 
Lee, Ing-jen, PhD, Vice president & General manager of R&D and sales division, 
Twinhead. 27nl93: 10: 30-11: 55 (Y). 
Lee, Jen-fang, Professor of Graduate Institute of Management School, Fu-Jen 
Catholic University. 3/5/93: 14: 00-14: 30 (N). 
Lee, Percy, Supervisor, Clevo. 5/1/94: 15: 00-15: 50 (Y). 
Lee, Terrisa, Administrator, Clevo. 22/6/93: 14: 00-15: 50 (Y). 
Lin, Andrew, Director for Administrative Dept., Sampo Tech. 31/5/93: 15: 00-15: 30 
(Y). 
Lin, Augustus Y., Vice President, ASI. 10/6/93: 10: 20-11: 30 (N); 4/1/94: 10: 00-11: 00 
(Y). 
Lin, Chao-tang, Senior director for Tarnsui factory, Elitegroup. 15n193: 14: 00-15: 10 
M. 
Lin, Edward, Manager for Administrative Dept., Twinhead. 3n193: 16: 40-17: 10 (Y). 
Lin, Frank, Sales Specialist, FIC. 18/1/94: 11: 00-11: 15 (N). 
Liu, Paul, Chain-nan, ASI. 21/1/94: 16: 40-17: 40 (Y). 
Lu, Gazy, Manager for Accounting & Spokesman, Compal. 28/6/93: 15: 30-16: 20 (N); 
5/1/94: 14: 00-15: 00 (Y). 
Lu, Lawrence, Vice President of Manufacturing, Mitac Europe. 7/4/93: 15: 00-16: 30 
(Y). 
Lu, Tom, Supervisor for Manufacturing Division, Twinhead, 3n193: 14: 00-14: 30 (Y). 
Ou, Jackson, Vice President of ADM headquarters, Clevo. 22n/93: 14: 40-15: 25 (Y). 
5/1/94: 15: 50-16: 00 (N). 
Peng, Philip, Vice President, Corporate Finance & Investment Management, Acer. 
24/1/94: 3: 00-4: 00 (Y). 
Ping, Marian, Industry Analyst, MIC, 111.12/5/93: 16: 30-17: 50 (Y). 
Sheu, Lai-fa, Division Director, IDB, MOEA. 21/5/93: 8: 30-9: 00 (Y). 
Shieh, Hong Ji, Director for Engineering Dept., 2nd Factory, FIC. 5/1/94: 11: 00-12: 00 
(Y). 
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Shih, S. P., Vice President for Manufacturing Division, Twinhead. 3n193: 14: 55-15: 40 
(Y). 
Song, Simmon, Supervisor for Overseas Supporting Dept., A UVA. 28/1/94: 14: 30- 
15: 00 (Y). 
Tang, Eric, Joumalist, Commercial Times. 11/1/94: 1: 50-3: 30 (Y). 
Tsan, Wen-nan, Manager, MIC, III; Former Product Manager, Acer. 12/5/93: 16: 30- 
17: 50 (Y). 
Tu, Tze-chen, Director, MIC, 111.24/8/92: 11: 00-12: 00; 24/5/93: 14: 00-15: 00 (N); 
24/5/93: 14: 00-15: 00 (Y). 
Wang, Josephine, Specialist for Public Relations, Acer. 26/5/93: 14: 10-14: 30 (N). 
Wang, Peter Fu-ching, Division Director, CCL, ITRI; Board of Director, TCA. 
21M93: 13: 10-14: 30 (Y). 
Weng, John, Assistant Vice President for Sales Division, A UVA. 29/6/93: 13: 55-14: 30 
(N): 2811/94: 3: 30-3: 20 (Y). 
Woo, Jerry, Director for S&M Centre, Marketing Communication Dept., Mitac. 
13/1/94: 16: 15-17: 00 (Y). 
Wu, Allen, Managing Director, Twinhead, UX. 225/3/93: 14: 00-15: 30 (Y). 
Table 10.1 Fonnal Research Interviews 
Interviewing time 
(minutes) 
Industry-level analysisl 635 
Acer 265 
Mitac 180 
FIC 201 
ASI 140 
Clevo 225 
Twinhead 590 
Compal 140 
AUVA 125 
Elitegroup 380 
Totals 2,885 
Note: (1) Industry-level analysis includes research into the social 
structures and cross-agents (state and firms) investigation. 
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Wu, Walt, Supervisor for Administrative Dept., Twinhead. 3n193: 14: 00-14: 30 (Y). 
Yeng, Gilbery, Senior Director for Procurement Division; Board of the Director, 
Elitegroup. 16/6/93: 13: 30-15: 30 (Y); 8n193: 14: 10-16: 00 (N); 27/1/94: 3: 00- 
4: 00 (Y). 
Yen, KM., Senior Staff of Presidential Office, Compal. 18/1/94: 16: 15-17: 00 (Y). 
Yin, Nancy L. F., Manager, TCA. 26/6/93: 11: 25-11: 55 (N). 
Yu, Cheng-kung, President, Yunlin Polytechnic Institute; Former Director for 
Computer Institute, the Ministry of Education. 24/8/92: 15: 30-14: 10 (N). 
H. Tours to Computer Exhibitions and Attendances to Conference and Speeches 
(Arranged by Date) 
28/5/93: 9: 00-17: 00 (N); Attending the Seminar of 'Information Industry Development 
and Market Opportunities in the East/Pacific Region', held by MIC, III. 
1/6/93: 14: 00-16: 00; A tour to 'Taipei International Computer Show'. 
3/6/93: 14: 00-16: 00; A tour to Taipei Computer Software Show'. 
7,8,9/6/93: 9: 00-17: 00 (N); Attending the Conference of 'Computer Technology 
1993', held by ITRI & MS. 
22/12/94: 12: 00-17: 00; A tour to'Taichun Information Exhibition'. 
12/1/94: 14: 00-15: 40 (Y); Attending the Speech by Stan Shih, Chairman of Acer. 
13/1/94: 14: 00-15: 40 (Y); Attending the Speech by T. C. Tu, Director for MIC, III. 
18/1/94: 14: 00-15: 40 (Y); Attending the Speech by Alpha Wu, President of MAG 
Innovision (Monitor). 
19/1/94: 14: 00-15: 40 (Y); Attending the Speech by W. N. Tsan, Manager for MIC, III. 
20/1/94: 14: 00-15: 40 (Y); Attending the Speech by M. T. Sheun, President of UMC. 
21/1/94: 14: 00-15: 40 (Y); Attending the Speech by Dr Frank Huang, Chairman of 
Elitegroup. 
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Appendix 3: Secondary Data Sources in the Field2 
(1) Relevant libraries with regard to the research 
Information and Computing Library, National Central Library [Address: 13F, 106, 
2nd Section, Ho-Ping E. Rd., Taipei; Tel: 886-2-737-7737] 
Library of Chinese Security and Future Markets Developmental Association 
[Address: 9F, 3, Nan-hai Rd., Taipei; Tel: 886-2-397-1222] 
Library of Economic Research Institute of Taiwan [Address: I IF, 178, Nan-king E. 
Rd., Taipei; Tel: 886-2-713-6959] 
Library of Economic Research Institute of Chinese [Address: 75, Chang-hsing Street, 
Taipei; Tel: 886-2-735-6006] 
Library of Institutefor Information Industry [Address: 10F, 106, Ho-ping E. Rd., 
Taipei; Telephone: 886-2-7377157] 
National Central Library [Address: 20, Chung-sun S. Rd., Taipei; Tel: 886-2-361 - 
9132] 
Science and Technology Data Centre, National Science Council, Executive Yuan 
[Address: 14-16F, 106, Ho-ping E. Rd., Taipei; Tel: 886-2-737-763 1] 
(2) Lists of industrial journals, periodicals, magazines, and newspaperS3 used in the 
research 
Asian Finance 
Asian Computer Monthly 
Business Week 
Business Weekly (in Chinese) 
2For a full catalogue of Taiwan, ROC government statistical publications, refer to Republic of 
China Yearbook; 1991-92 (1992: 643-7). 
317or a detailed directory of Taiwan major newspapers, refer to Republic of China Yearbook, 
(1992: 630-1). 
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Commercial Times Newspaper (in Chinese) 
Common Wealth (in Chinese) 
Computer Review 
Computerworld 
Computerworld, Taiwan (in Chinese) 
Computrade International 
Datamation 
Newsletterfor Information Industry (by MIC, III) (in Chinese) 
East Asia High Tech Review 
The Economist 
Economic Daily Newspaper (in Chinese) 
Electronic Business 
Electronic Business Asia 
Electronic Business Buyer 
Far Eastern Economic Review 
Information World Review 
Inforworld 
PCM, agazine 
PC Week 
PC World 
Taiwan Computer Suppliers (by TCA, June 1993) 
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Appendix 4: Case PC Companies' Performance: 
(1) Tumover (NT$1,000); 
(2) Profit margin (pre-tax) (NT$ 1,000); 
(3) ROE (%) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Acer 10,846,209 12,937,669 12,453,449 11,923,246 12,242,222 
783,843 170,730 49,828 (607,366) (55,951) 
24.4 2.38 0.73 (Z 18) (0.68) 
Mitac 3,310,584 4,068,999 5,067,025 6,046,454 4,471,770 
199,134 251,205 247,236 (73,362) (696,802) 
41.28 23.78 12.49 (2.97) (33.07) 
FIC 1,123,336 1,356,873 3,125,332 5,115,084 8,629,811 
45,531 126,708 203,812 201,502 301,249 
28.42 22.60 23.02 19.64 17.42 
ASI 586,153 669,350 1,565,988 2,063,385 2,888,995 
10,945 9,346 48,656 905 40,132 
7.63 2.89 11.12 0.02 6.47 
Clevo 287,586 646,853 1,751,257 1,888,874 3,303,410 
2,418 30,401 211,774 93,988 191,496 
3.39 26.96 76.90 20.35 32.13 
Twinhead 845,694 1,902,341 2,938,298 3,822,063 4,034,635 
40,469 21,064 10,524 88,642 156,977 
42.02 11.26 1.76 7.92 1.17 
Compal 2,095,394 2,449,468 3,211,060 4,110,857 4,628,420 
66,938 83,685 125,020 172,795 (81,053) 
17.95 41.82 55.22 12.25 (6.06) 
AUVA 678,954 2,199,160 2,789,032 2,675,551 3,058,516 
43,391 55,209 84,425 30,278 11,770 
30.09 13.24 11.96 3.17 0.62 
Elitegroup 460,557 1,682,980 3,620,877 3,930,995 5,030,687 
8,983 180,112 633,421 130,444 163,562 
40.45 99.34 105.55 15.67 16.03 
234 
Appendix5: Statutory Bodies - ITRI and III 
The industrial policy for the information sector among other strategic industries 
was formulated and implemented in a "strategic" path, implying that it was through 
"administrative order" authorised by Administrative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan was 
therefore relatively absent. This situation was only changed after 1993 when the 
opposition party gained about one-third seats in Legislative Yuan. Since then the role 
of "statutory bodies" in allocating state R&D resources has been questioned, in that 
not only were these institutions increasingly becoming shelters for the retired 
government officials, but also they were starting to compete with the private industry 
in the allocation of government scientific budgets. 
However, over the years, it is true that the state was deeply involved with the 
industry. Through the public research organisation rather than with any existing large 
private organisation, the state was pursuing a growth strategy for the information 
industry which is of economic significance to legitimate the political system of 
sovereign rules. In examining the distribution and responsibilities between different 
levels of state authorities, certain aspects of the KMT state machinery were particularly 
important to the way in which state and PC firms interact. Amongst these institutions, 
the "Industrial Technology and Research Institute" (ITRI) and "Institute for 
Information Industry" (111) are important to be worth singling out for discussions 
because of their specific functions. 
Industrial Technology and Research Institute (ITRI) 
The dominant feature of small and medium-size enterprises in Taiwan's industry 
has limited industry's R&D capacity. For example, advanced semiconductors require an 
initial investment of at least US$100 million (Bello and Rosenfeld, 1990: 271). Over 
the 1970s and 1980s the government intensified its efforts to widen an R&D capacity 
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for the new growth sectors. During the 1980s, about 46 to 63 per cent of total R&D 
spending was undertaken by the government (36 to 47 per cent by government 
agencies, 9 to 18 per cent by public enterprises), 33 to 52 per cent by private 
enterprises, and less than 1 per cent by the foreign sector (Table 10.2). 
Table 10.2 R&D expenditure by types of organisation, 1981-1991 
Period Total 
Expenditures 
(NT$ I m) 
R&D 
Expenditurest 
GNP (%) 
Government 
M 
Public 
Enterprises 
M 
Private 
Enterprises 
() 
Private 
Foundations 
M 
Foreign 
Enterprises 
M 
1981 16,414 0.93 36.6 16.1 41.9 5.2 0.2 
1982 1 16,864 0.89 43.1 15.1 38.4 3.0 0.4 
1983 19,200 0.91 44.0 16.3 36.8 2.8 0.1 
1984 22,444 0.95 47.4 15.9 34.5 1.4 0.9 
1985 25,397 1.01 45.5 18.0 33.7 1.7 1.1 
1986 28,702 0.98 42.1 18.0 38.7 0.7 0.5 
1987 36,780 1.12 36.0 14.8 47.6 1.0 0.6 
1988 43,839 1.22 44.5 12.0 42.0 1.2 0.3 
1989 54,789 1.38 35.8 11.9 49.8 2.0 0.5 
1990 71,548 1.65 36.4 9.4 52.8 1.2 0.2 
1991 81,765 1 1.38 1 43.0 1 9.1 45.5 0.9 1 1.5 
Source: National Science Council (various years) Indicators of Science and Technology, 
Republic of China. Taipei. 
A landmark is the establishment of the Industrial Technology Research Institute 
(ITRI) in 1973. By 1992, ITRI had a revenue of NT$11.89 billion (of which 8.27 
billion was from government projects while 3.62 billion was from private contracts) 
and a staff of over 5,000, of which 70 per cent were engineers and scientists4. The 
Industrial Technology and Research Institute (ITRI), which is the largest public R&D 
organisation on the island, plays a critical role in terms of research and development in 
information technology. 
4Tbe data of this section were adapted from the annual report of 1992 of the institution and the 
organisation's pamphlet of introduction. I also draw on interviews with senior managers of the 
institution. 
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Within ITRI are several specialised institutes; the key one in relation to the 
information industry is the Electronics Research and Service Organisation (ERSO) 
and after 1990, its newly created subsidiary - Computer and Communication Research 
Laboratory (CCL)5. By 1992 CCL had a staff of 965 and a budget of about US$61.8 
million (of which 38.8 million was from MOEA projects whereas 23 million was from 
business projects). ERSO/CCL operates its own integrated circuit facility and owns a 
related subsidiary at the HSIP, where foreign and domestic high-technology firms 
operate in close proximity to ITRI laboratories. Several of the critical innovations that 
had spearheaded the emergence of Taiwan's integrated circuit industry had come from 
within the ERSO/CCL laboratory. 
In practice, ERSO/CCL assembles groups of interested companies for 
collective R&D, with the government throwing in a huge chunk of the project funding. 
Currently the government funds almost half of the electronics R&D in Taiwan. ERSO 
also supplied financing to launch chip manufacturers, like the United Microelectronic 
Corporation (UMC), Taiwan's first manufacturer of integrated circuits with a 45 per 
cent equity share held by five private local firms (Wade, 1990: 104). UMC is Taiwan's 
largest semiconductor firni which is also starting to develop microprocessors. In 1993, 
it launched its equivalent of the Intel's 486 microprocessor, currently the fastest chip 
available to PC firms (Flannery, April 1993). 
Although almost all microcomputer firms are privately owned, ERSO/CCL was 
able to take a leading role with identifying particular items on Taiwan's own 
production frontier (Hou and Gee, 1993: 397-8). In particular, ERSO/CCL was given 
responsibility for guiding the development of core technologies and new products, and 
5ERSO was restructured in July 1990 upon the creation of the CCL in ITRI. The development 
of computer and telecommunications technology originally conducted under ERSO was 
assigned to CCL. ERSO laboratories now focus exclusively on the development of key 
electronic components and related subsystems. 
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for training microelectronics/computer engineers, some of whom would then move to 
industry. With responsibility to recruit a foreign partner to help develop and 
commercialise the technology, ERSO stands between the domestic information firms 
and the rest of the world for the purpose of facilitating the transfer and assimilation of 
advanced technologies. Often it licenses foreign technologies itself and then sub- 
licenses to firms, thus eliminating price-raising competition between firms for the same 
technology. Generally, it does not seek immediately to license a technology it wants; it 
buys items embodying the technology, reverse engineers them to see how they work, 
and then identifies precisely which technologies it needs to license and which it does 
not. 
The institution also acts as a consultant, and has, on many occasions, set up 
strategic consortia with local companies. In the case of PCs, the co-operation between 
ERSO/CCL and local firms includes the project of PC/XT, PC/AT, 386/AT, 486/At 
and the recent notebook development alliance. In the early 1980s, the coalition 
between ERSO/CCL and local firms operated well since the industry was in its infancy 
and only a few firms joined the alliances. But the recent joint-venture of notebook 
development, for which CCL combined 46 local firms to take part, was a failure. In 
contrast to the early case of PC-400, in which ERSO successfully helped the industry 
to transfer its technological capacity from manufacturing POXT to PC/AT, computer 
firms complained of the incompetence of CCL which allowed smaller companies to 
shirk on R&D, and thereby undercut the competition of notebook in the global market. 
Institutefor Information Industry (111)6 
Even though ERSO has also been active in the software sector, the lead has 
been taken by the publicly-owned Institute for Information industry. Founded in July 
6The data on this section were provided by III. I also draw on interviews with some senior 
managers of III. 
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1979 under the supervision of MOEA, the Institute for Information Industry (III) was 
jointly supported by the state, academic institutions and private companies. There are 
42 members on the Board of Trustees, 6 from the government, 7 from the academic 
community and 29 from the private sector. By the end of March 1992, the III had a 
staff of 894. Two-thirds of them were IT professionals with expertise in software 
systems and a legal staff with research and consultancy on intellectual property rights. 
At its foundation, the III was a non-profit organisation and its main mission 
was software development, including providing advice and guidance to state and 
private organisations. It assisted the overall planning of large-scale information 
systems, introduced and developed advanced technologies, nurtured information 
personnel, collected and analysed market information, and helped the government draft 
the short-, medium-, and long-term development plans for the information industry. In 
addition, under the sponsorship of the MOEA and in co-operation with various trade 
associations, it has held an annual Information Month (Formerly, Information Week). 
The event travels to Taiwan's major cities and since 1990, the show has been attended 
by over 6,970,000 people. 
However, as the information industry became established with more various 
interest groups in it, the role of III has changed. Today, with a government budget of 
NT$688 million (Commercial Times, 3 May 1993: 14), the III is still state-sponsored, 
with a charter to formulate long-term strategies for the development of Taiwan's 
information industry, but it has evolved into a profit-making public enterprise. It takes 
up nearly every major software project in the public sector instead of channelling 
demand to the private sector. The information companies have begun to criticise the 
III, complaining it is a "coach cum player" who competes with them from a position of 
favour7. Clearly, III's competence is signalled by its state-sponsored status when 
compared with other small and medium software firms in winning the large-scale, in- 
71nterviews with senior managers of PC companies and trade associations. 
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house projects. Largely due to the high failure rates of business organisation, the firms 
which have to make the purchasing decisions of software-engineering were willing to 
turn to the largest and most reliable supplier, namely, 1118. One notable example was 
the computerisation of the ticket-selling system of Taipei Railway Station. Even in this, 
the IIII's efforts to assist firms in dealing with overseas legal battles are still influential. 
81nterviews with CEO of MIC, Ill. 
2-10 
Appendix 6: Nation al- Champion Branding 
The following two advertisements, among others, have frequently appeared in 
Time, Newsweek and other US, European and Japanese niagazincs since 1993. Just as 
the cases of Acer and Kennex show, the distribution of state reSOLII'Ces can be dit'I'crent 
to individual firms, hence verifying the possibility of micro-corporatisn) Ill Talwan's 
case. 
Made in WaE Strcct, faiwan 
Ar'' (. 
-A kDo" 
ein Faiwan. 
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Appendix 7: Operationalisation of the Key Conceptual Categories of Analysis 
This list includes key conceptual categories which are employed to construct 
my tripartite structural theory of strategy by reference to which I explain why firms 
made their strategic choices differently. It is intended only to summarise these 
categories, not to elucidate them further. 
Social structure Rules and resources, implicated in the institutional ised 
patterns which refer to the ways in how people behave 
and to the relationships in which they stand with one 
another (Giddens, 1984: 17; 1989: 19) 
Policy style a type of social structure, referring to the ways in which 
state institutions function in the process of economic 
development and to the relationships between state and 
business (cf. Richardson et al, 1982: 12-4; Whitley, 
1992a: 119-65; Kenis, 1992; Waarden, 1992) 
Business recipe a type of social structure, referring to the ways in which 
firms function as economic actors, and to the 
relationships both between firms in the nation state and 
between owners, managers and workers within the 
organisations (Whitley, 1992a, e) 
Technology paradigm a type of social structure, referring to the ways in which 
industrial operators behave in the industry and to the 
dominant exchange relationships (cf. Dosi, 1982,1984; 
Jones and Womack, 1986) 
Industry system The patterning of the three social structures - policy 
style, business recipe and technology paradigm - which 
constitutes firms' attendant social environment 
0. 
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Corporate Identities Firms' structural links within their attendant industry 
system that not only provide them with access to a 
plurality of social resources empowering their actions 
but also connect them to a plurality of social rules 
governing or constraining their actions. 
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